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Resumo
Mecanismos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es foram concebidos com o intuito de facilitar o ge-
renciamento da complexidade de sistemas de software tolerantes a falhas. Eles promovem
uma separac¸a˜o textual expl´ıcita entre o co´digo normal e o co´digo que lida com situac¸o˜es
anormais, a fim de dar suporte a` construc¸a˜o de programas que sa˜o mais concisos, fa´ceis
de evoluir e confia´veis. Diversas linguagens de programac¸a˜o modernas e a maioria dos
modelos de componentes implementam mecanismos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es.
Apesar de seus muitos benef´ıcios, tratamento de excec¸o˜es pode ser a fonte de diversas
falhas de projeto se usado de maneira indisciplinada. Estudos recentes mostram que
desenvolvedores de sistemas de grande escala baseados em infra-estruturas de componentes
teˆm ha´bitos, no tocante ao uso de tratamento de excec¸o˜es, que tornam suas aplicac¸o˜es
vulnera´veis a falhas e dif´ıceis de se manter. Componentes de software criam novos desafios
com os quais mecanismos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es tradicionais na˜o lidam, o que aumenta
a probabilidade de que problemas ocorram. Alguns exemplos sa˜o indisponibilidade de
co´digo fonte e incompatibilidades arquiteturais.
Neste trabalho propomos duas te´cnicas complementares centradas em tratamento de
excec¸o˜es para a construc¸a˜o de sistemas tolerantes a falhas baseados em componentes.
Ambas teˆm eˆnfase na estrutura do sistema como um meio para se reduzir o impacto de
mecanismos de toleraˆncia a falhas em sua complexidade total e o nu´mero de falhas de
projeto decorrentes dessa complexidade. A primeira e´ uma abordagem para o projeto
arquitetural dos mecanismos de recuperac¸a˜o de erros de um sistema. Ela trata do pro-
blema de verificar se uma arquitetura de software satisfaz certas propriedades relativas
ao fluxo de excec¸o˜es entre componentes arquiteturais, por exemplo, se todas as excec¸o˜es
lanc¸adas no n´ıvel arquitetural sa˜o tratadas. A abordagem proposta lanc¸a ma˜o de diversas
ferramentas existentes para automatizar ao ma´ximo esse processo. A segunda consiste em
aplicar programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos (AOP) a fim de melhorar a modularizac¸a˜o de
co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Conduzimos um estudo aprofundado com o objetivo
de melhorar o entendimento geral sobre o efeitos de AOP no co´digo de tratamento de
excec¸o˜es e identificar as situac¸o˜es onde seu uso e´ vantajoso e onde na˜o e´.
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Abstract
Exception handling mechanisms were conceived as a means to help managing the com-
plexity of fault-tolerant software. They promote an explicit textual separation between
normal code and the code that deals with abnormal situations, in order to support the
construction of programs that are more concise, evolvable, and reliable. Several mains-
tream programming languages and most of the existing component models implement
exception handling mechanisms.
In spite of its many benefits, exception handling can be a source of many design faults
if used in an ad hoc fashion. Recent studies show that developers of large-scale software
systems based on component infrastructures have habits concerning the use of exception
handling that make applications vulnerable to faults and hard to maintain. Software
components introduce new challenges which are not addressed by traditional exception
handling mechanisms and increase the chances of problems occurring. Examples include
unavailability of source code and architectural mismatches.
In this work, we propose two complementary techniques centered on exception han-
dling for the construction of fault-tolerant component-based systems. Both of them
emphasize system structure as a means to reduce the impact of fault tolerance mechanisms
on the overall complexity of a software system and the number of design faults that stem
from complexity. The first one is an approach for the architectural design of a system’s
error handling capabilities. It addresses the problem of verifying whether a software ar-
chitecture satisfies certain properties of interest pertaining the flow of exceptions between
architectural components, e.g., if all the exceptions signaled at the architectural level
are eventually handled. The proposed approach is based on a set of existing tools that
automate this process as much as possible. The second one consists in applying aspect-
oriented programming (AOP) to better modularize exception handling code. We have
conducted a through study aimed at improving our understanding of the effects of AOP
on exception handling code and identifying the situations where its use is advantageous
and the ones where it is not.
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Cap´ıtulo 1
Introduc¸a˜o
Este cap´ıtulo contextualiza a tese, introduz o problema que ela visa tratar, descreve
sucintamente as soluc¸o˜es adotadas e apresenta um resumo das contribuic¸o˜es. O cap´ıtulo
tambe´m explica alguns dos conceitos que sera˜o usados ao longo de toda a tese e descreve
sua organizac¸a˜o.
1.1 Contexto
Nos u´ltimos anos, o desenvolvimento baseado em componentes [170] (DBC) vem sendo
usado na construc¸a˜o de grandes sistemas de software. Essa tendeˆncia e´ embasada na
ide´ia de que componentes reusa´veis que proveˆm funcionalidades prontas para usar po-
dem encurtar tempos de desenvolvimento e tempo para comercializar1 [181]. O princ´ıpio
fundamental do DBC e´ que sistemas de software devem ser desenvolvidos a partir da inte-
grac¸a˜o de componentes pre´-existentes, normalmente constru´ıdos por va´rias organizac¸o˜es.
Algumas das principais vantagens do uso componentes de software sa˜o (i) facilidade de
substituic¸a˜o e extensa˜o [41, 9], (ii) reuso [170] e (iii) aumento na previsibilidade do sis-
tema [9].
Uma implicac¸a˜o direta do DBC no processo de desenvolvimento de software e´ a divisa˜o
de responsabilidades entre a construc¸a˜o de componentes e sua integrac¸a˜o para formar siste-
mas [170]. Por um lado, construtores de componentes de software reusa´veis na˜o teˆm
conhecimento sobre os diferentes contextos nos quais componentes sera˜o implantados2
(design for reuse [104]). Por outro lado, esses componentes sa˜o providos normalmente
como ‘caixas pretas’. Isto e´, os projetos internos desses componentes e seus co´digos-
fonte muitas vezes na˜o esta˜o dispon´ıveis para integradores de sistemas (design with
1Do ingleˆs: time-to-market.
2Do ingleˆs: deployed.
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reuse [104]). Estes u´ltimos teˆm conhecimento apenas sobre o que e´ especificado nas in-
terfaces dos componentes, normalmente os servic¸os que o componente oferece (interfaces
providas) e aqueles dos quais depende (interfaces requeridas). Para tornar via´vel a inte-
grac¸a˜o de componentes desenvolvidos independentemente, o processo de desenvolvimento
empregado deve ter forte eˆnfase na arquitetura de software do sistema. De acordo com
Clements e Northrop [48], arquitetura de software e´ a estrutura dos componentes de um
programa/sistema, suas relac¸o˜es e princ´ıpios e diretrizes que controlam seu projeto e
evoluc¸a˜o ao longo do tempo.
Nos u´ltimos anos, o uso de componentes de software, que ate´ enta˜o era restrito a`
construc¸a˜o de sistemas de informac¸a˜o, com requisitos moderados de confiabilidade3, vem
se expandindo na direc¸a˜o de a´reas de aplicac¸a˜o nas quais o prec¸o de uma falha pode
ser alt´ıssimo, por exemplo, sistemas embarcados executados em avio˜es [124]. De acordo
com o Departamento de Transportes dos EUA, o reuso de componentes de software em
aplicac¸o˜es com essa caracter´ıstica se deve a questo˜es econoˆmicas e ao avanc¸o que o DBC
vem experimentando nos u´ltimos anos [176]. Na construc¸a˜o de sistemas de software com
um alto grau de confiabilidade, uma consequeˆncia da dicotomia construc¸a˜o/integrac¸a˜o e´
o requisito de que abordagens para o desenvolvimento de tais aplicac¸o˜es garantam essa
confiabilidade em dois n´ıveis: (i) para cada componente individual do sistema, de modo
que seja capaz de prover servic¸os de acordo com sua especificac¸a˜o; e (ii) na integrac¸a˜o
de um conjunto de componentes, de modo que as interac¸o˜es entre esses componentes na˜o
produzam resultados inesperados.
Sistemas cujos defeitos podem ameac¸ar vidas humanas ou resultar em grandes perdas
financeiras normalmente sa˜o feitos tolerantes a falhas [5], ou seja, capazes de prover o
seu servic¸o, ainda que apenas parcialmente, na presenc¸a de falhas. Sistemas tolerantes a
falhas sa˜o constru´ıdos partindo-se do pressuposto de que na˜o e´ poss´ıvel desenvolver um
sistema que sempre se comporte de acordo com sua especificac¸a˜o [5, 146]. Portanto, esses
sistemas apresentam mecanismos para detectar erros em seus estados e se recuperar desses
erros. Em um sistema tolerante a falhas, quando um erro e´ detectado, e´ preciso levar o
estado do sistema para um estado consistente e bem-definido para que o sistema possa
continuar sua execuc¸a˜o normal.
Te´cnicas de toleraˆncia a falhas surgem como candidatas naturais para auxiliar no
desenvolvimento de sistemas confia´veis baseados em componentes. Primeiro, porque a
visibilidade de caixa preta de alguns componentes de software torna dif´ıcil garantir que
esses componentes apresentam o grau esperado de confiabilidade, apesar de alguns esforc¸os
recentes visando reverter essa situac¸a˜o para certos tipos de componente [105]. Segundo,
porque mesmo quando essas garantias sa˜o fornecidas, normalmente na˜o e´ poss´ıvel ter
certeza que as interac¸o˜es entre componentes produzidos por diferentes fontes sempre pro-
3Do ingleˆs: dependability.
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duzira˜o o resultado esperado. Finalmente, ainda que seja poss´ıvel verificar de maneira
automa´tica que interac¸o˜es entre componentes de um sistema sempre seguem um proto-
colo bem definido, e´ necessa´rio garantir que o sistema na˜o falha de maneira catastro´fica
quando um problema ocorre devido a um elemento externo, por exemplo, um canal de
comunicac¸a˜o falho ou um dispositivo mecaˆnico defeituoso com o qual o sistema interage.
Tendo esses fatores em vista, pode-se afirmar que te´cnicas de toleraˆncia a falhas comple-
mentam outras te´cnicas para tornar confia´vel um sistema baseado em componentes, por
exemplo, verificac¸a˜o automa´tica [6] e testes [123, 183].
Esta tese foca no desenvolvimento de sistemas tolerantes a falhas baseados em compo-
nentes. Nossa abordagem consiste em combinar avanc¸os recentes nas a´reas de arquitetura
de software [159] e desenvolvimento de software orientado a aspectos [106] com te´cnicas
conhecidas de estruturac¸a˜o de sistemas tolerantes a falhas, mais especificamente, trata-
mento de excec¸o˜es [52]. As Sec¸o˜es 1.1.1-1.1.4 descrevem alguns dos conceitos necessa´rios
para o entendimento deste trabalho. Nas sec¸o˜es seguintes sa˜o apresentados o problema que
a tese se propo˜e a tratar (Sec¸a˜o 1.2), as soluc¸o˜es propostas para esse problema (Sec¸o˜es 1.3
e 1.4), uma lista de contribuic¸o˜es (Sec¸a˜o 1.5) e a organizac¸a˜o da tese (Sec¸a˜o 1.6).
1.1.1 Desenvolvimento Baseado em Componentes
A ide´ia de construir sistemas a partir de partes pre´-fabricadas e´ antiga na indu´stria.
Ha´ de´cadas que carros, computadores e ate´ mesmo casas sa˜o constru´ıdos dessa maneira.
O conceito de produc¸a˜o de software a partir de componentes pre´-fabricados e´ relativa-
mente recente, pore´m. Foi mencionado pela primeira vez por Mcllroy[126] em 1969. Em
1996 foi realizado o First International Workshop on Component-Oriented Programming
(WCOP’96), a partir do qual o interesse pelas te´cnicas baseadas em componentes vem
crescendo e se consolidando, seja sob o t´ıtulo de desenvolvimento baseado em compo-
nentes (DBC), ou de engenharia de software baseada em componentes (ESBC). Alguns
autores afirmam que o reuso de componentes de software tem potencial para reduzir dras-
ticamente os custos e o tempo necessa´rios para construir uma aplicac¸a˜o [127]. Ha´ diversas
definic¸o˜es para ESBC e DBC, como por exemplo:
“In CBD, the developer’s task is to assemble a (large) software system from
(a large number of) reusable components, and perhaps a comparatively small
amount of code written for the particular application”. [149].
“Component-based software engineering is concerned with the rapid assembly
of systems from components where: (i) components and frameworks have certi-
fied properties; and (ii) these certified properties provide the basis for predicting
the properties of systems built from components.”[9].
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Szyperski afirma que um componente, no contexto do desenvolvimento baseado em
componentes, deve [169]: (i) presumir que faz parte de uma arquitetura; (ii) apresen-
tar funcionalidades atrave´s de interfaces providas; (iii) explicitar suas dependeˆncias pa-
rame´tricas atrave´s de interfaces requeridas; (iv) ter dependeˆncias esta´ticas; (v) ser base-
ado em alguma plataforma de componentes espec´ıfica; (vi) requerer outros componentes;
e (vii) requerer contexto por-instaˆncia. O autor afirma ainda que, para tornar poss´ıvel a
composic¸a˜o de componentes, todas as dependeˆncias e suposic¸o˜es importantes da imple-
mentac¸a˜o de um componente precisam ser capturadas. Essa e´ uma afirmac¸a˜o importante,
ja´ que vai contra a tendeˆncia dos modelos de componentes atuais de enfatizar apenas as
funcionalidades que componentes proveˆm.
Apesar das diferenc¸as entre as definic¸o˜es, ha´ um consenso de que no DBC a eˆnfase
esta´ na integrac¸a˜o entre componentes e na˜o apenas em sua construc¸a˜o. Espera-se que essa
mudanc¸a no foco do processo de desenvolvimento torne poss´ıvel a construc¸a˜o de sistemas
melhores, com maior velocidade, maior grau de reuso e gastando-se menos dinheiro.
Para tornar via´vel a integrac¸a˜o entre componentes desenvolvidos independentemente,
foram criados os modelos de componentes. Um modelo de componentes especifica padro˜es
que devem ser impostos sobre desenvolvedores de componentes. A conformidade com um
modelo de componentes e´ uma das caracter´ısticas que diferencia componentes de outras
formas de modularizac¸a˜o [9]. Para auxiliar no desenvolvimento baseado em modelos de
componentes, foram desenvolvidos diversos frameworks de componentes, implementac¸o˜es
de servic¸os que da˜o suporte a um determinado modelo de componentes e garantem que
suas restric¸o˜es na˜o sa˜o violadas. Atualmente, os modelos de componentes mais popu-
lares sa˜o Enterprise Javabeans [168], da Sun, DCOM [131], da Microsoft, e o CORBA
Component Model [139], da OMG.
1.1.2 Toleraˆncia a Falhas e Tratamento de Excec¸o˜es
Sistemas de hardware normalmente incluem mecanismos para detecc¸a˜o e correc¸a˜o de fa-
lhas. Alguns exemplos desses mecanismos sa˜o o uso de co´digos de redundaˆncia c´ıclica
(CRC) e de replicac¸a˜o de dispositivos (como em discos r´ıgidos RAID). Para aplicac¸o˜es
que envolvem risco para vidas humanas (como aplicac¸o˜es me´dicas) ou risco de grandes
perdas financeiras (como na pesquisa espacial), chamadas cr´ıticas, e´ essencial garantir
que o servic¸o pelo qual a aplicac¸a˜o e´ responsa´vel continuara´ sendo provido, ainda que
apenas parcialmente, em situac¸o˜es nas quais falhas ocorram. Mesmo para sistemas que
na˜o sa˜o de missa˜o cr´ıtica, diversas razo˜es motivam o uso de mecanismos que os tornem
capazes de prover servic¸o na presenc¸a de falhas[8]. Definimos um sistema como tolerante
a falhas se este e´ capaz de prover servic¸o de acordo com sua especificac¸a˜o, mesmo na
presenc¸a de falhas[5].
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Embora os termos “falha”, “erro” e “defeito” sejam usados no dia-a-dia como sinoˆnimos,
na terminologia de toleraˆncia a falhas essas palavras teˆm significados distintos e bem defi-
nidos. Um defeito ocorre quando um sistema deixa de prover um determinado servic¸o ou
o faz em desacordo com a sua especificac¸a˜o. Defeitos sa˜o sempre observa´veis externamente
ao sistema. Um defeito e´ causado por um erro; uma inconsisteˆncia no estado interno do
sistema. A ocorreˆncia de erros pode ter como consequ¨eˆncia a ocorreˆncia de defeitos. Uma
falha corresponde a um evento ou sequ¨eˆncia de eventos que propicia o surgimento de um
erro num componente ou no sistema como um todo. Um erro e´ a manifestac¸a˜o de uma
falha no sistema.
De acordo com Anderson e Lee [5], a toleraˆncia a falhas se divide em quatro fases
que devem formar a base do projeto e implementac¸a˜o de qualquer sistema tolerante a
falhas. Essas fases sa˜o (i) detecc¸a˜o de erros, (ii) confinamento e avaliac¸a˜o de danos, (iii)
recuperac¸a˜o de erros e (iv) tratamento de falhas e continuac¸a˜o de servic¸o.
Detecc¸a˜o de erros. Para que um sistema seja capaz de tolerar uma falha, seus efeitos
precisam primeiro ser detectados. Uma falha se manifesta em um sistema atrave´s de um
erro, uma inconsisteˆncia em seu estado interno. Embora falhas na˜o possam ser detectadas
diretamente [5], erros podem. Consequentemente todo sistema tolerante a falhas deve ser
capaz de detectar erros que possam vir a se manifestar em seu estado. Um exemplo de
te´cnica bastante popular para detectar erros e´ o uso de invariantes, predicados que devem
ser verdade durante toda a execuc¸a˜o do sistema. Se, em algum momento da execuc¸a˜o do
sistema, um desses invariantes na˜o for satisfeito, um erro ocorreu.
Confinamento e avaliac¸a˜o de danos. Depois que um erro e´ detectado, e´ poss´ıvel que
ja´ tenha afetado uma parte bem maior do estado do sistema do que se suspeita, devido ao
intervalo de tempo entre o momento em que o erro ocorre e o momento em que e´ detectado.
Consequentemente, quando um erro e´ detectado, e´ necessa´rio avaliar a extensa˜o dos danos
causados. Sistemas tolerantes a falhas devem ser desenvolvidos de modo que erros possam
ser confinados a regio˜es bem-definidas, quando ocorrem, facilitando assim a avaliac¸a˜o de
danos.
Recuperac¸a˜o de erros. Quando um erro e´ detectado, e´ preciso levar o estado do
sistema para um estado consistente e bem-definido para que o sistema possa continuar
sua execuc¸a˜o normal. Te´cnicas para recuperac¸a˜o de erros se dividem em duas grandes
categorias que diferem na abrangeˆncia e na maneira como corrigem o estado do sistema:
recuperac¸a˜o de erros por retrocesso4 e recuperac¸a˜o de erros por avanc¸o 5.
4Do ingleˆs: backward error recovery.
5Do ingleˆs: forward error recovery.
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Te´cnicas de recuperac¸a˜o de erros por retrocesso restauram o estado do sistema para
algum estado anterior na esperanc¸a de que este seja consistente. Essas te´cnicas sa˜o [5]:
independentes de avaliac¸a˜o de danos; (ii) capazes de prover recuperac¸a˜o de falhas ar-
bitra´rias; (iii) um conceito geral, aplica´vel a todos os sistemas; e (iv) facilmente providas
como um mecanismo. Mecanismos de pontos de recuperac¸a˜o6 sa˜o um exemplo t´ıpico de
te´cnica de recuperac¸a˜o por retrocesso.
Transac¸o˜es atoˆmicas sa˜o um exemplo bastante popular de te´cnica de recuperac¸a˜o de
erros por retrocesso.
Te´cnicas de recuperac¸a˜o de erros por avanc¸o partem do princ´ıpio de que, quando um
erro e´ detectado, o sistema deve ser levado para um novo estado garantidamente consis-
tente. Recuperac¸a˜o de erros por avanc¸o permite que pol´ıticas de recuperac¸a˜o eficientes
e altamente especializadas sejam implementadas. Entretanto, essas te´cnicas requerem
uma quantidade maior de informac¸a˜o contextual para que possam ser empregadas. A
recuperac¸a˜o de erros por avanc¸o e´ [5]: (i) dependente da avaliac¸a˜o de danos; (ii) ina-
propriada para recuperar o sistema de falhas na˜o-antecipadas; (iii) projetada especifica-
mente para um sistema particular; e (iv) imposs´ıvel de implementar como um mecanismo
gene´rico. Recuperac¸a˜o de erros por avanc¸o normalmente e´ introduzida em sistemas de
software atrave´s de tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Esta te´cnica e´ discutida com mais detalhes
na Sec¸a˜o 1.1.2.
Tratamento de falhas e continuac¸a˜o de servic¸o. Em algumas situac¸o˜es, levar o
sistema para um estado consistente na˜o e´ o suficiente para garantir que este funcionara´ de
forma correta. Por exemplo, se um erro ocorre em decorreˆncia de uma falha de projeto,
corrigir o erro na˜o resolve o problema. Como a falha que o produziu e´ permanente, esse
erro voltara´ sistematicamente a acontecer. Neste caso, a u´nica maneira de garantir que o
sistema funcionara´ corretamente e´ remover a pro´pria falha. Um problema no tratamento
de falhas e´ que a detecc¸a˜o de um erro na˜o necessariamente serve para identificar a falha.
Conforme dito anteriormente, um erro pode ter um efeito na˜o-local sobre o estado do
sistema e relaciona´-lo com a ocorreˆncia de uma falha pode ser muito dif´ıcil. Partindo
do pressuposto de que a falha foi identificada corretamente, te´cnicas para tratamento de
falhas normalmente se baseiam na ide´ia de substituir o componente problema´tico por uma
variante correta.
Tratamento de Excec¸o˜es
Quando um programa apresenta desvios com relac¸a˜o a` sua especificac¸a˜o devido a uma
falha, e´ poss´ıvel que erros sejam introduzidos em seu estado. Quando um erro e´ detec-
6Do ingleˆs: checkpointing.
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tado, e´ necessa´rio sinalizar sua ocorreˆncia para que o sistema, caso inclua mecanismos
de toleraˆncia a falhas, seja capaz de corrigi-lo. Como espera-se que essa situac¸a˜o ocorra
raramente, o sinal que indica a ocorreˆncia de um erro e´ tradicionalmente chamado de
excec¸a˜o. Para que o sistema possa continuar a se comportar de acordo com sua es-
pecificac¸a˜o, mediante o lanc¸amento de uma excec¸a˜o, e´ necessa´rio trata´-la. A parte de
um sistema que implementa seu comportamento na auseˆncia de falhas, conforme definido
por sua especificac¸a˜o, e´ chamada de comportamento normal. Similarmente, a parte
do sistema que implementa seus mecanismos de recuperac¸a˜o de erros, responsa´veis por
torna´-lo tolerante a falhas, e´ chamada de comportamento excepcional, ou anormal.
Tratamento de excec¸o˜es [80] e´ uma te´cnica para estruturar o comportamento excepcional
de um programa, de modo que erros possam ser detectados, sinalizados e tratados.
Diversas linguagens de programac¸a˜o populares da˜o suporte a tratamento de excec¸o˜es,
atrave´s da definic¸a˜o e implementac¸a˜o de sistemas de tratamento excec¸o˜es7. Essas lin-
guagens permitem que desenvolvedores definam excec¸o˜es e os tratadores correspondentes.
Quando um erro e´ detectado, uma excec¸a˜o e´ sinalizada e o tratador adequado e´ procu-
rado e acionado de maneira automa´tica. O conjunto de tratadores de excec¸o˜es de um
programa define a seu comportamento excepcional. Se uma mesma excec¸a˜o pode ser si-
nalizada em diferentes partes de um programa, e´ poss´ıvel que tratadores diferentes sejam
executados. A escolha do tratador que sera´ acionado depende do contexto de tratamento
de excec¸o˜es em que a excec¸a˜o e´ lanc¸ada. Um contexto de tratamento e´ uma regia˜o de
um programa dentro da qual as mesmas excec¸o˜es sa˜o tratadas da mesma maneira. Cada
contexto tem um conjunto de tratadores associados que sa˜o acionados quando as excec¸o˜es
correspondentes sa˜o sinalizadas. Exemplos t´ıpicos de contextos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es
em linguagens orientadas a objetos sa˜o comandos, blocos de co´digo, me´todos, classes e
objetos.
O conceito de componente tolerante a falhas ideal (CTFI) [5] define um fra-
mework conceitual para estruturar tratamento de excec¸o˜es em sistemas de software. Um
CTFI e´ um componente8 no qual as partes responsa´veis pelo comportamento normal e
pelo comportamento excepcional esta˜o separadas e bem-definidas, dentro da sua estru-
tura interna, permitindo que erros sejam detectados e tratados com maior facilidade. O
objetivo da abordagem de CTFI e´ proporcionar uma forma de estruturar sistemas que
minimize o impacto dos mecanismos de toleraˆncia a falhas em sua complexidade global.
A Figura 1.1 apresenta a estrutura interna de um componente tolerante a falhas ideal
e os tipos de mensagem que ele troca com outros componentes na arquitetura. Ao rece-
ber uma requisic¸a˜o de servic¸o, um CTFI fornece uma resposta normal se a requisic¸a˜o e´
7Do ingleˆs: exception handling systems.
8No sentido mais amplo; um objeto, um subsistema, um componente de software ou ate´ mesmo um
sistema inteiro.
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Figura 1.1: Componente tolerante a falhas ideal.
processada com sucesso. Se a requisic¸a˜o de servic¸o na˜o e´ va´lida, e´ sinalizada uma excec¸a˜o
de interface. Se o servic¸o esta´ dispon´ıvel mas ocorre uma falha durante o processamento
da requisic¸a˜o e o CTFI na˜o e´ capaz de trata´-la internamente, e´ levantada uma excec¸a˜o de
defeito.
1.1.3 Arquitetura de Software
Assim como acontece com o desenvolvimento de software baseado em componentes, na˜o
existe uma definic¸a˜o universalmente aceita para arquitetura de software [11, 143]. Ha´ um
conjunto de caracter´ısticas, pore´m, que e´ mencionado na grande maioria das definic¸o˜es
existentes na literatura. Essas caracter´ısticas sa˜o sumarizadas pela definic¸a˜o adotada por
Clements e Northrop [48]:
“(Software Architecture is) the structure of the components of a program/sys-
tem, their interrelationships and principles and guidelines governing their de-
sign and evolution over time.”
A arquitetura de um sistema de software reflete o conjunto de deciso˜es que devem
ser tomadas primeiro no projeto desse sistema; aquelas que sa˜o mais dif´ıceis de mudar
em etapas posteriores do desenvolvimento. A arquitetura de software envolve a estru-
tura e organizac¸a˜o atrave´s das quais componentes e subsistemas interagem para formar
sistemas e as propriedades de sistemas que podem ser melhor projetadas e analisadas
sistemicamente [110]. E´ largamente aceito que a arquitetura de um sistema de software
tem um forte impacto em sua capacidade de satisfazer seus requisitos de qualidade, como
seguranc¸a, disponibilidade e desempenho, entre outros [11, 47, 165].
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Uma arquitetura de software normalmente e´ representada e documentada atrave´s de
va´rias perspectivas, ou viso˜es [109]. Cada visa˜o descreve um aspecto diferente da ar-
quitetura do sistema, similarmente aos diversos tipos de plantas que sa˜o usados para
representar os va´rios aspectos de uma construc¸a˜o. Alguns exemplos cla´ssicos [109] de
viso˜es arquiteturais sa˜o: (i) a visa˜o de processos, que lida com concorreˆncia e distribuic¸a˜o
e representa um conjunto de unidades de computac¸a˜o, potencialmente distribu´ıdas, que
se comunicam atrave´s de um barramento ou uma rede; e (ii) a visa˜o lo´gica, que decompo˜e
o sistema em um conjunto de abstrac¸o˜es e indica os servic¸os que essas abstrac¸o˜es proveˆm
e requerem e como elas se relacionam. Uma visa˜o arquitetural mostra como a arquitetura
do sistema atinge um determinado atributo de qualidade [11]. Por exemplo, a visa˜o de
camadas indica o qua˜o porta´vel um sistema e´, enquanto a visa˜o de implantac¸a˜o pode ser
usada para se analisar a performance e a confiabilidade do sistema [46].
As linguagens para descric¸a˜o de arquiteturas, ou ADLs9, surgiram devido a` necessi-
dade de representar arquiteturas de uma maneira mais formal. ACME[76] e Wright[4]
sa˜o exemplos de ADLs. Embora exista uma diversidade considera´vel no que concerne a`s
capacidades das diferentes ADLs existentes, todas compartilham de uma mesma base con-
ceitual da qual os principais elementos sa˜o componentes, conectores e configurac¸o˜es [128].
Componentes sa˜o elementos arquiteturais responsa´veis por realizar computac¸o˜es. Como e´
esperado que as interac¸o˜es entre componentes sejam complexas, essas interac¸o˜es sa˜o mate-
rializadas explicitamente atrave´s de conectores. Um conjunto de componentes interligados
atrave´s de conectores caracteriza uma configurac¸a˜o.
A arquitetura de sistemas de software na˜o-triviais normalmente envolvem diversos
estilos arquiteturais. Um estilo arquitetural define um vocabula´rio de tipos de elementos
de projeto que fazem parte de uma famı´lia de arquiteturas e as regras pelas quais esse
elementos sa˜o compostos [76]. Alguns exemplos sa˜o o baseado em camadas, cliente-
servidor e pipes and filters [158].
1.1.4 Programac¸a˜o Orientada a Aspectos
A programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos (AOP) [106] foi proposta na segunda metade dos
anos 90 como uma maneira de modularizar interesses transversais10, interesses cuja im-
plementac¸a˜o esta´ espalhada em diversas partes do co´digo do sistema, misturada a co´digo
responsa´vel por outros requisitos. Exemplos de tais interesses sa˜o logging e autenticac¸a˜o.
AOP e´ baseada na ide´ia de que sistemas computacionais sa˜o melhor programados se
especificarmos separadamente os seus va´rios interesses e alguma descric¸a˜o de seus relacio-
namentos e usarmos os mecanismos providos por AOP para combina´-los em um programa
9Do ingleˆs: architecture description languages.
10Do ingleˆs: crosscutting concerns.
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coerente [63].
Um elemento importante da programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos e´ a dicotomia entre
linguagem base, ou de componentes, e linguagem de aspectos [40]. Essa dicotomia se
baseia nos seguintes princ´ıpios: (i) sistemas sa˜o decompostos em aspectos e componentes;
(ii) aspectos modularizam interesses crosscutting; (iii) componentes modularizam interes-
ses na˜o-crosscutting; e (iv) aspectos devem ser explicitamente representados a parte de
componentes e outros aspectos. Alguns exemplos de linguagens orientadas a aspectos
sa˜o AspectJ [114] e Eos [144]. A primeira usa Java como linguagem base, enquanto a
segunda usa C#. Programas nas linguagens base e de aspectos sa˜o combinados atrave´s
de um processo chamado weaving. A ferramenta responsa´vel por essa tarefa e´ chamada
de weaver.
As duas propriedades fundamentais que tornam AOP ta˜o u´til e diferenciam esse pa-
radigma de todos os que vieram antes sa˜o quantificac¸a˜o11 e transpareˆncia12 [67]. Quanti-
ficac¸a˜o e´ a capacidade de escrever comandos unita´rios que sa˜o capazes de afetar diversas
partes de um programa. Quantificac¸a˜o torna poss´ıvel expressar comandos do tipo “nos
programas P, sempre que a condic¸a˜o C for verdadeira, execute a ac¸a˜o A”. Transpareˆncia,
no contexto da programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos, quer dizer que programas escritos na
linguagem base na˜o precisam ser preparados especificamente para serem combinados com
aspectos; podem ser escritos como se aspectos simplesmente na˜o existissem. Alguns au-
tores afirmam que transpareˆncia e´ um termo muito forte e que ha´ benef´ıcios em organizar
programas na linguage base de tal maneira que combina´-los com os aspectos sejam mais
fa´cil [136]. Por isso, muitos autores preferem usar o termo na˜o-invasa˜o13, ao inve´s de
transpareˆncia. E´ importante frisar que, independentemente do termo empregado, e´ fun-
damental a ide´ia de que programas na linguagem base na˜o devem fazer refereˆncia expl´ıcita
a aspectos.
Diversos trabalhos existentes na literatura mostram que AOP e´ u´til para modularizar
va´rios requisitos comuns no desenvolvimento de sistemas de software. Alguns exem-
plos sa˜o distribuic¸a˜o [37, 164], persisteˆncia [114, 164], autenticac¸a˜o [114], tratamento de
excec¸o˜es [24, 117] e implementac¸a˜o de padro˜es de projeto [19, 74, 91]. O impacto da
programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos tanto na academia quanto na indu´stria nos u´ltimos
anos e´ ta˜o grande que a revista Technology Review de janeiro de 2001 incluiu a pro-
gramac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos em uma lista de “dez tecnologias emergentes que mudara˜o
o mundo” [147].
11Do ingleˆs: quantification.
12Do ingleˆs: obliviousness.
13Do ingleˆs: non-invasiveness.
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1.2 Problema
Desde os primo´rdios da computac¸a˜o tolerante a falhas, em geral, e da toleraˆncia a falhas
em sistemas de software, em particular, e´ sabido que a principal causa de falhas de projeto
residuais, erros de programac¸a˜o popularmente conhecidos como bugs, em sistemas de
software e´ a complexidade desses sistemas [146]. Na a´rea de sistemas de software cr´ıticos,
ha´ um consenso de que sistemas mais simples tendem a ser mais seguros14 [116, 94]. O uso
de te´cnicas adequadas de estruturac¸a˜o e´ crucial para a construc¸a˜o de sistemas de software
tolerantes a falhas [146]. Caso contra´rio, a complexidade adicional que mecanismos de
toleraˆncia a falhas introduzem nos sistemas propiciara´ a aparic¸a˜o de um nu´mero ainda
mais acentuado de falhas de projeto.
Mecanismos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es [52, 80] foram concebidos com o intuito de
se gerenciar a complexidade de software tolerante a falhas. Esses mecanismos visam se-
parar o co´digo “normal”, responsa´vel pelas funcionalidades da aplicac¸a˜o, e o co´digo que
torna o sistema tolerante a falhas, a fim de dar suporte a` construc¸a˜o de programas mais
confia´veis, concisos e fa´ceis de evoluir [142]. Tratamento de excec¸o˜es e´ uma te´cnica para
a implementac¸a˜o de recuperac¸a˜o de erros por avanc¸o (Sec¸a˜o 1.1). Consequentemente,
complementa outras abordagens para tornar sistemas mais confia´veis, como transac¸o˜es
atoˆmicas [83]. O uso de tratamento de excec¸o˜es na construc¸a˜o de diversos sistemas de
grande escala e o fato de diversas linguagens de programac¸a˜o orientadas a objetos moder-
nas, como Java [82], Ada [171], C# [95] e C++ [108], e modelos de componentes, como
DCOM [131], CCM [139] e EJB [168], implementarem tratamento de excec¸o˜es atestam
sua importaˆncia para a pra´tica atual do desenvolvimento de software.
Frequentemente, uma parte considera´vel do co´digo de um sistema e´ dedicada a` de-
tecc¸a˜o e ao tratamento de erros. Em 1989, Cristian [52] afirmava que frequentemente essa
parcela do co´digo correspondia a mais de dois terc¸os do co´digo total de uma aplicac¸a˜o.
Um estudo mais recente [182] envolvendo um conjunto de aplicac¸o˜es de co´digo aberto
escritas em Java detectou que entre 1 e 5% dos textos dos programas consistia de tra-
tadores de excec¸o˜es (blocos catch em Java) e ac¸o˜es de limpeza (blocos finally). Em
outro estudo [148] que levou em considerac¸a˜o 5 aplicac¸o˜es de grande escala baseadas (com
centas de milhares ou mesmo milho˜es de linhas de co´digo) na plataforma Java Enterprise
Edition [13], a raza˜o entre o nu´mero de tratadores de excec¸o˜es e o nu´mero de operac¸o˜es
em cada aplicac¸a˜o variou entre 0,058 e 1,79. Em um estudo realizado [24] por mim e
alguns colegas (apresentado no Cap´ıtulo 6) envolvendo quatro aplicac¸o˜es, duas produzi-
das na indu´stria e duas na academia, foi detectado que entre 9,9% e 20,8% das operac¸o˜es
incluem co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es.
Esses nu´meros mostram que tratamento de excec¸o˜es e´ uma te´cnica amplamente di-
14Do ingleˆs: safe.
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fundida no desenvolvimento de aplicac¸o˜es reais. Apesar disso, desenvolvedores costumam
focar no comportamento normal das aplicac¸o˜es e so´ lidar com o co´digo responsa´vel por de-
tectar e tratar erros na etapa de implementac¸a˜o [52, 148], de maneira ad hoc. Essa pra´tica
de projeto e implementac¸a˜o cria uma situac¸a˜o prop´ıcia para o aparecimento de falhas de
projeto. O co´digo responsa´vel por detectar e tratar erros costuma estar espalhado em
diversos mo´dulos de um sistema, misturado ao co´digo responsa´vel pelo comportamento
normal, o que dificulta sua estruturac¸a˜o, entendimento e manutenc¸a˜o [117]. Adicional-
mente, mecanismos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es, quando usados de maneira descuidada,
podem ter um efeito no comportamento do programa similar ao do comando goto [161].
Como consequeˆncia desses fatores, um nu´mero significativo de falhas de projeto em um sis-
tema de software costuma estar localizado no co´digo responsa´vel pelo seu comportamento
excepcional. Exemplos de tais falhas incluem vazamento de recursos [22, 182], excec¸o˜es
ignoradas [125, 148] e fluxo de controle imprevisto (uma excec¸a˜o que na˜o e´ tratada no
local esperado) [150].
Em sistemas baseados em componentes, um fenoˆmeno similar pode ser observado. Ha´
evideˆncia de que desenvolvedores de sistemas baseados na plataforma J2EE [13], um dos
padro˜es da indu´stria para DBC, apresentam ha´bitos de programac¸a˜o, no tocante ao uso
de tratamento de excec¸o˜es, que tornam aplicac¸o˜es vulnera´veis a falhas de projeto e dif´ıceis
de manter [148]. Alguns desses ha´bitos sa˜o tratadores vazios e na˜o liberac¸a˜o de recursos
alocados. A isso soma-se o fato de que sistemas baseados em componentes introduzem
complicac¸o˜es que na˜o existem na construc¸a˜o de sistemas de software “tradicionais”: (1)
em um sistema baseado em componentes, o co´digo fonte de um ou mais componentes
pode na˜o estar dispon´ıvel no momento em que o sistema e´ integrado [181]; (2) mesmo
quando o co´digo de um componente esta´ dispon´ıvel, pode na˜o ser recomenda´vel modi-
fica´-lo sob pena de introduzir falhas de projeto [181]; (3) componentes desenvolvidos por
organizac¸o˜es distintas e integrados em um mesmo sistema podem fazer suposic¸o˜es con-
flitantes sobre as maneiras como falham, quais defeitos decorrem dessas falhas e como a
falha de um componente servidor e´ sinalizada para seus componentes clientes [58] e dessas
suposic¸o˜es resultam incompatibilidades arquiteturais15; e (4) suposic¸o˜es imprecisas feitas
pelos integradores do sistema sobre a confiabilidade dos componentes no contexto em que
sera˜o usados podem esconder modos de falhas [102], por exemplo, o foguete Ariane-5 ex-
plodiu porque um componente reusado do foguete Ariane-4 produziu uma excec¸a˜o devido
a uma conversa˜o nume´rica e os integradores do sistema supuseram que esse cena´rio nem
precisaria ser testado ja´ que, no foguete Ariane-4, ele na˜o podia ocorrer [78].
Este trabalho examina o problema da construc¸a˜o de sistemas tolerantes a falhas ba-
seados em componentes. O enfoque do trabalho esta´ em sistemas de software nos quais a
separac¸a˜o entre comportamento normal e comportamento excepcional e´ feita atrave´s de
15Do ingleˆs: architectural mismatches [75].
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tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Tendo em vista a eˆnfase em sistemas baseados em componentes,
a investigac¸a˜o se divide em duas partes, uma relativa a` integrac¸a˜o de componentes de
software (design with reuse) e outra relativa a` sua construc¸a˜o (design for reuse), o que
resulta em duas perguntas de pesquisa:
1. Como reduzir o nu´mero de falhas, em sistemas baseados em componentes, decor-
rentes de suposic¸o˜es conflitantes ou incompletas sobre o comportamento excepcional
dos componentes integrados no sistema?
2. Como melhorar a estruturac¸a˜o interna de componentes de software, de modo a mi-
nimizar o impacto do comportamento excepcional desses componentes sobre a sua
complexidade total?
Esta tese propo˜e soluc¸o˜es para diminuir a quantidade de falhas de projeto introdu-
zidas em sistemas baseados em componentes pelo uso de tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Para
alcanc¸ar esse fim, sa˜o apresentadas duas abordagens complementares, cada uma centrada
em um elemento da dicotomia integrac¸a˜o/construc¸a˜o. Ambas teˆm foco na estrutura do
sistema como uma maneira de gerenciar a sua complexidade e reduzir o nu´mero de falhas
de projeto. As Sec¸o˜es 1.3 e 1.4 descrevem as abordagens propostas para integrac¸a˜o e
construc¸a˜o de componentes de software tolerantes a falhas, respectivamente.
1.3 Uma Abordagem Tolerante a Falhas para a Inte-
grac¸a˜o de Componentes
1.3.1 Visa˜o Geral
A primeira parte desta tese foca na integrac¸a˜o de componentes de software para a cons-
truc¸a˜o de sistemas confia´veis. Mais especificamente, propomos uma abordagem rigorosa
para o projeto arquitetural do comportamento excepcional de sistemas baseados em com-
ponentes. Conforme mencionado na Sec¸a˜o 1.2, o co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es cos-
tuma ser a fonte de diversas falhas de projeto. Frequentemente, isso se deve ao fato
desse co´digo ser implementado de maneira ad hoc, sem nenhum planejamento a priori.
Nos u´ltimos anos, alguns autores veˆm defendendo a ide´ia de que, para atingir os n´ıveis
desejados de confiabilidade, mecanismos para detectar e tratar erros devem ser desen-
volvidos de maneira sistema´tica, ao longo de todas as fases do desenvolvimento de um
sistema [59, 154, 160]: requisitos, projeto arquitetural, projeto detalhado, implementac¸a˜o
e testes. Idealmente, a construc¸a˜o dos mecanismos de toleraˆncia a falhas de um sistema
devem seguir uma metodologia de desenvolvimento rigorosa (que lanc¸a ma˜o de ferramen-
tas e te´cnicas formais para a construc¸a˜o de partes cr´ıticas do sistema) ou inteiramente
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formal [12], a fim de garantir que os mecanismos que tornam esse sistema confia´vel sa˜o,
eles pro´prios confia´veis.
Tendo em vista a influeˆncia da arquitetura de um sistema de software em sua qualidade
final, se um sistema tem requisitos estritos de confiabilidade e tratamento de excec¸o˜es
sera´ usado para estruturar seus mecanismos de toleraˆncia a falhas, acreditamos que pode
ser bene´fico dar atenc¸a˜o especial ao comportamento excepcional desse sistema durante
a etapa de projeto arquitetural [30, 89, 58]. Partindo dessa premissa, quatro cap´ıtulos
(Cap´ıtulos 2-5) desta tese refinam, explicam e validam a seguinte hipo´tese, que responde
a` pergunta de pesquisa 1:
Hipo´tese 1: A descric¸a˜o rigorosa de como excec¸o˜es fluem entre componentes
no n´ıvel arquitetural e a verificac¸a˜o automa´tica de propriedades relativas ao
comportamento excepcional do sistema nesse n´ıvel de abstrac¸a˜o aumentam a
chance de que falhas de projeto relacionadas ao comportamento excepcional
sejam detectadas antes que o sistema seja implementado.
1.3.2 Um Mecanismo de Tratamento de Excec¸o˜es no Nı´vel Ar-
quitetural
A primeira parte desta tese propo˜e uma abordagem para modelar a arquitetura de um
sistema da perspectiva do seu comportamento excepcional. No n´ıvel arquitetural, e´ ne-
cessa´rio levar em considerac¸a˜o a maneira como estilos arquiteturais [158] influenciam a
propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es. Um estilo arquitetural define um vocabula´rio de tipos de ele-
mentos de projeto que fazem parte de uma famı´lia de arquiteturas e as regras pelas quais
esse elementos sa˜o compostos [76]. Alguns exemplos sa˜o o baseado em camadas, cliente-
servidor e pipes and filters. O artigo “An Architectural-Level Exception Handling System
for Component-Based Applications”, apresentado no Cap´ıtulo 2, mostra como um estilo
arquitetural espec´ıfico, chamado C2 [173], pode influenciar o projeto de um mecanismo de
tratamento de excec¸o˜es, em especial no que se refere a` propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es. Esse artigo
foca nas excec¸o˜es que fluem entre os componentes integrados para compor um sistema.
Alguns autores propuseram arcabouc¸os [162, 179] que estendem plataformas de com-
ponentes existentes com suporte a` detecc¸a˜o e ao tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Apesar de
funcionarem no n´ıvel arquitetural, esses arcabouc¸os usam os mecanismos de tratamento
de excec¸o˜es das linguagens de programac¸a˜o empregadas e na˜o levam em considerac¸a˜o as
particularidades de diferentes estilos arquiteturais.
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1.3.3 Especificac¸a˜o do Fluxo de Excec¸o˜es em Arquiteturas de
Software
Tendo em vista a influeˆncia de estilos arquiteturais na propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es entre com-
ponentes, abordagens para a descric¸a˜o e ana´lise de uma arquitetura da perspectiva do
seu comportamento excepcional devem incluir a noc¸a˜o de estilo arquitetural. Essa ide´ia
e´ materializada pelo arcabouc¸o Aereal (Architectural Exceptions Reasoning and Analy-
sis) [28], um conjunto de atividades, ferramentas e modelos para a descric¸a˜o e ana´lise
do comportamento excepcional de um sistema de software a partir de sua arquitetura.
Como estilos arquiteturais diferentes teˆm pol´ıticas distintas para propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es,
o arcabouc¸o da´ suporte a` definic¸a˜o de regras sobre como excec¸o˜es fluem entre elementos
arquiteturais em diferentes estilos. Aereal e´ baseado em ACME [76], uma linguagem de
intercaˆmbio para a descric¸a˜o de arquiteturas, Alloy [98], uma linguagem de especificac¸a˜o
baseada em lo´gica relacional de primeira ordem, e nos conjuntos de ferramentas associ-
ados [101, 157]. O artigo “Specification of Exception Flow in Software Architectures”
descreve em detalhes a abordagem proposta. Esse artigo compo˜e o Cap´ıtulo 3 desta tese.
Desenvolvimento de software centrado na arquitetura com Aereal exige uma metodo-
logia de desenvolvimento que inclua atividades espec´ıficas para o levantamento do modelo
de falhas do sistema (as maneiras como o sistema falha e as excec¸o˜es que sa˜o geradas
como consequeˆncia) e a especificac¸a˜o do seu comportamento excepcional [54, 154]. O
arcabouc¸o usa como entradas uma descric¸a˜o da arquitetura do sistema e especificac¸o˜es
informais do seu modelo de falhas e de seu comportamento excepcional. A partir dessas
especificac¸o˜es, o arquiteto de software define uma nova visa˜o arquitetural, chamada Visa˜o
de Fluxo de Excec¸o˜es, que indica as excec¸o˜es geradas e tratadas pelos elementos arquite-
turais. Considera-se que um tratador pode propagar uma excec¸a˜o, ou seja, relanc¸ar a
excec¸a˜o recebida ou uma excec¸a˜o diferente, ou mascarar a excec¸a˜o, ou seja, terminar sua
execuc¸a˜o sem lanc¸ar nenhuma excec¸a˜o. Em seguida, uma ferramenta provida por Aereal
usa essas informac¸o˜es para identificar todas as excec¸o˜es que sa˜o recebidas e lanc¸adas pelos
elementos arquiteturais do sistema e complementa a descric¸a˜o da arquitetura com essa
informac¸a˜o. Diversas propriedades relativas ao fluxo de excec¸o˜es entre os componentes
arquiteturais podem ser analisadas a partir dessa descric¸a˜o arquitetural estendida. Adi-
cionalmente, o arquiteto pode definir restric¸o˜es sobre como excec¸o˜es sa˜o propagadas nos
estilos arquiteturais instanciados em uma arquitetura. Usando-se as ferramentas da lin-
guagem ACME, e´ poss´ıvel verificar de maneira automa´tica se a arquitetura obedece essas
restric¸o˜es.
Nos u´ltimos anos, surgiram va´rios trabalhos cuja ide´ia central e´ modelar tratamento de
excec¸o˜es em n´ıvel arquitetural. Alguns desses trabalhos propo˜em novos mecanismos para
a estruturac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional no n´ıvel arquitetural [89, 57, 58], enquanto
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outros descrevem extenso˜es relacionadas ao comportamento excepcional para ADLs [97].
Nenhum deles, pore´m, foca especificamente na descric¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional
e na verificac¸a˜o de propriedades relacionadas.
1.3.4 Um Modelo de Fluxo de Excec¸o˜es no Nı´vel Arquitetural
O arcabouc¸o Aereal e´ baseado em um modelo formal gene´rico que define quais sa˜o res-
ponsabilidades de cada componente arquitetural, no tocante ao lanc¸amento, recebimento
e tratamento de excec¸o˜es, e como excec¸o˜es fluem entre esses componentes. O modelo
tambe´m inclui um conjunto de regras formalmente especificadas que descrevem o fun-
cionamento do mecanismo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Esse modelo pode ser mapeado
de forma quase direta para linguagens de especificac¸a˜o bem conhecidas, como Alloy [98]
e B [3], e suas instaˆncias descrevem arquiteturas de sistemas de software. Atrave´s das
ferramentas associadas a essas linguagens, e´ poss´ıvel verificar de maneira automa´tica se a
arquitetura de um sistema satisfaz diversas propriedades que dizem respeito ao seu com-
portamento excepcional. O artigo “Reasoning about Exception Flow at the Architectural
Level”, que aparece no Cap´ıtulo 4, descreve esse modelo formal em detalhes.
Diversos trabalhos [38, 64, 150, 156, 186] propo˜em ana´lises esta´ticas de co´digo fonte que
geram informac¸o˜es sobre o fluxo de excec¸o˜es em programas. Nossa abordagem se baseia
nesses trabalhos mas foca em fases anteriores do desenvolvimento de um sistema, mais
especificamente, no seu projeto arquitetural, e leva em considerac¸a˜o as particularidades
desse n´ıvel de abstrac¸a˜o. Adicionalmente, a decomposic¸a˜o das regras de um mecanismo de
tratamento de excec¸o˜es em propriedades que possam ser verificadas isoladamente tambe´m
e´ uma contribuic¸a˜o original.
1.3.5 Verificac¸a˜o de Tratamento de Excec¸o˜es em Sistemas Con-
correntes Cooperativos
Inicialmente, a abordagem proposta e´ apresentada no contexto de sistemas nos quais vi-
gora a suposic¸a˜o de que erros sa˜o independentes. Consequentemente, e´ poss´ıvel tratar
cada excec¸a˜o como se fosse a u´nica em determinado instante de tempo. A maioria dos sis-
temas de software existentes e a maioria das linguagens de programac¸a˜o que implementam
tratamento de excec¸o˜es (C++, Java, Ada, Eiffel, etc.) aderem a esse modelo sequencial
de funcionamento. Essa abordagem foi estendida para tambe´m contemplar sistemas con-
correntes cooperativos, nos quais na˜o e´ poss´ıvel supor que erros sejam independentes. Em
tais sistemas, mu´ltiplas unidades de computac¸a˜o (processos, threads, componentes, etc.)
concorrentes se comunicam assincronamente e cooperam com o fim de atingir um obje-
tivo comum [20]. Esses sistemas diferem de sistemas concorrentes competitivos, nos quais
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mu´ltiplas unidades de computac¸a˜o competem para ter acesso a recursos compartilhados.
Em sistemas concorrentes cooperativos, se mu´ltiplas excec¸o˜es sa˜o levantadas simultane-
amente, e´ necessa´rio trata´-las de maneira cooperativa, ja´ que podem ser decorrentes da
mesma falha. Devido a`s complicac¸o˜es inerentes a` programac¸a˜o de sistemas concorrentes,
mecanismos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es para sistemas cooperativos sa˜o sensivelmente di-
ferentes de mecanismos para sistemas sequenciais. O artigo “Verification of Coordinated
Exception Handling”, que constitui o Cap´ıtulo 5 desta tese, apresenta uma te´cnica para
a descric¸a˜o e verificac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional de tais sistemas.
Ha´ diversas formalizac¸o˜es de mecanismos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es para sistemas
concorrentes cooperativos [172, 177, 185]. Entretanto, esses trabalhos focam em aspectos
diferentes de tais mecanismos como: (i) a ordenac¸a˜o temporal de eventos [185]; (ii) o
dinamismo das estruturas desses sistemas; e (iii) uma especificac¸a˜o detalhada de sua
semaˆntica, sem levar em considerac¸a˜o a verificac¸a˜o de sistemas [177]. Ate´ onde pudemos
averiguar, nenhum deles lida especificamente com a verificac¸a˜o de propriedades relativas
a` propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es.
1.3.6 Validac¸a˜o
Esta parte da tese foi validada atrave´s de execuc¸a˜o de va´rios estudos de caso. Dois deles
sa˜o descritos no Cap´ıtulo 3 e um outro e´ descrito no Cap´ıtulo 5. Um dos estudos de
caso do Cap´ıtulo 3 e´ baseado em um exemplo de livro texto [163]. Os outros dois sa˜o
baseados nas especificac¸o˜es de sistemas reais [54, 21]. Esses estudos de caso mostraram
que a abordagem proposta valida a hipo´tese de pesquisa. Falhas de projeto decorrentes
de suposic¸o˜es impl´ıcitas e/ou incompletas relativas ao comportamento excepcional dos
componentes dos sistemas foram encontrados nos treˆs estudos de caso. Alguns dos pro-
blemas foram detectados durante a etapa de modelagem dos sistemas, enquanto outros
foram detectados pelas ferramentas de verificac¸a˜o empregadas. Adicionalmente, os ar-
tefatos resultantes do uso da abordagem servem como documentac¸a˜o da arquitetura do
sistema, com a vantagem de poderem ser analisados de forma automa´tica com o aux´ılio
de ferramentas.
1.4 Uma Abordagem Tolerante a Falhas para a Cons-
truc¸a˜o de Componentes
1.4.1 Visa˜o Geral
A segunda parte desta tese trata da construc¸a˜o de componentes de software. Mais especi-
ficamente, investigamos a adequac¸a˜o do paradigma de programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos
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(AOP) [106] para melhorar a estruturac¸a˜o interna de componentes, atrave´s de uma se-
parac¸a˜o expl´ıcita entre comportamentos normal e excepcional. A ide´ia de empregar AOP
na modularizac¸a˜o de tratamento de excec¸o˜es parte da premissa de que tratamento de
excec¸o˜es e´ um interesse inerentemente transversal [106, 117, 114, 180].
O uso de AOP para modularizar tratamento de excec¸o˜es tambe´m e´ motivado pelo
fato de AOP generalizar propostas de linguagens como Guide [112] e Extended Ada [53]
para flexibilizar a associac¸a˜o de tratadores de excec¸o˜es a diferentes elementos do pro-
grama. Por exemplo, na linguagem Guide, tratadores podem ser associados a comandos,
me´todos e classes. Ja´ na linguagem Extended Ada, ale´m dos tipos de associac¸a˜o ja´ im-
plementados por Ada, comandos, blocos, me´todos e classes, tambe´m e´ poss´ıvel associar
tratadores de excec¸o˜es a objetos. Em uma linguagem orientada a aspectos, a capacidade
de associar tratadores a elementos de um programa e´ limitada apenas pelos mecanismos
dispon´ıveis na linguagem para selecionar pontos espec´ıficos desse programa16. Por exem-
plo, na linguagem AspectJ [114], uma extensa˜o orientada a aspectos de propo´sito geral
para Java, e´ poss´ıvel associar tratadores a classes, me´todos, excec¸o˜es, comandos e ate´
fluxos de execuc¸a˜o. Ja´ Eos [144], uma extensa˜o orientada a aspectos de C#, ale´m desses
tipos de associac¸a˜o, permite que tratadores sejam associados a objetos de forma simples.
O uso de AOP para modularizar tratamento de excec¸o˜es tambe´m e´ uma evoluc¸a˜o
com relac¸a˜o a trabalhos anteriores [71, 133] baseados em reflexa˜o computacional [121].
Linguagens como as supracitadas AspectJ e Eos permitem que diversos pontos de um
programa que na˜o podem ser selecionados por protocolos de meta-objetos conhecidos [42,
138] sejam usados como contextos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Exemplos incluem fluxos
de execuc¸a˜o e comandos arbitra´rios dentro do corpo de um me´todo. Com base nesses
fatores, dois cap´ıtulos desta tese validam e refinam a seguinte hipo´tese, que responde a`
pergunta de pesquisa 2:
Hipo´tese 2: O uso de programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos para modularizar o
co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es de um programa melhora a qualidade desse
programa, tanto do ponto de vista do comportamento normal quanto do excep-
cional.
1.4.2 Um Estudo Quantitativo sobre a Aspectizac¸a˜o de Trata-
mento de Excec¸o˜es
Foi conduzido um estudo para avaliar as vantagens que o uso de AOP traz para a mo-
dularizac¸a˜o do tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Esse estudo e´ descrito em detalhes no artigo
“Exceptions and Aspects: The Devil is in the Details” [24], que aparece no Cap´ıtulo 6.
16Do ingleˆs: join points.
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O estudo consistiu em refatorar para aspectos o co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es de
quatro aplicac¸o˜es diferentes, treˆs delas baseadas em componentes. Treˆs dessas aplicac¸o˜es
foram implementadas originalmente em Java, enquanto a quarta foi escrita em AspectJ.
Empregamos a linguagem AspectJ como representante do paradigma orientado a aspectos
para separar tratamento de excec¸o˜es dos outros interesses de cada sistema. Foi usado um
conjunto de me´tricas [73] para medir, nas verso˜es originais e refatoradas, quatro atributos
de qualidade: separac¸a˜o de interesses, concisa˜o, coesa˜o e acoplamento. A investigac¸a˜o in-
cluiu tambe´m uma ana´lise dos sistemas refatorados levando em conta (i) a reusabilidade
do co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es e (ii) a escalabilidade de AOP para modularizar
tratamento de excec¸o˜es na presenc¸a de outros interesses transversais.
De acordo com os resultados desse estudo, o uso de AOP para separar os comporta-
mentos normal e excepcional de um sistema e´ bene´fico em va´rias situac¸o˜es recorrentes
no desenvolvimento de software, mas isso depende de uma combinac¸a˜o de diversos fato-
res. Em diversas situac¸o˜es corriqueiras no desenvolvimento de software, aspectizac¸a˜o ad
hoc pode na˜o ser poss´ıvel ou piorar a qualidade do sistema. Em especial, a coesa˜o dos
sistemas-alvo do estudo, conforme medida pela me´trica que empregamos, piorou consis-
tentemente depois do tratamento de excec¸o˜es ter sido modularizado com aspectos. Isso
se deveu em grande parte a` necessidade de, em alguns casos, modificar o co´digo origi-
nal antes de extrair o tratamento de excec¸o˜es para aspectos. Adicionalmente, o grau de
reuso de co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es foi baixo. Embora esse resultado tenha sido
esperado, tendo em vista a natureza espec´ıfica de aplicac¸a˜o do co´digo de tratamento de
excec¸o˜es [5], ele contradiz os resultados de um estudo anterior bastante conhecido [117].
Nesse estudo anterior, uma das consequeˆncias do uso de AOP foi uma grande economia
de linhas de co´digo devido ao reuso de tratadores. Finalmente, e´ dif´ıcil aspectizar um
trecho de co´digo quando mais de um interesse transversal afeta esse trecho.
Embora textos introduto´rios [106, 114, 180] normalmente mencionem tratamento de
excec¸o˜es como um exemplo da utilidade de AOP, poucos trabalhos avaliam a adequac¸a˜o
de AOP para modularizar o interesse de tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Neste trabalho foi
elaborado e executado um estudo detalhado, focando em quatro aplicac¸o˜es reais, para
avaliar os benef´ıcios trazidos pelo uso de AOP para se modularizar o comportamento
excepcional desses sistemas. Ate´ onde foi poss´ıvel averiguar, na˜o ha´ nenhum estudo na
literatura com o mesmo grau de profundidade ou com a mesma abrangeˆncia. O u´nico
estudo visando avaliar os benef´ıcios do emprego de AOP para este fim, realizado por
Lippert e Lopes [117], se baseou em uma infra-estrutura reusa´vel, na qual o co´digo de
tratamento de excec¸o˜es era muito simples e na˜o-dependente de aplicac¸a˜o. Adicionalmente,
a avaliac¸a˜o qualitativa desse estudo foi realizada em termos de atributos na˜o tradicionais
na literatura de Engenharia de Software, como plugability e suporte ao desenvolvimento
incremental, e a avaliac¸a˜o quantitativa usou nu´mero de linhas de co´digo como u´nica
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me´trica.
1.4.3 Um Cata´logo de Cena´rios para Guiar a Modularizac¸a˜o de
Tratamento de Excec¸o˜es com Aspectos
Com base nos resultados obtidos, propomos uma classificac¸a˜o para co´digo de tratamento
de excec¸o˜es. Essa classificac¸a˜o leva em considerac¸a˜o os fatores que teˆm maior influeˆncia
sobre a extrac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional de um sistema para aspectos, de acordo
com os resultados do estudo. Adicionalmente, propomos um cata´logo de cena´rios que
consiste de combinac¸o˜es desses fatores. O objetivo desse conjunto de cena´rios e´ servir
de guia para desenvolvedores incubidos da tarefa de modularizar tratamento de excec¸o˜es
usando aspectos, tanto para sistemas ja´ existentes quanto para sistemas novos. Para
atingir esse fim, o cata´logo indica em quais cena´rios o uso de AOP melhora a qualidade
do sistema e em quais piora. Um cena´rio e´ considerado bene´fico quando: (i) a aspectizac¸a˜o
de tratamento de excec¸o˜es tem um efeito positivo nos atributos de qualidade do sistema,
conforme medido pelo conjunto de me´tricas empregado; e (ii) o co´digo resultante na˜o exibe
“maus cheiros” [68]. Tanto a classificac¸a˜o proposta quanto os cena´rios sa˜o apresentados
em detalhes no artigo “Implementing Modular Error Handling with Aspects: Best and
Worst Practices”, que aparece no Cap´ıtulo 7.
Apesar da popularidade crescente de AOP e de sua adoc¸a˜o inclusive na indu´stria [39],
ainda na˜o existem cata´logos reunindo conhecimento relativo ao uso pra´tico de AOP para
estruturar tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Essa situac¸a˜o difere fortemente do que acontece com
a programac¸a˜o orientada a objetos [22, 60, 125, 141, 148].
1.5 Contribuic¸o˜es
Esta tese apresenta as seguintes contribuic¸o˜es:
1. Um mecanismo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es que funciona no n´ıvel da arquitetura de
software e leva em considerac¸a˜o algumas das particularidades de sistemas baseados
em componentes. Esse mecanismo e´ centrado em um estilo arquitetural espec´ıfico,
C2 [173], e evidencia a influeˆncia que estilos arquiteturais teˆm na propagac¸a˜o de
excec¸o˜es (Sec¸a˜o 1.3.2 e Cap´ıtulo 2).
2. Uma abordagem para dar suporte a` descric¸a˜o e a` ana´lise de arquiteturas de software,
da perspectiva do seu comportamento excepcional. Essa abordagem leva em con-
siderac¸a˜o a maneira como diferentes estilos arquiteturais influenciam a propagac¸a˜o
de excec¸o˜es e complementa metodologias de desenvolvimento cujo foco e´ o compor-
tamento excepcional do sistema (Sec¸a˜o 1.3.3 e Cap´ıtulo 3).
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3. Um modelo formal que indica as responsabilidades de cada elemento arquitetural,
no que se refere ao lanc¸amento, recebimento e tratamento de excec¸o˜es, e que permite
que certas propriedades u´teis relativas ao fluxo de excec¸o˜es entre esses elementos se-
jam verificadas de maneira automa´tica. Essas propriedades foram organizadas de tal
maneira que cada uma pode ser verificada independentemente e o conjunto de todas
elas descreve um mecanismo arquitetural de tratamento de excec¸o˜es (Sec¸a˜o 1.3.4 e
Cap´ıtulo 4).
4. Uma abordagem para a especificac¸a˜o e verificac¸a˜o de sistemas concorrentes coopera-
tivos da perspectiva do seu comportamento excepcional (Sec¸a˜o 1.3.5 e Cap´ıtulo 5).
5. Uma ana´lise dos fatores que tiveram influeˆncia na modularizac¸a˜o do co´digo de tra-
tamento de excec¸o˜es usando aspectos, com base na experieˆncia adquirida atrave´s da
refatorac¸a˜o de quatro aplicac¸o˜es distintas (Sec¸a˜o 1.4.2 e Cap´ıtulo 6).
6. Uma avaliac¸a˜o inicial dos efeitos da estruturac¸a˜o de tratamento de excec¸o˜es usando
aspectos quando outros interesses transversais tambe´m sa˜o modularizados atrave´s
de aspectos (Sec¸a˜o 1.4.2 e Cap´ıtulo 6).
7. Um cata´logo de cena´rios de tratamento de excec¸o˜es que indica, para cada cena´rio,
se e´ vantajoso usar aspectos para separar comportamento normal e comportamento
excepcional (Sec¸a˜o 1.4.3 e Cap´ıtulo 7).
1.6 Organizac¸a˜o da Tese
A tese foi estruturada como uma coletaˆnea de seis artigos escritos em ingleˆs que foram
publicados ou submetidos para publicac¸a˜o em confereˆncias e perio´dicos internacionais.
Cada artigo corresponde a um cap´ıtulo e, para cada cap´ıtulo, ha´ uma introduc¸a˜o e uma
conclusa˜o curtas, escritas em portugueˆs, responsa´veis por ligar os cap´ıtulos de forma mais
coerente. Todos os artigos sa˜o reproduzidos na ı´ntegra, com pequenas modificac¸o˜es no
texto original para corrigir erros de escrita, diagramac¸a˜o e notac¸a˜o.
Esta tese esta´ organizada da seguinte maneira:
• O Cap´ıtulo 2 descreve um mecanismo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es que funciona no
n´ıvel da arquitetura de software e leva em considerac¸a˜o as particularidades de sis-
temas baseados em componentes. Atrave´s da descric¸a˜o dos elementos desse meca-
nismo, o cap´ıtulo introduz alguns conceitos u´teis para o entendimento do restante
da tese.
• O Cap´ıtulo 3 descreve o arcabouc¸o Aereal para a descric¸a˜o e ana´lise de excec¸o˜es no
n´ıvel arquitetural.
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• O Cap´ıtulo 4 descreve formalmente o modelo de fluxo de excec¸o˜es usado pelo ar-
cabouc¸o Aereal. Esse modelo foca em sistemas onde vigora a suposic¸a˜o de que
erros sa˜o independentes e que cada excec¸a˜o pode ser tratada como se fosse a u´nica
levantada no sistema, em determinado instante de tempo.
• O Cap´ıtulo 5 descreve uma abordagem para a modelagem e verificac¸a˜o do compor-
tamento excepcional de sistemas concorrentes cooperativos, nos quais na˜o e´ poss´ıvel
presumir que mu´ltiplos erros manifestados concorrentemente sa˜o consequeˆncia de
falhas independentes.
• O Cap´ıtulo 6 apresenta o estudo que realizamos para avaliar as vantagens e desvan-
tagens do uso de AOP para modularizar co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es.
• O Cap´ıtulo 7 descreve um conjunto de cena´rios que visa auxiliar desenvolvedores a
decidir em que situac¸o˜es o uso de AOP e´ vantajoso e quando e´ prejudicial.
• O u´ltimo cap´ıtulo apresenta considerac¸o˜es finais, resumindo as contribuic¸o˜es deste
trabalho e estabelecendo direc¸o˜es para pesquisas futuras.
Cap´ıtulo 2
Um Mecanismo de Tratamento de
Excec¸o˜es em Nı´vel Arquitetural para
Aplicac¸o˜es Baseadas em
Componentes
Este cap´ıtulo se refere a` Sec¸a˜o 1.3.2 do Cap´ıtulo 1 e descreve um mecanismo de tratamento
de excec¸o˜es que funciona no n´ıvel arquitetural. Esse mecanismo leva em considerac¸a˜o ca-
racter´ısticas espec´ıficas de sistemas baseados em componentes e foca nas excec¸o˜es que
fluem entre os componentes de software no n´ıvel arquitetural. O mecanismo proposto foi
implementado atrave´s de um arcabouc¸o orientado a objetos chamado FaTC2 (Fault Tole-
rant C2), uma extensa˜o do arcabouc¸o C2.FW [127]. Este u´ltimo proveˆ uma infraestrutura
para a construc¸a˜o de aplicac¸o˜es baseadas no estilo C2.
O principal objetivo desse artigo e´ investigar como funciona a propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es
entre os componentes de software integrados em um sistema. Acreditamos que ela tem
diferenc¸as fundamentais com relac¸a˜o a` maneira como excec¸o˜es fluem entre me´todos e
procedimentos no n´ıvel da linguagem de programac¸a˜o. Para ilustrar esse ponto, o ar-
tigo mostra como o estilo arquitetural empregado, C2 [173], influencia a propagac¸a˜o de
excec¸o˜es entre os elementos arquiteturais.
O artigo que este cap´ıtulo conte´m foi apresentado no First Latin-American Sympo-
sium on Dependable Computing, em outubro de 2003 [30]. Uma versa˜o preliminar [31]
descrevendo o arcabouc¸o FaTC2 foi apresentada no ICSE’2003 Workshop on Software
Architectures for Dependable Systems, em maio do mesmo ano.
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2.1 Introduction
Modern computing systems require evolving software that is built from existing software
components, in general developed by independent sources [15]. Hence, the construction of
component-based systems with high dependability requirements out of existing software
components represents a major challenge, since few assumptions can generally be made
about the level of confidence of off-the-shelf components. In this context, an approach for
the provision of fault tolerance based on the system’s software architecture[48] is necessary
in order to build dependable software systems assembled from untrustworthy components
[89].
Exception handling[80] is a well-known technique for incorporating fault tolerance into
software systems. An exception handling system (EHS) offers control structures which
allow developers to define actions that should be executed when an error is detected. The
user of such a system should be able to signal exceptions when an error is detected. The
EHS should be able to find and activate an exception handler to recover from errors and
put the system back in a coherent state. Even though many well-known programming
languages provide EHSs [82, 108, 171], exception handling for component-based systems
addressed at the architectural level remains an open issue. Component-based systems
introduce new challenges which are not addressed by traditional EHSs. Some of these
challenges include:
• exception handlers should be attached to higher-level abstractions specific to component-
based systems, such as components and connectors, not only to implementation
language constructs, such as methods and classes;
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• the source code for the system components may not be available, specially when
off-the-shelf components are employed. Hence, it is not possible to modify these
components in order to introduce exception handling;
In this paper, we present ALEx, an architectural-level EHS which addresses the con-
cerns presented above. ALEx is based on the work of Guerra et al [56], which describes
a structuring concept for building fault-tolerant component-based systems based on the
concept of idealised fault-tolerant component [5]. An idealised fault-tolerant component
promotes separation of concerns between the abnormal activity (fault tolerance measures)
of a system and its normal activity. Upon the receipt of a service request, an idealised
fault-tolerant component produces three types of responses: normal responses in case the
request is successfully processed, interface exceptions in case the request is not valid, and
failure exceptions, which are produced when a valid request is received but cannot be
successfully processed. Idealised fault-tolerant components may be organized into layers,
so that components may handle exceptions raised by components located in other layers.
We also describe an object-oriented framework, called FaTC2, which implements our
proposed EHS. FaTC2 is an extension of C2.FW [127], an OO framework that provides
an infrastructure for building applications using the C2 architectural style [173]. The C2
style is a component-based architectural style [76] that supports large grain reuse and
flexible system composition, emphasizing weak bindings between components. This style
was chosen due to its ability to compose heterogeneous off-the-shelf components [127].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides some background
information. Section 2.3 gives a motivation for the construction of an EHS for component-
based applications. Section 2.4 presents ALEx, our approach for architectural-level excep-
tion handling. Section 2.5 provides a brief description of FaTC2, a Java implementation
of ALEx based on the C2 architectural style. Section 2.7 gives a brief comparison with
related work. Finally, Section 2.8 summarizes our conclusions and suggests directions for
future work.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Exception Handling
Following the terminology adopted by Lee and Anderson [5], a system consists of a set
of components that interact under the control of a design. A fault in a component may
cause an error in the internal state of the system which eventually leads to the failure of
the system. Two techniques are available for errors: (i) forward error recovery and (ii)
backward error recovery. The first technique attempts to return the system to an error-
free state by applying corrections to the damaged state. The second technique attempts
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to restore a previous state which is presumed to be free from errors. Exceptions and
exception handling constitute a common mechanism applied to the provision of forward
error recovery.
An exception handling system (EHS) allows software developers to define exceptional
conditions and to structure the abnormal activity of software components. When an
exception is raised by a component, the EHS is responsible for changing the normal control
flow of the computation within a component to its exceptional control flow. Therefore,
raising an exception results in the interruption of the normal activity of the component,
followed by the search for an appropriate exception handler (or simply handler) to deal
with the signaled exception. The set of handlers of a component constitutes its abnormal
activity part. For any exception mechanism, handling contexts associate exceptions and
handlers. Handling contexts are defined as regions in which the same exceptions are
treated in the same way. Each context should have a set of associated handlers, which
are executed when the corresponding exception is raised.
2.2.2 C2 Architectural Style
In the C2 architectural style [173], components communicate by exchanging asynchro-
nous messages sent through connectors, which are responsible for the routing, filtering,
and broadcast of messages. Figure 2.1 shows a software architecture using the C2 style
where the elements A, B, and D are components, and C is a connector. The thin vertical
lines correspond to connections, ports for connecting the architectural elements. A con-
figuration is a set of components, connectors, and connections between these elements.
Components and connectors have a top interface and a bottom interface (Figure 2.1).
Systems are composed in a layered style, where the top interface of a component may be
connected to the bottom interface of a connector and its bottom interface may be connec-
ted to the top interface of another connector. Each side of a connector may be connected
to any number of components or connectors. Two types of messages are defined by the
C2 style: requests, which are sent upwards through the architecture, and notifications,
which are sent downwards. Requests ask components in upper layers of the architecture
for some service to be provided, while notifications signal a change in the internal state
of a component.
The C2.FW framework [127, 175] provides an infrastructure for building C2 applica-
tions. The C2.FW Java [82] framework comprises a set of classes and interfaces which
implement the abstractions of the C2 style, such as components, connectors, messages,
and connections. C2.FW has been implemented in C++, Java, Python and Ada.
2.2. Background 27
Figura 2.1: An example of software architecture based on the C2 style.
2.2.3 Idealised C2 Component
The work of Guerra et al.[56] uses the concept of Idealised Fault-Tolerant Component to
structure the architecture of component-based software systems compliant with the C2
architectural style. It introduces the Idealized C2 Component (iC2C), which is equivalent,
in structure and behavior, to the idealised fault-tolerant component. Service requests and
normal responses of an idealised fault-tolerant component are mapped as requests and
notifications in the C2 architectural style. Interface and failure exceptions of an idealised
fault-tolerant component are considered subtypes of notifications.
The iC2C is composed of five elements: NormalActivity and AbnormalActivity compo-
nents, and iC2C top, iC2C internal, and iC2C bottom connectors. Its internal structure
is presented in Figure 2.2. The NormalActivity component processes service requests and
answers them through notifications. It also implements the error detection mechanisms
of the iC2C. Internally, a NormalActivity component may be either a stateless or stateful
component. However, since an iC2C should guarantee that each request received is pro-
cessed in the initial state of the iC2C[89], stateless components are easier to deal with.
In order to employ stateful components, some means for guaranteeing that requests are
processed atomically, such as atomic transactions, should be provided.
The AbnormalActivity component encapsulates the exception handlers (error reco-
very) of the iC2C. While an iC2C is in its normal state, the AbnormalActivity component
remains inactive. When an exceptional condition is detected, it is activated to handle the
exception. In case the exception is successfully handled, the iC2C returns to its nor-
mal state and the NormalActivity component resumes processing. Otherwise, a failure
exception is signalled to components in lower layers of the architecture, which become
responsible for handling it.
The iC2C bottom connector is responsible for filtering and serializing requests recei-
ved by the iC2C. This conservative policy aims at guaranteeing that requests are always
received by the NormalActivity component in its initial state, to avoid possible side-effects
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Figura 2.2: Internal structure of an iC2C.
of an exceptional condition caused by a concurrent service request. The iC2C internal
connector is responsible for message routing inside the iC2C. The destination of the mes-
sages sent by the internal elements of the iC2C depends on its type and whether the iC2C
is in a normal or abnormal state.
The iC2C top connector encapsulates the interaction between the iC2C and compo-
nents located in upper levels of the architecture. It is responsible for guaranteeing that
service requests sent by the NormalActivity and AbnormalActivity components to other
components located in upper levels of the architecture are processed synchronously (re-
quest/response). The iC2C top connector also performs domain translation, converting
incoming notifications to a format which the iC2C understands and outgoing requests to
a format which the application understands.
The structure of the iC2C makes it compatible with the constraints imposed by the
C2 architectural style. Hence, an iC2C may be incorporated into an existing C2 configu-
ration. Previous experiments [56, 89] with the iC2C model have shown its adequacy for
the construction of component-based systems, including systems built from off-the-shelf
components [88].
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2.3 Exception Handling at the Architectural Level
Exception handling for component-based software systems introduces some difficulties
which are not addressed by traditional EHSs. These particularities are a consequence
of the differences between the abstractions supported by programming languages and
component-based software development. In a traditional EHS defined by a programming
language, exception handlers are attached to the constructs the language supports. For
example, Guide [112] is an object-oriented language which supports the attachment of
handlers to statements, methods and classes. Similarly, an EHS which supports the
construction of component-based systems should allow exception handlers to be attached
to their basic elements, namely, components, connectors, and configurations.
In traditional EHSs, when an exception is raised, a handler is searched locally, depen-
ding on the handling context. If none is found, the exception is signaled to the enclosing
method invocation. However, this scheme for exception propagation may not be adequate
for component-based systems. In software architectures, connectors are represented as
first-class design entities, due to the potential complexity of the interactions among com-
ponents. This feature allows the support of more sophisticated communication elements
than simple method calls, and separates explicitly the execution flow of an application
from its chain of method invocations. An EHS for component-based applications should
consider these requirements during its design and support the propagation of exceptions
according to the flow of information between components. In the C2 style, for example,
components communicate by means of asynchronous message passing. Service requests
are sent from components in lower layers of an architecture to components in upper layers,
and response notifications flow in the opposite direction. Additionally, components may
run in separate threads. Hence, in a C2 architecture, if a component issues a request
which triggers the raising of an exception, the latter should be propagated to the compo-
nent which issued the request. In other words, it should be propagated downwards the
architecture, and not along the method invocation chain.
Finally, an architectural-level exception handling system should support the attach-
ment of handlers to components without requiring modifications on them. This require-
ment is very important because, in component-based software development, the source
code for the system components may not be available, specially if off-the-shelf components
are employed. In order to leverage exception handling for component-based applications,
we have devised an architectural-level EHS, called ALEx, which addresses the concerns
stated above.
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2.4 An Exception Handling System for Component-
Based Applications
In this section, we present the main characteristics of our exception handling system and
discuss our design decisions to address the requirements discussed in Section 2.3. We
follow the guidelines established by Garcia et al [71], and describe ALEx in terms of
the following features: exception representation, handler definition, handler attachment,
exception propagation, handler search, and continuation of the control flow.
In our approach, an iC2C (Section 2.2.3) can represent a component, connector or con-
figuration which has an architectural-level exception handler attached. We also employ
the C2 architectural style for describing examples of architecture configurations, since it
is leveraged by the concept of iC2C. Exceptions are wrapped by C2 notifications in order
to be propagated along the layers of the system’s architecture. Notifications representing
exceptions are called exception notifications, and they are distinguished from normal no-
tifications. Furthermore, we define regular C2 components as C2 components that: (i)
do not send exception notifications, and (ii) will not recognize an exception notification
received as being the signalling of an exception. In other words, a regular C2 component
will recognize an exception notification as an ordinary notification sent in response to a
request issued prior to the receipt of the notification. We will not consider special cases,
such as regular C2 components capable of sending exception notifications.
Hereafter, we use the term “exception” to designate both exceptions and exception
notifications, since the latter is simply an implementation concept which is not directly
related to the EHS. For situations where implementation issues are relevant, we highlight
the difference between the two terms.
2.4.1 Exception Representation
According to the taxonomy defined by Garcia et al [72], ALEx represents exceptions
as data objects, that is, objects which are used for holding context information which is
relevant for their handling. More specifically, we define exceptions as messages, which
constitute a suitable abstraction for component-based systems. Exceptions are raised by
calling a specific keyword (in our Java implementation, the throw keyword).
Different types of exceptions are organized hierarchically as classes. The class Ar-
chitecturalException is the root of this hierarchy. ALEx defines two subclasses of Archi-
tecturalException, FailureArchitecturalException and InterfaceArchitecturalException, which
correspond to the failure exceptions and interface exceptions of an idealised fault-tolerant
component, respectively. Any raised exception which is not of type InterfaceArchitectura-
lException is treated as a failure exception, indicating that the architectural element may
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public class AbnormalActivity ... {
public Message handleException(IOException e){
// Body of a handler for IOException.
}
...
public Message handleException(ArchitecturalException e){
// Body of the generic handler. Must be implemented!
}
...
}
Figura 2.3: Definition of handlers in ALEx.
be in an inconsistent state. Interface exceptions must be explicitly signaled.
The signatures of the operations in component interfaces should explicitly indicate
the exceptions they raise. According to the work of Garcia et al.[72], this practice leads
to better readability, modularity, maintainability, reusability and testability. Further-
more, explicitly declaring the exceptions raised by a component allows static checks to be
performed by means of analysis tools, increasing dependability.
2.4.2 Handler Attachment and Definition
Our EHS supports multi-level attachment of handlers, that is, handlers may be associated
with: (i) a component, (ii) a connector, (iii) a configuration. Figure 2.2 shows a set
of exception handlers, represented by the AbnormalActivity component, attached to a
component, represented by the NormalActivity component. The abnormal activity of a
component is defined by a class which implements a set of methods, each one representing
an exception handler. Furthermore, each of these classes should define at least a default
handler, capable of handling an exception of the ArchitecturalException type. Figure 2.3
shows a partial definition of an exception handler which handles exceptions of types
IOException and ArchitecturalException.
Exception handlers may also be attached to configurations, as well as to components
and connectors. The possibility of attaching handlers to specific configurations allows
that different exception handling contexts be defined within a single application. This
is achieved by nesting exception handlers, as illustrated by Figure 2.4, where an iC2C is
used as the NormalActivity component of another iC2C. This feature is specially useful
for systems which have critical regions that require a higher level of fault tolerance.
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Figura 2.4: Nesting exception handling contexts.
2.4.3 Exception Propagation and Handler Search
Our exception handling model adopts explicit propagation of exceptions. The benefits of
this approach are discussed in the work of Garcia et al.[72]. In ALEx, the handling and
propagation of an exception depends on whether it is a failure exception or an interface
exception. When an iC2C raises a failure exception, its handling is limited to the handlers
within the same iC2C (that is, its AbnormalActivity component). If the exception can
not be handled, then the predefined exception FailureArchitecturalException is further pro-
pagated. A handler may also explicitly resignal the exception to a component in a lower
layer of the architecture. In Figure 2.4, exceptions raised by the NormalActivity compo-
nent of the innermost iC2C are handled by the AbnormalActivity component within it.
If the internal handling fails, the handler may resignal the exception to the AbnormalAc-
tivity component of the outermost iC2C. In case an exception reaches the lowest level of
an architecture, an exception handler for the entire system should be executed.
An interface exception raised upon the receipt of a service request is not handled by
the component, since it does not indicate that the component is faulty. In this case, the
exception is propagated to the client component which issued the request. The client
component handles this exception in the same manner as a failure exception, since it
possibly indicates a fault within the client component.
The search for handlers for a failure exception raised by the NormalActivity component
of an iC2C is defined as follows:
1. The EHS tries to find a specific handler for the exception in the AbnormalActivity
component within the same iC2C. Handlers are searched according to the class
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hierarchy defined for exceptions:
if an exception of class C is raised in a given system, a handler for exceptions
of class C will be searched;
if none is found, the EHS proceeds searching for a handler for an immediate
superclass S of C;
if none is found, the EHS searchers for a handler for an immediate superclass of
S, and so on.
2. If no specific handler is found, the default handler is selected. This handler may
actually handle the exception or simply resignal it.
3. In the latter case, if the iC2C which raised the exception is wrapped by another iC2C
(as is the case in Figure 2.4), step 1 is repeated for the outermost AbnormalActivity
component. Otherwise, the exception is propagated downwards the architecture, to
the client component which issued the request that triggered its signaling. Step 1
is then repeated for the AbnormalActivity component of the client component.
The search for handlers for an interface exception raised by the NormalActivity com-
ponent of an iC2C proceeds in a similar manner, except that steps 1 and 2 are not initially
performed.
2.4.4 Continuation of the Control Flow
ALEx adopts the termination model[52], that is, if during the processing of a service
request a component raises an exception and it is successfully handled by another com-
ponent, execution is resumed by the latter.
Figure 2.5 presents an example of an architecture composed by two idealised C2 com-
ponents (ClientComponent and ServerComponent), and a connector linking them. Figure
2.6 shows a UML seq. diagram illustrating a scenario where the control flow continues
after an exception is successfully handled. The following steps describe the diagram:
1. ClientComponent requests a service from ServerComponent;
2. ServerNormalActivity tries to handle the service request;
3. ServerNormalActivity raises an exception which is received by ServerAbnormalActivity;
4. ServerAbnormalActivity tries to handle the exception;
5. ServerAbnormalActivity fails to handle the exception and raises a failure exception;
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Figura 2.5: A C2 architecture composed by a client component and a server iC2C.
6. ClientComponent receives the exception and routes it to ClientAbnormalActivity;
7. ClientAbnormalActivity handles the exception and sends a return to normal request to
ClientNormalActivity, indicating that processing should be resumed;
8. ClientNormalActivity resumes processing.
2.5 Exception Handling System in the Framework
FaTC2
In this section, we describe FaTC2, an object-oriented framework which implements our
architectural-level exception handling approach. FaTC2 is an extension of the Java [82]
version of the C2.FW framework. The original C2.FW framework does not provide ade-
quate support for the construction of fault-tolerant systems. FaTC2 extends C2.FW with
the concept of iC2C, in order to provide the support for forward error recovery, by means
of the EHS described in Section 2.4.
Figure 2.7 presents a partial class hierarchy for FaTC2, and its intersection with
C2.FW. In the following sections, we describe the framework FaTC2, based on the notions
described in Figure 2.2.
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Figura 2.6: A scenario illustrating the termination model adopted by ALEx.
2.5.1 IC2C
The iC2C is the basic unit provided by FaTC2 for attaching handlers to components or
configurations. The creation of an iC2C is encapsulated by the IC2C class. In order to
create an instance of IC2C, objects representing the NormalActivity and AbnormalActivity
components (Figure 2.2) must be supplied. Optionally, the developer may chose to also
supply objects representing the iC2C top and iC2C bottom connectors, in case filtering
or domain-translation are required. Otherwise, default implementations are employed.
Although the IC2C class may be used directly in an application, it is recommended that
developers create subclasses of it, specifying the NormalActivity and AbnormalActivity
components, and iC2C top and iC2C bottom connectors which are to be used.
An analogous structuring may be used for representing fault-tolerant connectors, as
long as the semantic differences between components and connectors are taken into ac-
count.
2.5.2 NormalActivity Component
The NormalActivity component encapsulates the functionality (normal activity) of an
iC2C. It may represent both a single component and a configuration. In this work, we
will only address the case where an iC2C represents a single component.
In order to define a NormalActivity component, a developer must provide a class
that implements the INormalActivity interface. This interface declares three operations
which define the application-dependent behavior of the component: handleRequest(),
returnToNormal(), and reset().
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Figura 2.7: A partial class hierarchy for C2.FW and FaTC2.
The handleRequest() method is responsible for (i) processing service requests and (ii)
detecting errors. It takes as argument the request message to be processed, and returns
a response notification to be delivered to the client component. If an error is detected
during the processing of a service request, this method signals an exception, which may
be a FailureArchitecturalException or an InterfaceArchitecturalException. Exceptions are
caught by the framework and packaged as exception notifications, which are sent to the
AbnormalActivity component.
The returnToNormal() and reset() methods are related to the abnormal activity
of the iC2C. The former is called when the iC2C has successfully handled an exception,
and should resume processing. The latter is called when the iC2C is unable to handle an
exception, and should perform some cleanup actions before handling new requests.
FaTC2 provides developers with an abstract class which implements the application-
independent behavior of the NormalActivity component, as defined by ALEx (Section
2.4). This class is called AbstractNormalActivityComponent, and should be extended by
the class which implements the NormalActivity component for a given iC2C. In the situ-
ations described above, the tasks of delivering requests to the handleRequest() method,
sending response notifications to client components, and packaging and sending exception
notifications to the AbnormalActivity component are performed by AbstractNormalActi-
vityComponent.
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In case the handling of a request demands the NormalActivity component to request
services from components located in upper layers of the architecture, the AbstractNor-
malActivityComponent class provides a utility method, requestService(), which may be
used to send synchronous (request/response) requests transparently, upwards the archi-
tecture.
2.5.3 AbnormalActivity Component
The AbnormalActivity component encapsulates the exception handlers of an iC2C. In
order to implement it, a developer must provide a class that implements the IAbnormalAc-
tivityComponent interface. This interface declares a single method, handleException(),
which defines the default exception handler of the component. This scheme enforces the
policy defined by ALEx, that at least the default exception handler must be implemented
by every AbnormalActivity component.
Additional handlers are defined by handler methods that are declared in the same class
which implements the IAbnormalActivityComponent interface. The order in which they are
declared is not important. Handler methods present the following structure:
public Message handleException(<exception> e, Request m) raises Exception {
// Body of a handler for <exception>.
}
In the code snippet above, <exception> stands for the exception type (a Java class)
which the handler is capable of handling. The Request r parameter refers to the request
which was being processed when the exception was signaled. If an exception is success-
fully handled, the handler method returns an object of type Message. This represents a
C2 message which is delivered to the NormalActivity component in order for processing
to be resumed. If an exception can not be handled, the handler method should resignal
it or raise another exception. Either way, the exception is propagated to the enclosing
exception handling context (Section 2.4.3).
FaTC2 provides developers with an abstract class which implements the application-
independent behavior of the AbnormalActivity component, as defined by ALEx (Section
2.4). This class is called AbstractAbnormalActivityComponent, and should be extended by
the class which implements the AbnormalActivity component for a given iC2C.
In case the handling of an exception requires the AbnormalActivityComponent to
request services from other components, or from the NormalActivityComponent in the
same iC2C, class AbstractAbnormalActivityComponent provides methods which allow syn-
chronous requests to be carried transparently, similarly to the AbstractNormalActivityCom-
ponent class.
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2.5.4 iC2C top, iC2C bottom and iC2C internal Connectors
The IC2CTopConnector, IC2CBottomConnector, and IC2CInternalConnector classes are de-
fault implementations for the iC2C top, iC2C bottom, and iC2C internal connectors, res-
pectively.
IC2CTopConnector and IC2CBottomConnector may be extended in order to implement
filtering of notifications in the top domain of an iC2C or requests in its bottom domain,
respectively. A filtering scheme is defined by implementing the accept() method in a
subclass of IC2CTopConnector or IC2CBottomConnector. A message m is processed only if
accept(m) == true.
Subclasses of IC2CTopConnector may also implement domain translation in the top do-
main of the iC2C. The methods translateIncomingMessage() and processOutgoingMessage()
are responsible for this task and are called by FaTC2, respectively, immediately after a
message has been accepted by the iC2C top connector, and immediately before a given
message is sent by it. The iC2C bottom connector is not expected to perform domain
translation. In the C2 architectural style, an element placed in an upper layer of an
architecture should make no assumptions about elements in the lower layers [173].
In case no filtering or domain translation is necessary, the default implementations for
the iC2C top and iC2C bottom connectors may be used.
The IC2CInternalConnector class is reused without needing any specialization, since its
only task is to route messages inside an iC2C.
2.6 An Application Example
In order to show the usability of FaTC2, we present a small example extracted from the
Mine Pump Control System[163]. The problem is to control the amount of water that
collects at the mine sump, switching on a pump when the water level rises above a certain
limit and switching it off when the water has been sufficiently reduced. In this section,
we describe an implementation for the example application which uses the infrastructure
provided by FaTC2.
2.6.1 Description of the Architecture
The C2 architecture of our example is shown in Figure 2.8. The Pump component com-
mands the physical pump to be turned on/off. Component LowWaterSensor signals a
notification when the water level is low. WaterFlowSensor checks whether water is flowing
out of the sump. The IdealPumpControlStation component controls the draining of the
sump by turning on/off the pump, according to the level of the water in the sump. It
includes an exception handler which is executed when the pump is turned on but no water
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Figura 2.8: C2 configuration for the fault-tolerant Mine Pump Control System.
flow is detected. The error handler is implemented by the AbnormalPumpControlStation
component. The Pump, LowWaterSensor and WaterFlowSensor components have been im-
plemented as simple C2 components, while IdealPumpControlStation is an iC2C. In order
to build the IdealPumpControlStation, five classes are implemented: NormlPumpControlSta-
tion, AbnormalPumpControlStation, PumpControlStationTop, IdealPumpControlStation and
TranslationConnector.
Class NormalPumpControlStation implements the NormalActivity component of Ide-
alPumpControlStation, that is, the methods defined by the INormalActivityComponent in-
terface(Section 2.5.2). Due to the support provided by FaTC2, no messages need to be
explicitly sent by any of the methods in NormalPumpControlStation; that is, the architect
does not need to understand the internal protocol of the iC2C or the way it is implemen-
ted.
The AbnormalPumpControlStation class implements the exception handler of the Ideal-
PumpControlStation. When an exception message is received by the handleException()
method, the latter keeps sending new requests to Pump until either water flow is detected
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or the maximum number of retries permitted is reached. In the former case, normal acti-
vity is resumed(the method simply returns). In the latter, a FailureArchitecturalException
message is sent downwards the architecture(the method throws an IC2CFailureException).
The following code snippet partially illustrates this situation.
public Message handleException(Exception e, Request m)
throws Exception {
(...)
if(this.retries >= this.MAX RETRIES) {
throw new IC2CFailureException(e);
}
(...)
In order to send an exception message downwards the architecture, the architect should
throw a Java exception. In the example above, an exception of type IC2CFailureException,
a subtype of Exception, is thrown.
The PumpControlStationTop class provides the IdealPumpControlStation component
with an extension of the IC2CTopConnector class which performs filtering. When a request
is issued by the IdealPumpControlStation, PumpControlStationTop records the type of the
request sent, so that only a notification which is a response to that request is allowed to be
processed. To build this filtering scheme, two methods had to be implemented: accept()
and processOutgoingMessage()(Section 2.5.4).
IdealPumpControlStation is a subclass of IC2C. The IdealPumpControlStation class defi-
nes a public constructor which takes as argument the name of the IdealPumpControlStation
instance to be created. TranslationConnector translates requests and notifications at the
bottom interface of the IdealPumpControlStation (Figure 2.8).
The implementation of this architecture using FaTC2 was relatively easy, although a
large amount of glue code had to be implemented in order for the NormalPumpControlSta-
tion component to work with FaTC2. This was due to the fact that the selected example
application worked in an asynchronous manner while FaTC2 implements an iC2C which
was modelled as a synchronous (request/response) entity. This highlighted some of the
limitations of this synchronous approach and pointed out some directions we should follow
in our future research, discussed in Section 2.8.
2.7 Related Work
Software fault-tolerance at the architectural level is a young research area that has recen-
tly gained considerable attention [88]. Most of the existing works in this area emphasize
the creation of fault-tolerance mechanisms [50, 97, 145] and description of software ar-
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chitectures with respect to their dependability properties [155, 167]. Some approaches
based on the idea of design diversity [5] have been developed in the context of the re-
liable evolution of component-based distributed systems. Both the Hercules framework
[50] and the concept of Multi-Versioning Connectors [145] maintain old and new versions
of components working concurrently, in order to guarantee that the expected service is
provided, even if there are faults in the new versions. Both approaches are orthogonal to
ours and could be used in conjunction.
Stavridou and Riemenscheneider [167], and Saridakis and Issarny [155] emphasize the
formal description of architectures in order to prove they are reliable. By employing these
specifications together with refinement laws which guarantee the preservation of the reli-
ability property, both approaches intend on producing concrete architectural descriptions
which are easily translated to code. None of the two works addresses the problem of
incorporating error recovery into existing components.
The concept of iC2C[56] defines a structure for incorporating fault tolerance into
component-based systems at the architectural level. It defines an internal protocol fol-
lowed by its elements in order to enforce damage confinement [5]. Our work refines the
concept of iC2C by introducing elements which are not addressed by its definition, such
as the the representation of exception handlers and the enforcement of explicit exception
propagation.
The work by Guerra et al.[88] deals with the problem of integrating COTS components
in systems with high reliability requirements. It presents a case study where the concept
of iC2C is used, together with protective wrappers [88]. The goal of this approach is to
make non-reliable COTS components which represent a critical regions of systems reliable.
The work by Issarny and Banaˆtre [97] describes an extension to existing architecture
description languages for specifying architectural-level exceptions (configuration excep-
tions). This work differs from ours because it emphasizes fault treatment [5] at the
architectural level, by means of architecture reconfiguration. Our work, on the other
hand, emphasizes architectural-level error recovery. Furthermore, it defines exceptions
which should not be handled by any component in the architecture, that is, exception
handlers are defined for the whole architecture and are activated under specific situations.
In our approach, a component raises an architectural-level exception because it is unable
to handle it, and other components in the architecture or exception handlers attached to
enclosing configurations (as shown in Figure 2.4) may try to handle it as well.
2.8 Conclusions and Future Work
According to Sprott [166], there is a general consensus in the industry that software
components will bring profound changes to the way software is built. Even now, software
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systems built out of reusable software components are used in a wide range of applications.
Many of these systems have high dependability requirements and, in order to achieve the
required levels of dependability, it is necessary to incorporate into them means for coping
with software faults.
In this paper, we have presented ALEx, an architectural-level exception handling sys-
tem which leverages the construction of fault-tolerant component-based applications. The
use of traditional language-based exception handling systems for building fault-tolerant
component-based systems presents some challenges which have been discussed in Section
2.3. ALEx addresses these issues by instituting exception handling at the architectu-
ral level. We have also briefly described FaTC2, an object-oriented framework for the
construction of fault-tolerant component-based systems which implements ALEx.
It is important to note that architectural-level exception handling is not a replacement
for language-level exception handling. In our view, exception handling in the language
level should be the main technique for achieving fault tolerance internally to components
(intra-components). Architectural-level exception handling (inter-components) should be
employed when (i) an exception can not be handled by the component which raised it, and
some other component in the architecture might be able to handle it, and (ii) mechanisms
for error detection and recovery must be introduced in a component in order to make it
trustworthy (or more trustworthy), but the component should not be modified or its
source code is not available.
Until the present moment, the iC2C has been modeled as a synchronous (request/res-
ponse) entity and the implementation of FaTC2 conforms to this model. That means that
an iC2C is unable to handle asynchronous notifications and that requests are issued under
the assumption that a response will be eventually received. This restriction might be too
conservative for some applications, since a large amount of glue code may be necessary
if a synchronous iC2C needs to interact with asynchronous components (Section 2.6).
Hence, a future work for is the definition of an iC2C for which some of these restrictions
are relaxed.
FaTC2 still does not implement all the features defined by ALEx. Some features,
such as support for attaching handlers to arbitrary configurations and hierarchical handler
search upon the receipt of an exception (Section 2.4.3) have not been implemented yet.
Hence, another future work for FaTC2 is the implementation of the remaining features
described by the specification of ALEx.
Finally, we believe that the design and implementation of ALEx are independent
of the C2 architectural style and the iC2C. Hence, we plan to evaluate our approach
on generic layered architectures by means of an implementation which does not rely
on the concept of iC2C. In this case, new means for associating exception handlers to
components would need to be established, in order to maintain the features described in
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Section 2.4. Computational Reflection [121] and Aspect-Oriented Programming [106] are
good candidates for this task.
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2.9 Resumo do Cap´ıtulo 2
Este cap´ıtulo apresentou uma proposta de mecanismo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es para
aplicac¸o˜es baseadas em componentes. Diferentemente de mecanismos tradicionais, que
focam nas construc¸o˜es existentes em linguagens de programac¸a˜o, esse mecanismo de tra-
tamento de excec¸o˜es funciona em um n´ıvel de abstrac¸a˜o mais alto e se baseia nos elementos
que compo˜em a arquitetura de um sistema de software. Foi discutida tambe´m a influeˆncia
que o estilo arquitetural adotado, C2, tem no funcionamento do mecanismo, em particular
na propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es e na busca por tratadores. O cap´ıtulo tambe´m descreveu sucin-
tamente um arcabouc¸o orientado a objetos chamado FaTC2 que implementa o mecanismo
de tratamento de excec¸o˜es proposto.
O pro´ximo cap´ıtulo generaliza algumas das ide´ias apresentadas neste, no contexto do
estilo C2, e propo˜e uma abordagem para a descric¸a˜o da arquitetura de um sistema do
ponto de vista do seu comportamento excepcional. Essa abordagem permite que desen-
volvedores especifiquem a maneira como excec¸o˜es sa˜o propagadas em diferentes estilos
arquiteturais. Ale´m disso, torna poss´ıvel verificar diversas propriedades de interesse re-
lativas ao fluxo de excec¸o˜es entre os elementos da arquitetura. O foco do trabalho sai
da implementac¸a˜o de arquiteturas tolerantes a falhas e passa para o projeto arquitetural
do comportamento excepcional. Essa mudanc¸a de foco visa criar um ferramental que deˆ
suporte a` integrac¸a˜o confia´vel de componentes de software no n´ıvel arquitetural, evitando
incompatibilidades arquiteturais relativas ao comportamento excepcional dos componen-
tes integrados.
Cap´ıtulo 3
Especificac¸a˜o de Fluxo de Excec¸o˜es
em Arquiteturas de Software
Este cap´ıtulo se refere a` Sec¸a˜o 1.3.3 do Cap´ıtulo 1 e descreve o arcabouc¸o Aereal (Archi-
tectural Exceptions Reasoning and Analysis), um conjunto de atividades, ferramentas e
modelos para a descric¸a˜o e ana´lise do comportamento excepcional de um sistema software
a partir de sua arquitetura. Esse arcabouc¸o e´ centrado em uma nova visa˜o arquitetural,
chamada Visa˜o de Fluxo de Excec¸o˜es, que indica as excec¸o˜es geradas e tratadas (mas-
caramento e propagac¸a˜o) pelos elementos arquiteturais. Como estilos arquiteturais teˆm
pol´ıticas distintas para propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es, o arcabouc¸o da´ suporte a` definic¸a˜o de re-
gras sobre como excec¸o˜es fluem entre elementos arquiteturais em diferentes estilos. Aereal
e´ baseado em ACME [76], uma linguagem de intercaˆmbio para a descric¸a˜o de arquitetu-
ras, e Alloy [98], uma linguagem de especificac¸a˜o baseada em lo´gica relacional de primeira
ordem. Atrave´s dos conjuntos de ferramentas associados a essas linguagens [101, 157] e
das ferramentas providas por Aereal, diversas propriedades interessantes podem ser veri-
ficadas a partir da Visa˜o de Fluxo de Excec¸o˜es. Algumas dessas propriedades se referem
a` adereˆncia da arquitetura a`s restric¸o˜es impostas por diferentes estilos arquiteturais, no
tocante a` propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es. Outras dizem respeito a`s regras do mecanismo de
tratamento de excec¸o˜es que o arcabouc¸o define e a`s caracter´ısticas deseja´veis do compor-
tamento excepcional de uma aplicac¸a˜o. A abordagem proposta e´ validada atrave´s de dois
estudos de caso.
O arcabouc¸o proposto visa apoiar a integrac¸a˜o confia´vel de componentes, exigindo que
arquitetos sejam expl´ıcitos com relac¸a˜o a`s suposic¸o˜es que fazem no tocante ao compor-
tamento excepcional dos componentes integrados. E´ fato bem conhecido que suposic¸o˜es
incompletas ou incorretas sa˜o a principal causa de falhas introduzidas em um sistema
durante a etapa de integrac¸a˜o dos seus componentes [75]
O artigo que este cap´ıtulo conte´m foi publicado no Journal of Systems and Soft-
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ware [28]. Uma versa˜o preliminar [25] foi apresentada no ICSE’2005 Workshop on Archi-
tecting Dependable Systems, em maio de 2005.
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3.1 Introduction
The concept of software architecture [159] has been recognized in the last decade as a me-
ans to cope with the growing complexity of software systems. According to Clements and
Northrop [48], software architecture is the structure of the components of a program/sys-
tem, their interrelationships and principles, and guidelines governing their design and
evolution over time. It is widely accepted that the architecture of a software system has a
large impact on its capacity to meet its intended quality requirements, such as reliability,
security, availability, and performance, amongst others [11]. Software architectures are
described formally using architecture description languages, or ADLs [128]. Most ADLs
share the same conceptual basis whose main elements are architectural components (loci of
computation or data stores), architectural connectors (loci of interaction between compo-
nents), and architectural configurations (connected graphs of components and connectors
that describe architectural structure) [128]. Software architectures described in an ADL
can be analyzed by tools, in order to verify whether it satisfies some desired properties. In
particular, automated and semi-automated analysis of software architectures are valuable
tools in the construction of dependable systems.
Applications that can cause risks for human lives or risk of great financial losses are
usually made fault-tolerant [5], so that they are capable of providing their intended service,
even if only partially, when faults occur. Fault-tolerant systems include mechanisms for
detecting errors in their states and recovering from these errors. Exception handling [52]
is a well-known mechanism for structuring error recovery in software systems. Since ex-
ception handling is an application-specific technique, it complements other techniques for
improving system reliability, such as atomic transactions [83], and promotes the imple-
mentation of very specialized and sophisticated error recovery measures. Furthermore, in
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applications where a rollback is not possible, such as those that interact with mechanical
devices, exception handling may be the only choice available. An exception handling sys-
tem (EHS) helps in the construction of dependable software by imposing constraints on
the way exceptions and exception handlers may be used in a given language and detecting
violations of these constraints. For instance, the EHS of Java detects unhandled excepti-
ons at compile-time, unless the developer states explicitly that this checking should not
be performed (by declaring the exception unchecked).
Usually, a system’s error detection and handling mechanisms are developed in an ad-
hoc manner during system implementation [52, 148, 180]. However, some researchers ar-
gue that, to achieve the desired levels of reliability, mechanisms for detecting and handling
errors should be developed systematically from the early phases of development [154, 59],
that is, from requirements, passing by analysis and design (architectural design and de-
tailed design) phases. One approach that offers potential benefits to the development of
dependable systems at the architectural level is to combine ADLs and exceptions during
the design of the architecture. By extending formal architecture descriptions with infor-
mation about exceptions, developers (i) better document their decisions about the flow
of exceptions at the architectural level, (ii) make their assumptions about the EHS of the
language(s) that will be used during system implementation explicit, and (iii) can check
inconsistencies between the architecture description and the assumed EHS. Hence, in this
paper, we attempt to answer the following research question:
Research question #1: How can software architectures be enriched with
information about exceptions so that it is easy to verify some useful properties
regarding exception flow?
A generic solution to this question should deal with software architectures based on
multiple architectural styles. An architectural style defines a vocabulary of types of design
elements which are part of a family of architectures and the rules by which these elements
are composed [76]. Well-known examples are Client/Server and Publisher/Subscriber [18].
Since architectural styles dictate how components in an architecture interact, they also
impact the way exceptions flow amongst architectural elements [30]. Therefore, we refine
research question #1 to include the notion of architectural style:
Research question #2: How can software architectures be enriched with
information about exceptions so that it is easy to verify some useful properties
regarding exception flow while taking into account the constraints imposed by
different architectural styles?
We present the Aereal (Architectural Exceptions Reasoning and Analysis) framework,
which supports the extension of architectural descriptions with information about excep-
tions. These extended descriptions can be analyzed in order to check if they satisfy the
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constraints imposed by different architectural styles on how exceptions flow between ar-
chitectural elements. Moreover, it is possible to specify properties of interest regarding
exception flow and verify automatically if they are satisfied by an architecture. As ena-
bling technologies, Aereal uses Alloy [98], a first-order relational language, ACME [76],
an interchange language for architecture description, and their associated tool sets.
This work is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides some background information
on exception handling, ACME, and Alloy. Section 3.3 gives a motivation for specifying
exceptions at the architectural level and lists some requirements that a solution to research
questions #1 and #2 should satisfy. Section 3.4 provides an overview of Aereal approach
to architecture-centric software development. Section 3.5 describes two case studies we
have conducted to assess the usefulness of the framework. Section 3.6 reviews some related
works. The last section presents concluding remarks and points out directions for future
works.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Exception Handling
When a system receives a service request and produces a response according to its speci-
fication, the produced response is said to be normal. Conversely, if the system produces
a response that does not conform with its specification, this response is said to be abnor-
mal, or exceptional. Abnormal responses usually indicate the occurrence of an error and
since these responses are expected to occur only rarely, they are called exceptions. When
exceptions occur, the system should handle them in order to return to a coherent state.
The part of the behavior of a system that is responsible for handling exceptions is called
abnormal, or exceptional, activity. Conversely, the part of the behavior of a system that
is responsible for its functionality, as defined by its specification, is called normal activity.
Exception handling [52] is a mechanism for structuring the exceptional activity of a
system so that errors can be more easily detected, signaled, and handled. It is implemented
by many mainstream programming languages, such as Java, Ada, C++, and C#. These
languages allow the definition of exceptions and the corresponding handlers. The set of
exceptions and exception handlers in a system define its exceptional activity.
The concept of idealized fault-tolerant component (IFTC) [5] defines a conceptual fra-
mework for structuring exception handling in software systems. An IFTC is a component1
in which the parts responsible for the normal and abnormal activities are separated and
well-defined, within its internal structure. The goal of the IFTC approach is to pro-
vide means to structure systems so that the impact of fault tolerance mechanisms in
1In a broader sense; an object, a subsystem, a software component, or a whole systems.
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Normal Request Interface Exception
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Figura 3.1: Idealised Fault-Tolerant Component.
the overall system complexity is minimized. This eases the detection and handling of
errors. Figure 3.1 presents the internal structure of an IFTC and the types of messages
it exchanges with other components in a system.
When an IFTC receives a service request, it produces a normal response if the request
is successfully processed. If an IFTC receives an invalid service request, it signals an
interface exception. If an error is detected during the processing of a valid request, the
normal activity part of the IFTC raises an internal exception, which is received by the
exceptional activity part of the IFTC. If the IFTC is capable of handling an internal
exception properly, normal activity is resumed. If the IFTC has no handlers for an
internal exception or is unable to handle an exception for which it has a handler, it
signals a failure exception. Interface and failure exceptions are collectively called external
exceptions. In this work, it is assumed that architectural elements behave like IFTCs.
Hence, only external exceptions are taken into account, as strictly internal exceptions are
not visible architecturally.
3.2.2 ACME
ACME [76] works as both an interchange language for architecture description and an
ADL. It provides a simple structural framework for representing architectures, together
with a flexible annotation mechanism. The language does not impose any semantic in-
terpretation of an architectural description, but simply provides a syntactic structure to
which semantic descriptions can be associated. This semantic information can then the
interpreted by tools.
ACME supports the definition of four distinct aspects of architecture: (1) structure,
(2) properties of interest, (3) constraints, and (4) types and styles. Structure aspect defi-
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nes the organization of a system into its constituent parts, components, connectors, and
attachments between these elements. The properties of interest aspect defines syntactic
structures to which semantic information can be associated and analyzed by tools. Cons-
traints are guidelines for how the architecture can change over time. The types and styles
aspect defines classes and families of similar architectures.
In ACME, architectural styles are called families. An ACME family defines types of
architectural elements that can be used in architectures that adhere to a specific archi-
tectural style and constraints on instances of these types. An ACME family2 can extend
another one by means of subtyping. Extension in ACME works as in object-oriented lan-
guages; all the elements defined by the parent ACME family are visible in and part of the
child family. Architectural element types defined by a child ACME family may extend
element types defined by the parent ACME family. Subtyping relations between element
types work in the same way as subtyping relations between ACME families. Multiple
inheritance is allowed and name conflicts result in invalid ACME families/element types.
Figure 3.2 presents part of the ACME definition of the Client/Server architectural
style. The ClientAndServerFam family in the Figure 3.2 defines two types of components,
ClientT and ServerT (Lines 6 and 9), and one type of connector, CSConnT (Line 13).
Instances of each component type have exactly one access point, or “port” in ACME
terminology (Lines 7 and 10). The ServerT component type has an integer property
indicating the maximum number of concurrent requests an instance is capable of handling.
In ACME, the access points of a connector (to which component ports are attached) are
called “roles”. Instances of CSConnT have two roles, one for the client and one for the
server (Lines 14 and 15). Moreover, connector type CSConnT defines a simple constraint
indicating that connectors of this type have exactly two roles (Line 16).
Figure 3.3 shows a partial definition of a very simple ACME system. An ACME
system is an architecture description adhering to 0 or more architectural styles. Elements
in an ACME system are instances of the element types defined by the styles to which
it adheres. System NetBanking adheres only to the Client/Server style (Lines 2-3). It
defines two components, InternetBankingServer (Lines 6-12) and Client1 WebBrowser (14-
20), of types ServerT and ClientT, respectively, and one connector, conn (Line 13), of type
CSConnT. Architectural structure is specified by defining attachments between component
ports and connector roles. The receivedRequest port of InternetBankingServer is attached
to the serverSide role of conn and the sendRequest port of Client1 WebBrowser is attached
to the clientSide role of conn (Lines 4 and 5). Elements in a system can define instance-
specific properties. In the example, both InternetBankingServer and Client1 WebBrowser
define instance-specific properties regarding their positions in the screen (Lines 8-9, 16-
17).
2In the rest of the paper, we use the terms “ACME family” and “architectural style” interchangeably.
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1 Family ClientAndServerFam = {
2 Port Type ClientPortT = { ... }
3 Port Type ServerPortT = { ... }
4 Role Type clientSideRoleT = { ... }
5 Role Type serverSideRoleT = { ... }
6 Component Type ClientT = {
7 Port sendRequest : ClientPortT = new ClientPortT ;
8 }
9 Component Type ServerT = { ... }
10 Port receiveRequest : ServerPortT = new ServerPortT ;
11 Property max-concurrent -requests : int ;
12 }
13 Connector Type CSConnT = {
14 Role clientSide : clientSideRoleT = new clientSideRoleT;
15 Role serverSide : serverSideRoleT = new serverSideRoleT;
16 invariant size(self.roles) == 2;
17 }
18 }
Figura 3.2: ACME definition of the Client/Server style.
Architectural modeling in ACME is supported by AcmeStudio [157]. AcmeStudio is an
architecture development environment that allows the definition of new architectural styles
and the modeling of systems which instantiate these styles using an intuitive graphical
user interface. The environment includes a constraint solver called Armani [134] that
checks whether an architecture satisfies the constraints defined by the styles to which it
adheres.
Aereal assumes that architecture descriptions are written in ACME. Although other
ADLs could be employed, some reasons have made us choose ACME: (i) it focuses on
the structure of the system; (ii) it has powerful constructs for defining new architectural
styles; (iii) it is extensible by the use of properties; and (iv) it has mature tool support.
Since ACME is both an ADL and an interchange language, developers may employ other
ADLs for modeling specific aspects of the system and then translate these specifications
to ACME [77], so that they can be used with Aereal.
3.2.3 Alloy
Alloy [98] is a lightweight modeling language for software design. It is amenable to a fully
automatic analysis, using the Alloy Analyzer (AA) [101], and provides a visualizer for
making sense of solutions and counterexamples it finds. Similarly to other specification
languages, such as Z and B [3], Alloy supports complex data structures and declarative
models.
In Alloy, models are analyzed within a given scope, or size. The analysis performed
by the AA is sound, since it never returns false positives, but incomplete, since the AA
only checks things up to a certain scope. However, it is complete up to scope; the AA
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1 import families \ ClientAndServerFam.acme;
2 System Netbanking : ClientAndServerFam =
3 new ClientAndServerFam extended with {
4 Attachment Client1_WebBrowser.sendRequest to conn.clientSide ;
5 Attachment InternetBankingServer .receiveRequest to conn.serverSide ;
6 Component InternetBankingServer : ServerT = new ServerT extended with {
7 Port receiveRequest : ServerPortT = new ServerPortT extended with {
8 Property vis-x : float = 20.0;
9 Property vis-y : float = -25.0;
10 };
11 ...
12 };
13 Connector conn : CSConnT = new CSConnT ;
14 Component Client1_WebBrowser : ClientT = new ClientT extended with {
15 Port sendRequest : ClientPortT = new ClientPortT extended with {
16 Property vis-y : float = 65.0;
17 Property vis-x : float = 176.0;
18 };
19 ...
20 };
21 ...
22 };
Figura 3.3: A trivial ACME system.
never misses a counterexample which is smaller than the specified scope. As pointed out
by the Alloy tutorial [99], small scope checks are still very useful for finding errors.
Alloy is used by Aereal for analyzing exception flow mainly because (i) it focuses on
how data is specified, an important feature for modeling exceptions as data objects [72];
(ii) it supports automated analysis; (iii) it has a mature constraint solver; and (iv) it is
simpler and arguably easier to use than similar languages, such as B.
3.3 Specification of Exceptions at the Architectural
Level
Usually, a large part of a system’s code is devoted to error detection and handling [52, 148,
182]. However, since developers tend to focus on the normal activity of applications and
only deal with the code responsible for error detection and handling at the implementation
phase, this part of the code is usually the least understood, tested, and documented [52,
148]. In order to achieve the desired levels of reliability, mechanisms for detecting and
handling errors should be developed systematically throughout all the phases of software
development [59, 154]. As pointed out by many authors [11, 47, 165], the architecture
of a software system has a strong impact on its ability to meet its intended quality
requirements, for example, security, reliability, availability, and performance. Thus, if
a system should be reliable and exception handling is one of the mechanisms that will
be used to achieve this goal, it may be beneficial to consider exception handling-related
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issues during architectural design.
At the architectural level, an exception is a signal (message, event, language-level
exception, etc.) employed by an architectural element to indicate to other elements that
it has failed. An element that potentially receives an exception should be capable of
doing something about it. During architectural design, it may still be too early to know
exactly what. However, the design of an architecture involves assigning responsibility to
architectural elements [48]. Therefore, it should be known at least which elements raise
which exceptions, which elements are responsible for handling a certain exception, and
which elements, upon receipt of an exception, just propagate it. This small amount of
information is enough to reason about relevant properties regarding exception handling,
for example, whether an exception raised by an element is actually handled by some other
element in the architecture.
Architects often need to understand the architecture of a system from various perspec-
tives, according to specific quality attributes. Architectural views [109] represent different
aspects of the same architecture and each view shows how the architecture achieves a
particular quality attribute [11]. These quality attributes are usually characterized in
terms of properties of interest that the architecture should satisfy. A view for analyzing
properties of interest about exception flow should include information such as: (i) the
exceptions that each architectural element raises, handles, and propagates; and (ii) how
exceptions flow between these elements. The following subsection presents an example of
a view that describes the flow of exceptions in the architecture of an air traffic control
(ATC) system. This example was extracted from a popular textbook on software archi-
tectures [11]. We highlight some of the limitations of the informal approach employed to
specify this view. Section 3.3.2 lists some requirements we believe that any approach for
modeling exceptions at the architectural level should satisfy.
3.3.1 A Motivating Example
An Air Traffic Control (ATC) system is a large-scale complex distributed system with
very strict availability and performance requirements, meaning that the system should
function 24/7 and timing deadlines must be met absolutely. The ATC system is an en
route system which controls aircrafts from soon after takeoff until shortly before landing.
Its end users are the air traffic controllers. It has a layered software architecture with one
subsystem cooperating with others for services.
Due to its high availability requirements, the architects of the system designed a fault
tolerance view of the software architecture (Figure 3.4) [10]. This structure describes how
the faults are detected and isolated, and how the system recovers. So, besides presenting
ways of detecting and isolating faults which belongs to specific components, the fault-
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Figura 3.4: Fault tolerance architectural view of an ATC system.
tolerant hierarchy is designed do trap and recover from errors which are a consequence of
cross-application interactions.
In Figure 3.4, the names of the components are abbreviated. Arrows indicate flow
of exceptions between components (layers) of the architecture and a layer that receives
exceptions from another layer is responsible for handling those exceptions. The idea of
the authors is to express a hierarchical depiction of the system where layers that are closer
to the top implement more general exception handling strategies. Each one of the eleven
components of the architecture presented in Figure 3.4 has a specific role, as shown in
Table 3.1.
The architecture of Figure 3.4 conveys useful information about exceptions in the
system. For example, it is clear that exceptions flow from the Network component to the
Local/Group A.M. and O/S E.A.S. components. It is also clear, due to the topology of the
system, that the M&C Console and ATC Console layers have the most general exception
handlers. This is expected, since, in an ATC system, users should always be notified of
unhandled exceptions [11]. However, in spite of these useful pieces of information, the
fault tolerance view of Figure 3.4 has some important shortcomings. First, this view does
not specify what are the exceptions that each layer raises and handles. Second, it is not
possible to infer whether there are relevant cause-effect relations between the exceptions
that layers receive and signal. For example, there is no way of knowing whether the
exceptions signaled by Local/Group A.M to G.A.M are a consequence of the exceptions
received by the former from Network. Third, the view expresses a strictly hierarchical
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Tabela 3.1: Components in the fault-tolerance view of the ATC system.
Component Description
Monitor & Control Console Gives an overview of the state of the system. It has special software
(M&C Console.) to support monitoring and controlling functions and provides
the top-level availability management functions.
ATC Console A user console. It is also used by the controllers and is the access
point to services which do not require a strict control of availability.
Global Availability Monitor Manages the availability of functions within the suite. It determines
(G.A.M.) which of the multiple redundant copies of an application program
within a sector suite is the primary copy and should thus
receive messages
Local/Group A set of application-level system services. It is responsible for
Availability Manager (A.M.) managing the initiation, termination, and availability of the
application programs.
Application Software Operational Represents the application-level system services
Unit (A.S.O.U.)
Operating System Extensions Provides additional system services that are necessary to support a
Address Space (O/SE.A.S.) fault-tolerant distributed system. UNIX does not provide all these
services.
Network Provides communication to the redundant services in a transparent
way. There are at least two networks: a local communication
network (LCN), and a backup communication network (BCN). The
latter is used in some LCN failure conditions.
Operating System. A UNIX operating system.
Processor The hardware that processes software instructions. Due to a design
choice, redundant processors must exist.
I/O Devices The device tasks are optional and are only present for applications
that directly communicate with a device driver.
Attachments The data, which either is necessary to process the application
functions, or is stored as a result of a service.
structure for exception flow. It might not be appropriate to describe in the same manner
the flow of exceptions in software architectures where components are peers. Fourth, it
is not clear what a double-headed arrow means. These shortcomings could be alleviated
by additional documentation complementing the diagram, but we did not find mention
to such a documentation [10].
3.3.2 Requirements
To avoid the shortcomings highlighted in Section 3.3.1, we believe an effective approach
for modeling exceptions at the architectural level should satisfy the following basic requi-
rements:
Req.1: It should make it possible to unambiguously distinguish the exceptions that ar-
chitectural components and connectors signal and catch, and how these exceptions flow
between different architectural elements. Moreover, it should also be possible to specify
the exceptions that an architectural element handles, the exceptions it raises, and the
ones it propagates.
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Req.2: To enhance maintainability, the specification of exceptions at the architectural
level should be orthogonal and traceable to the “normal” architecture description.
Req.3: It should be supported by a pictorial (boxes-and-lines) representation, in order
to be understandable by non-specialists and easier to use.
Req.4: It should take into account the notion of architectural styles. The approach should
support the extension of traditional styles, such as layered (as in Section 3.3.1) and pu-
blisher/subscriber, with information about exceptions, in order to take into account the
particularities of each style.
Req.5: It should support automated analysis. In this manner, it is possible to verify in
a cost-effective way if the architecture presents some desired properties before the system
is actually implemented.
Req.6: It should make it easy to verify if an architecture description adheres to rules
defined by EHS of real-world programming languages, such as Java, Ada, C++, and C#.
3.4 The Aereal Framework
Architecture-based development with Aereal starts with the traditional activities of a
software development process, namely, requirements analysis and architectural design
of the system. It is also necessary to define scenarios in which the system may fail
(fault model), what exceptions correspond to each type of error, and where and how
the exceptions are handled (exceptional activity). The specification of the system’s fault
model and exceptional activity can be conducted as prescribed by some works in the
literature [154, 54]. The most important results of these activities are a description of
the system’s architecture and informal specifications of the system’s fault model and
exceptional activity.
The use of Aereal in architecture-centric development involves the following activities:
1. Defining how exceptions flow between architectural elements for each architectural
style used in the architecture description. This information is specified by defining
new architectural styles, called exceptional styles, that complement the traditional
(i.e. Client/Server, Layered) ones. Hereafter we call the latter normal styles.
2. Specifying the Exception Flow View of the software architecture. This view depicts
the components that catch or signal exceptions (called exceptional components), as
well as special connectors through which exceptions flow between these components
(exception ducts). An exception flow view adheres to one or more exceptional styles.
3. Composing the architecture description with the exception flow view, producing
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Figura 3.5: Overview of the Aereal framework.
an architecture description extended with information about exceptions (or simply
extended architecture description).
4. Analyzing structural constraints, that is, checking whether the architecture descrip-
tion violates any of the constraints defined by the exceptional styles to which it
adheres.
5. Generating an Alloy specification from the extended architecture description.
6. Analyzing exception flow based on the generated Alloy specification.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the main components of Aereal. In the figure, ovals represent
artifacts and rectangles with rounded corners represent activities. Some of the ovals are
dashed to indicate that they are either part of the infrastructure of the framework or
generated automatically. An Aereal specification consists of a set of ACME system and
family descriptions. One ACME system specifies the components and connectors view of
the system [11]. The remaining ACME systems specify the exception flow views of the
architecture. The ACME families specify architectural styles, both normal and exceptio-
nal, to which the ACME systems adhere. The definition of the exceptional activity and
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Figura 3.6: Architecture of a simple Internet Banking system.
the ACME architectural description in Figure 3.5 are assumed to exist and be produced
as part of the software development process being used.
Figure 3.6 shows a high level components and connectors view of the architecture of an
Internet Banking (IB) system. In the figure, components and connectors are represented
by rectangles and circles, respectively. The architecture of the sytem adheres to the
Client/Server architectural style. In the rest of this section, we use the IB system to
make a more detailed presentation of Aereal.
The following subsections provide a detailed description of the workflow supported by
Aereal.
3.4.1 Defining exceptional styles
Aereal uses special-purpose architectural connectors to model exception flow between
components. These connectors, called exception ducts, are unidirectional point-to-point
links through which only exceptions flow. Exception ducts may be refined when new
exceptional styles are defined. In this manner, the specificity of each architectural style
may be taken into account. The idea that simple point-to-point connections are suitable
general-purpose abstractions for modeling style-independent communication between ar-
chitectural components was proposed by Mehta and Medvidovic [129]. We have tailored
this idea to our specific needs. This structural perspective on exception flow was adopted
because: (i) it is intuitive to architects, who are used to thinking in terms of components
and connectors; (ii) it is compatible with well-established views on what exception flow
is [52]; and (iii) it is easy to integrate with the concept of architectural style. It abstracts
away issues such as flow of control and flow of data.
Aereal includes a basic architectural style (an ACME family) called SingleExcFam on
which all exceptional styles are based. SingleExceptionFam defines types that designate
architectural elements that catch and/or signal exceptions. A new exceptional style must
extend (be subtype of) two styles: SingleExcFam and the normal style to which it corres-
ponds. The latter must be extended in order to make it possible to specify invariants for
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the new exceptional style that also involve elements of its corresponding normal style. It
is possible to create many different exceptional styles for a single normal style and use
some or all of them in an architecture description.
Style-specific features are introduced in a new exceptional style by creating subtypes
of the element types that SingleExcFam defines and adding new internal elements (e.g.
new ports in a component type), properties, and invariants. ExceptionalComponent is the
supertype of all architectural components that deal with exceptions. By default, instances
of ExceptionalComponent have no ports. New exceptional styles have to define subtypes of
ExceptionalComponent that have ports, in order to specify whether instances of the type
signal or catch exceptions, or both. SingleExcFam defines two port types, CatcherPortT
and SignalerPortT, indicating that a component catches and signals exceptions, respecti-
vely. The supertype of all exception ducts is (for historical reasons) ExceptionalConnector.
Since exception ducts are point-to-point channels, instances of this type have exactly two
roles, of types CatcherRoleT and SignalerRoleT.
Example
Figure 3.7 presents a partial definition of the Exceptional Client/Server architectural
style (ExceptionalClientAndServerFam ACME family). ExceptionalClientAndServerFam ex-
tends SingleExceptionFam and ClientAndServerFam (Lines 3 and 4). It defines two types
of exceptional components, ExceptionalClientT and ExceptionalServerT (Lines 5 and 9),
corresponding to clients and servers, respectively, and one type of exception duct, Ex-
ceptionalCSConnT (Line 13). Instances of ExceptionalClientT have a single port, of type
CatcherPortT (Line 6). Instances of ExceptionalServerT also have a single port, of type
SignalerPortT (Line 9). The invariants in lines 7 and 11 guarantee that ExceptionalClientT
and ExceptionalServerT have no other ports. The invariant in lines 14-22 describes a ge-
neral pattern of exception flow that can be specialized by each exceptional style. It states
that if there is an exception duct linking two exceptional components in an exception flow
view, then these components must exist as normal components in the normal architectu-
ral description and there must be a normal connector (a connector of type CSConnT, as
shown in Line 20) linking them.
3.4.2 Specifying the exception flow view
An exception flow view comprises the components from the architecture description that
signal or catch exceptions and exception ducts connecting these components. It adhe-
res to one or more exceptional styles, depending on the normal styles the architecture
description uses. Each element in an exception flow view is annotated with information
about exceptions. All the elements in an exception flow view are instances of types that
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1 import families \ SingleExceptionFam.acme;
2 import families \ ClientAndServerFam.acme;
3 Family ExceptionalClientAndServerFam extends SingleExcFam,
4 ClientAndServerFam with {
5 ...
6 Component Type ExceptionalClientT extends ExceptionalComponent with {
7 Port catchesPort : CatcherPortT = new CatcherPortT;
8 invariant size(self.ports) == 1;
9 }
10 ...
11 Component Type ExceptionalServerT extends ExceptionalComponent with {
12 Port signalsPort : SignalerPortT = new SignalerPortT;
13 invariant size(self.ports) == 1;
14 }
15 ...
16 Connector Type ExceptionalCSConnT extends ExceptionalConnector with {}
17 invariant Forall c1 : ExceptionalClientT in self. components |
18 Forall c2 : ExceptionalServerT in self.components |
19 Forall conn : ExceptionalCSConnT in self.connectors |
20 (( attached (conn, c1) AND attached (conn, c2) AND
21 connected (c1, c2)) -> ( satisfiesType(c1, ClientT ) AND
22 satisfiesType(c2, ServerT ) AND
23 (Exists normalConn : CSConnT in self. connectors |
24 attached (normalConn , c1) AND attached ( normalConn , c2)) ))
25 << label : string = "OK.";errMsg : string = "Problems .";>>;
26 ...
27 }
Figura 3.7: Partial definition of the Exceptional Client/Server style.
the exceptional styles to which it adheres define. Aereal represents exception flow views
as ACME systems.
The element types that SingleExcFam defines declare properties that are used to asso-
ciate information about exceptions to architectural elements. In the exception flow view,
instances of these types assign values to these properties. This information is taken into
account during exception flow analysis (Section 3.4.4). Table 3.2 lists the properties de-
clared by the element types of SingleExcFam and informally describes their semantics. All
the properties in the table, except for the last one, are declared by ExceptionalComponent
and ExceptionalConnector. Element types CatcherPortT and CatcherRoleT only declare
properties handles, catches, and propagates. Element types SignalerPortT and SignalerRo-
leT only declare properties raises and signals. Only instances of SignalerPortT use property
catcherPorts.
In the exception flow view, values assigned to properties declared by exceptional com-
ponents and exception ducts add up to the values assigned to the homonym properties
declared by associated ports and roles, respectively. For example, if an exceptional com-
ponent C assigns value {RemoteException} to property raises and signaler port P of
C assigns value {IOException} to its homonym property, it is assumed that the value
of property raises for P is {RemoteException, IOException}. This semantics makes it
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Tabela 3.2: Properties employed by the exception flow view to associate information
about exceptions to architectural elements.
Property Description
signals The set of exceptions signaled by an architectural element.
Aereal automatically computes signals from the values assigned
to raises, handles, and propagates for all the elements in an
exception flow view. Optionally, it is possible to manually specify
a set of exceptions. In this case, Aereal verifies if the element
actually signals the exceptions during exception flow analysis.
catches The set of exceptions caught by an architectural element.
Similarly to signals, computed automatically by Aereal.
handles The set of exceptions that an architectural element handles.
In this case, “handles” means that the handler for the exception
does not end its execution by raising an exception. After
handling, normal execution is resumed.
propagates This property is a variation of handles where the handler ends
its execution by raising an exception. The propagates property
specifies a cause-consequence relationship between an exception
that an element catches and an exception that it signals.
raises The set of exceptions that an element raises. Since only external
exceptions are taken into account by Aereal, raises is
a subset of signals
catcherPorts The set of ports of type CatcherPortT associated
to a port of type SignalerPortT. Exceptions caught by
these catcher ports and not handled or propagated by the
element are signaled through the associated signaler port.
If catcherPorts is left unspecified for a given
signaler port, Aereal assumes that this port is associated
to all the catcher ports of the element.
possible to specify that different ports of the same component manipulate different sets
of exceptions while retaining the ability to specify a common denominator. A similar
rationale applies to exception ducts and roles.
Usually, unlike exceptional components, exception ducts are connectors that do not
exist in the normal architecture description. They are orthogonal to “regular” connectors,
in the sense that they do not necessarily follow the same rules for message/data passing
and transfer of control. For instance, an exception duct between components that adhere
to the Publisher/Subscriber style may or may not indicate transfer of control, depending
on the semantics of the application. In our approach for exception flow analysis, this
is not of utmost importance because we are not modeling system behavior. Moreover,
even though a set of components in a Publisher/Subscriber architecture may communi-
cate through a single normal connector, there may be several exception ducts between
these components, depending on how the components may fail and which is responsible
for handling which exceptions.
Example
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The IB system’s exception flow view only uses the Exceptional Client/Server style, de-
fined by ExceptionalClientAndServerFam, since only the Client/Server style is used in the
architecture description. It is important to notice, however, that various architectural
styles could have been used.
Figure 3.8 shows part of the ACME definition of the IB system’s exception flow view.
This ACME system adheres to the Exceptional Client/Server architectural style (Lines
2-3). Line 9 specifies that the InternetBankingServer component signals an exception cal-
led RequestNotProcessedException. This exception is raised by the component itself (Line
8). Lines 14 and 15 state that exeception duct ExceptionalCSConnT0 catches exceptions
of type RequestNotProcessedException and signals exceptions of type RemoteException,
respectively. Furthermore, Lines 16-17 specify that ExceptionalCSConnT signals Remote-
Exception as a consequence of catching RequestNotProcessedException.
1 import families \ ExceptionalClientAndServerFam .acme;
2 System ExceptionalNetbanking : ExceptionalClientAndServerFam =
3 new ExceptionalClientAndServerFam extended with {
4
5 Component InternetBankingServer : ExceptionalServerT =
6 new ExceptionalServerT extended with {
7 Port signalsPort : SignalerPortT = new SignalerPortT extended with {
8 Property raises : Set {} = { RequestNotProcessedException };
9 Property signals : Set {} = { RequestNotProcessedException };
10 };
11 };
12 Connector ExceptionalCSConnT0 : ExceptionalCSConnT =
13 new ExceptionalCSConnT extended with {
14 Property catches : Set {} = { RequestNotProcessedException };
15 Property signals : Set {} = { RemoteException };
16 Property propagates : Sequence <> =
17 < RequestNotProcessedException , RemoteException >;
18 };
19 ...
20 };
Figura 3.8: Exception flow view of the IB system.
3.4.3 Composing architecture description and exception flow vi-
ews
Structural constraints are evaluated after an extended architecture description is gene-
rated. This description is produced by the Composer tool, which is provided by Aereal.
This tool reads the architecture description and the exception flow view and updates the
former with exception-related information defined by the latter. This organization pro-
motes separation of concerns at the architectural level, since the architecture description
does not refer to the exception flow view, and the two exist as separate design artifacts
and are composed automatically.
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Figure 3.9 presents pseudo-code describing part of the functioning of the Composer. In
the pseudo-code, variables representing architectural elements have fields through which it
is possible to access their internal elements. For example, variable excFlowView represents
the whole exception flow view and has the fields families and components, among others.
The first is the set of all exceptional styles to which the exception flow view adheres and
the second is the set of components in it. The Composer works by copying elements
(components, connectors/exception ducts, ports in a component, attachments, etc.) from
the exception flow view to the architecture description. Each element is identified by
its name. The scope of an element is the architectural element of which it is part, for
example, the scope of a component is a whole system, the scope of a port is a component,
etc.
When the Composer attempts to copy an exceptional component for which there is a
homonym component in the architecture description, the tool copies the properties and
ports that store exception-related information (Table 3.2) to the component in the archi-
tecture description. As for exception ducts, to avoid conflicts between homonym ducts
that appear in different exception flow views, the names of these elements are altered
during composition and attachments involving them are updated to reflect these changes.
It is not possible to combine existing exception ducts in the same way as exceptional
components because this could potentially create exception ducts linking more than two
components. Since the composition process has, by default, a “union” semantics, instead
of “overwrite”, many different exception flow views can be composed with the same ar-
chitecture description simultaneously. This supports a step-by-step development process
where various exception flow views are specified for different parts of the architecture
description. In later phases of system development, these views can be combined and
analyzed in conjunction.
Structural constraints analysis employs the Armani constraint solver [134] or AcmeS-
tudio (which includes Armani) to check if the extended architecture description satisfies
the invariants defined by the exceptional styles to which it adheres. Violations of these
invariants result in error messages.
Example
Figure 3.10 presents the components and connectors view of the extended architecture
description of the IB system, as produced by the Composer. Notice that between the
server and each client there are two connectors, a normal Client/Server connector and an
exception duct.
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1 Composer (ACMESystem excFlowView , ACMESystem archDescription) {
2 // families stores the set of families to which a system adheres
3 for each F in excFlowView .families
4 if (F not in archDescription.families ) add F to archDescription.families
5 for each EC:ExceptionalComponent in excFlowView .components {
6 if ( archDescription.components contains an element NC:Component
7 such that NC.name = EC.name) {
8 // types stores the set of types of which an element is an instance
9 for each T in EC.types
10 if (T not in NC.types) add T to NC.types
11 for each P:Set in EC.properties such that SingleExcFam defines P
12 // NC also has P because it is an instance of all the
13 // types of which EC is an instance
14 NC.P = NC.P + EC.P // set union and assignment
15 for each port PSE: SignalerPortT in EC.ports
16 if ( there is no PSN in NC.ports such that PSN.name = PSE.name)
17 add PSE to NC.ports
18 else if ( SignalerPortT in PSN.types)
19 for each P:Set in PSE.properties such that SingleExcFam defines P
20 PSN.P = PSN.P + PSE.P // set union and assignment
21 else report an error
22 ... // The same for ports of type CatcherPortT
23 }
24 else add EC to archDescription.components
25 }
26 ... // copy exception ducts/roles
27 for each A in excFlowView .attachments
28 if not (A in archDescription. attachments )
29 add A to archDescription.attachments
30 else report an error
31 }
Figura 3.9: Algorithm executed by the Composer tool.
3.4.4 Analyzing exception flow
To analyze how exceptions flow in the architecture, it is necessary to generate an Alloy
specification corresponding to the extended ACME description. Since generating the
Alloy specification manually is a difficult and error-prone activity, Aereal provides a tool,
called Converter, that automatically translates an extended ACME description to Alloy.
The Converter works according to the following steps:
1. Read the ACME descriptions corresponding to the extended architecture description
and the architectural styles (both normal and exceptional).
2. Build a language-independent representation of the architecture. This intermediate
representation is based on a system model described elsewhere [26]. It includes
architectural elements that are instances of types defined by exceptional styles and
exception-related information associated to these elements through relations that
correspond to the properties listed of Table 3.2. During the construction of the
intermediate representation, the Converter discards information about architectural
styles because this information is not used during exception flow analysis.
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Figura 3.10: Extended architecture description of the Internet Banking system.
3. Compute signaled and caught exceptions. As pointed out in Section 3.4.2, the sets
of exceptions that each architectural element signals and catches are automatically
computed by Aereal. Manually-specified sets of signaled and/or caught exceptions
are preserved by this process.
4. Write the text file comprising the Alloy specification of the system.
Exception flow analysis consists in verifying if the generated Alloy specification satisfies
Alloy predicates corresponding to properties of interest. The properties of interest that a
system must satisfy are split in three categories: basic, desired, and application-specific.
Basic properties define the well-formedness rules of the model, the characteristics of valid
systems. They specify the exception handling mechanism assumed by Aereal, which
is based on C++’, and how software architectures are structured. Examples of basic
properties are presented below, stated informally.
BP1. Architectural elements signal all the exceptions they raise.
BP2. All exception ducts catch exceptions from and signal exceptions to exactly one
exceptional component.
BP3. The graph formed by using exceptional components as vertexes and exception ducts
as edges is connected.
BP4. Architectural elements signal all the exceptions they catch and do not handle.
Desired properties are general properties that are usually considered beneficial, although
they are not part of the basic exception handling mechanism. In general, they assume
that the basic properties hold. Some examples are the following.
DP1. Architectural elements do not have handlers for exceptions they do not catch.
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DP2. All the exceptions caught by an architectural element are handled by it, even if
some of its handlers end their execution by raising exceptions (explicit exception
propagation [72]).
DP3. No unhandled exceptions.
Application-specific properties are rules regarding the flow of exceptions in a specific
application. The Alloy definition of the exception handling mechanism used by Aereal
(Figure 3.5) includes the specifications of several basic and desired properties that can be
used “as-is”. Developers only specify additional desired properties and application-specific
properties, if any. The AA is employed to analyze the exception flow. If a property of
interest is violated, the AA generates a counterexample with a configuration of the system
for which the violated property of interest does not hold. Otherwise it notifies the user
that the system may be valid.
By default, all exceptions are subtypes of RootException. It is possible to specify in
Alloy a type hierarchy for the exceptions. For example, to mimic the EHS of Java, at
least four exception types would be necessary: (i) Throwable, subtype of RootException;
(ii) Exception, subtype of Throwable; (iii) Error, subtype of Throwable; and (iv) Runtime-
Exception, subtype of Exception. Application-specific exceptions would inherit from these
exception types. This type hierarchy is then taken into account when exception flow is
analyzed. If no exception type hierarchy and no checks beyond the default ones are ne-
cessary, no knowledge of Alloy is required to use the framework.
Example
Figure 3.11 defines two Alloy predicates named bp1 and dp1, formally specifying properties
BP1 and DP1, respectively. Alloy predicates are logic sentences that must be checked by
the AA. In the body of the predicates, raises, signals, catches, propagates, handles,
and catchesFrom are names of relations that associate exception information to the ele-
ments of the system. For instance, the signals relation specifies what are the exceptions
that a component signals and the exception ducts that catch them. The “.” operator re-
presents relational join. For example, given raises ∈ Component↔Duct↔RootException
and C ∈ Component, where Component, Duct, and RootException are sets, C.raises =
ES constrains the image of C under relation raises to be ES ∈ Duct↔RootException.
Predicate bp1() states that the set of exceptions that a component raises is a subset
of the exceptions it signals. Predicate dp1() specifies that the set of exceptions that a
component handles is a subset of the exceptions it catches. The operators all, <:, &&,
and in represent, respectively, universal quantification, domain restriction, logical con-
junction, and subset. A more detailed description of the system model defined by Aereal
is available elsewhere [26].
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1 /* Basic property BP1 */
2 pred bp1 () {
3 all C : Component | (C.raises in C.signals )
4 }
5 /* Desired property DP1 */
6 pred dp1 () {
7 all C : Component | all D : Duct | D in C.catchesFrom &&
8 D.(C.handles ) in D.(C.catches ) &&
9 (D.(C.catches ))<:(D.(C.propagates ))=D.(C. propagates )
10 }
Figura 3.11: Properties BP1 and DP1 specified in Alloy.
Figure 3.12 shows a counterexample generated by the AA when we analyzed exception
flow in the Alloy specification of the IB system. This counterexample indicates that the
generated Alloy specification violates basic property BP1. The error has been detected
because we have modified the exception flow view of the IB system (Figure 3.8) so that
InternetBankingServer signals RequestNotProcessedException but it does not raise it.
3.5 Evaluation
To assess whether Aereal meets the requirements of Section 3.3.2, we undertook two case
studies to answer the following experimental questions:
EQ1. Does the abstraction for exception flow employed by Aereal, exception ducts, sup-
port the specification of exception flow views based on different architectural styles?
EQ2. Can Aereal help developers in gaining a deeper understanding of a system’s excep-
tional activity?
EQ3. How useful is Aereal in the task of finding design errors and inconsistencies in the
exceptional activity of a system?
EQ4. Does the approach employed by Aereal scale up well for systems with a large
number of components, ducts, and/or exceptions?
The targets of the case studies were (i) a textbook example mining control system [163]
(Section 3.5.1) and (ii) a financial system that registers and controls checkbooks, account
contracts, and credit limits (Section 3.5.2). The latter was developed in an industrial
setting and is part of a real application deployed in several companies.
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Figura 3.12: A counterexample generated by AA.
3.5.1 Mining Control System Case Study
The case study is based on a simplified version of the control system for the mining
environment [163]. The extraction of minerals from a mine produces water and releases
methane gas to the air. The mining control system is used to drain mine water from a
sump to the surface, and to extract air from the mine when the methane level becomes
high. A schematic representation of the mining system is given in Figure 3.13. The mining
control system consists of three control stations: one that monitors the level of water in
the sump, one that monitors the level of methane in the mine, and another that monitors
the mineral extraction. When the water reaches a high level, the pump is turned on and
the sump is drained until the water reaches a low level. A water flow sensor is able to
detect the flow of water in the pipe. However, the pump is situated underground, and for
safety reasons it must not be started, or continue to run, when the amount of methane in
the atmosphere exceeds a safety limit. For controlling the level of methane, there is an air
extractor control station that monitors the level of methane inside the mine, and when
the level is high an air extractor is switched on to remove air from the mine. The whole
system is also controlled from the surface via an operator console that should handle any
emergencies raised by the automatic system.
Figure 3.14 shows the components and connectors view of the architecture of the mi-
ning system [154]. This representation is related to the logical architecture of the system,
that is, it describes the conceptual organization of the design elements into groups, inde-
pendently of their physical packaging. In this architecture, collaborations between compo-
nents are performed from higher to lower layers. Arrows between the software components
indicate data flow between them. Components from upper layers make service requests
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Figura 3.13: Schematic diagram of the mining system.
to components from lower layers and the latter produce responses that can be normal or
exceptional. This architecture view uses only the layered architectural style [159].
The system can fail in several ways. All the sensors (MethaneHigh, AirFlow, WaterHigh,
WaterLow, and WaterFlow) and actuators (AirExtractor, Pump, and MineralExtrator) may
fail. Errors in these components are detected by the corresponding control stations.
Sensors can fail by stopping to send information to their corresponding control stations.
However, when they do send information, the latter is assumed to be correct. Actuators
can fail by not working when switched on and not stopping to work when switched off.
ControlStation
MineralExtractorControl
MineralExtractor
OperatorInterface
Pump
WaterFlow
PumpControlAirExtractorControl
AirExtractor
MethaneHigh
AirFlow WaterLow
WaterHigh
Figura 3.14: Architecture design of the mining control system.
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Tabela 3.3: Exceptions related to the AirExtractorControl component.
Exception Description
AirExtractorOffException The level of methane is high, the air extractor is on,
but no air flow is detected.
AirExtractorOnException The level of methane is normal, the air extractor is
off, but the sensor detects air flow.
SensorFailureException A timeout occurs while the AirExtractorControl
component is waiting for information from the sensors.
Whenever an error is detected, the detecting control station signals an exception to the
ControlStation component, which attempts to interrupt execution and activate an alarm.
We assume that communication between components is reliable. Table 3.3 shows the
different types of exceptions that can be raised by AirExtractorControl. Exceptions raised
by the other control stations follow the same pattern, except for MineralExtractorControl,
which does not signal sensor-related exceptions. A detailed description of the exceptional
activity of the mining system is available elsewhere [154].
This case study was conducted in two phases. Phase 1 (Section 3.5.1) addresses experi-
mental questions EQ2 and EQ3. Phase 3 (Section 3.5.1) specifically targets experimental
question EQ1. Both phases were conducted by one of the authors.
Applying Aereal - Phase 1
We started by applying the workflow presented in Figure 3.5 to the mining control sys-
tem. The first activity consisted in describing the architecture of Figure 3.14 in ACME,
using the definition provided by AcmeStudio for the layered architectural style. We then
specified an exceptional layered style, represented by the ExceptionalLayeredFam ACME
family. The latter is similar to the ExceptionalClientAndServerFam family (Section 3.4.1),
but simpler. This simplicity is mainly due to two factors. First, exceptional components
in layered architectures do not have ports by default, since any component is capable of
(not)signaling/catching exceptions. This differs from Client/Server architectures, where
responsibility for signaling and catching exceptions is unambiguously assigned to each type
of component. Second, layered architectures have only one type of component, namely,
the layer. A strictly layered style [18], where only adjacent layers communicate, would
impose additional constraints, but we have not taken these constraints into account.
The following activity consisted in specifying the exception flow view of the architec-
ture. Initially, this view comprised only the AirExtractorControl, PumpControl, Minera-
lExtractorControl, and ControlStation components. The former three are responsible for
detecting errors and signaling exceptions to the latter, which handles them. According to
the specification of the system’s exceptional activity [154], the expected behavior of Con-
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trolStation when it receives exception AirExtractorOnException is to “activate an external
alarm, in order to notify the system operator about the existence of a safety threat, and
shut down the system”. Since the alarm is external to the system and its activation does
not involve any exceptions being signaled by it or by ControlStation, we have not included
it in the exception flow view. This approach faithfully reflects the specification of the
system’s exceptional activity. The problem with it, though, is that the operator of the
system does not receive any information about the safety threat when the alarm rings.
This seems unrealistic since the reason to ring the alarm is to notify the operator that it
might be necessary to manually intervene, in order to avoid catastrophic damage. If the
operator does not know anything about the safety threat that triggered the alarm, it is
not possible to respond promptly.
In order to avoid the aforementioned problem, the ControlStation component should
inform the operator about the nature of the threat. The natural way to do this is through
the OperatorInterface component. However, the original specification of the mining sys-
tem states that the two components only interact to start/stop mineral extraction. We
interpret this is an incompleteness in the specification. To solve the problem, we modified
the handling strategy of ControlStation. Besides attempting to shut down the system and
activating the alarm, the handler now signals an exception, EmergencyException, to Ope-
ratorInterface. This new exception encapsulates the one that was caught, which includes
information about the safety threat, and is handled by the OperatorInterface component.
Two reasons motivated the choice of representing this interaction as an exception, ins-
tead of an additional service request: (i) the ControlStation component is notifying the
OperatorInterface that an error occurred and exceptions are the natural means to do this;
and (ii) ControlStation is located in a lower layer and service requests only flow from up-
per layers to lower layers, not the other way around. Figure 3.15 show part of the final
specification of the ControlStation component.
After finishing the specification of the exception flow view, we used the Composer and
Converter tools to produce the Alloy specification corresponding to the architecture of the
mining system. We then used the AA to analyze exception flow and the latter reported
that the specification satisfied all the basic and desired properties.
Applying Aereal - Phase 2
The second phase of the case study consisted in describing the mining control system
using different modeling approaches. More specifically, our intent was to use different
architectural styles, in order to provide at least an initial answer to experimental question
EQ1. We produced two alternative designs for the mining system. The first one adheres
to the C2 [173] architectural style and is an adaptation of another work [89]. The second
alternative design for the mining system was an exercise aimed at assessing the difficulty
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1 Component ControlStation : layerT , ExceptionalLayerT =
2 new layerT , ExceptionalLayerT extended with {
3 ... // other stuff
4 Port CatcherPortT0 : CatcherPortT = new CatcherPortT extended with {
5 Property propagates : Sequence <> =
6 < AirExtractorOnException , EmergencyException , ... >;
7 Property catches : Set {} = { AirExtractorOnException ,
8 AirExtractorOffException , SensorFailureException };
9 };
10 Port CatcherPortT1 : CatcherPortT = new CatcherPortT extended with {
11 Property propagates : Sequence <> =
12 < SwitchPumpOnException , EmergencyException , ... >; ... };
13 Port CatcherPortT2 : CatcherPortT = new CatcherPortT extended with { ... };
14 Port SignalerPortT0 : SignalerPortT = new SignalerPortT extended with {
15 Property catcherPorts : Set {} =
16 {CatcherPortT0, CatcherPortT1, CatcherPortT2};
17 Property signals : Set {} = { EmergencyException };
18 };
19 };
Figura 3.15: Partial ACME specification of the ControlStation component.
of describing an exception flow view for an architecture that adheres to more than one
architectural style.
In the C2 style, components communicate by exchanging asynchronous messages sent
through connectors, which are responsible for the routing, filtering, and broadcasting
of messages. Figure 3.16 shows a software architecture using the C2 style where the
elements A, B, and D are components, and C is a connector. A configuration is a set of
components, connectors, and links between these elements. Components and connectors
have a top interface and a bottom interface (Figure 3.16). Systems are composed in a
layered style, where the top interface of a component may be linked to the bottom interface
of a connector and its bottom interface may be linked to the top interface of another
connector. Each side of a connector may be connected to any number of components or
connectors. Two types of messages are defined by the C2 style: requests, which are sent
upwards through the architecture, and notifications, which are sent downwards.
As in Phase 1, we started by defining exceptional styles corresponding to the normal
styles used in the architecture of each system. In the case of C2, we also had to specify
the ACME family corresponding to the normal style. Specifying the exceptional C2 style
in ACME was more difficult than doing the same for the layered and Client/Server styles.
There were two reasons for this: (i) C2 has more complex topological rules than the styles
we had seen so far and the corresponding exceptional style must respect these rules; and
(ii) since connectors in C2 can be linked directly and ACME does not allow this, we had to
model both C2 components and C2 connectors as ACME components. ACME connectors
were used as links. Figure 3.17 presents an invariant from the ExceptionalC2Fam ACME
family. This complex invariant states that there can only be an exception duct linking
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Figura 3.16: An example of software architecture based on the C2 style.
the signaler port of a component Cx and the catcher port of a component Cy if there is
also a normal connector between these components such that: (i) the bottom interface of
component Cx is linked to the top interface of the connector; and (ii) the top interface of
component Cy is linked to the bottom interface of the connector.
1 invariant Forall conn : ExceptionalC2MessageBusT in self. connectors |
2 Exists normalConn : C2MessageBusT in self.components |
3 (Forall Cy : ExceptionalC2ComponentT in self.components |
4 ( reachable (normalConn , Cy) AND ( Exists cp : CatcherPortT in Cy.ports |
5 Exists cr : CatcherRoleT in conn.roles |
6 (attached (cp, cr)) ) ) -> ( Exists link2 : C2LinkT in self.connectors |
7 (Exists tdp : TopPort in Cy.ports |
8 Exists bdp : BottomPort in normalConn .ports |
9 size(intersection(tdp.attachedRoles, link2.roles)) > 0 AND
10 size(intersection(bdp.attachedRoles, link2.roles)) > 0 AND
11 size(intersection(tdp.attachedRoles, bdp. attachedRoles)) == 0 ))) AND
12 (Forall Cx : ExceptionalC2ComponentT in self.components |
13 reachable (normalConn , Cx) -> ( Exists sp : SignalerPortT in Cx.ports |
14 Exists sr : SignalerRoleT in conn.roles |
15 (attached (sp, sr))) -> ( Exists link1 : C2LinkT in self.connectors |
16 (Exists bdp : BottomPort in Cx.ports |
17 Exists tdp : TopPort in normalConn .ports |
18 size( intersection(bdp. attachedRoles, link1.roles )) > 0 AND
19 size( intersection(tdp. attachedRoles, link1.roles )) > 0 AND
20 size( intersection(bdp. attachedRoles, tdp.attachedRoles)) == 0)));
Figura 3.17: An invariant defined by the ExceptionalC2Fam ACME family.
After finishing the ACME definition of the exceptional C2 style, we specified the C2-
based exception flow view of the mining system. This task was straightforward because of
the experience acquired in Phase 1. We then proceeded to generate the Alloy specification,
and analyze exception flow. The AA reported that the specification satisfied all the basic
and desired properties.
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Figura 3.18: Extended architecture description of the multi-style mining control system.
The second alternative design for the mining control system uses three different archi-
tectural styles: Publisher/Subscriber, layered, and Client/Server. The subconfiguration
that comprises components OperatorInterface and ControlStation adheres to the Client/-
Server style. The subconfiguration comprising ControlStation, MineralExtractorControl,
PumpControl, AirExtractorControl, and the sensor components adheres to the Publisher/-
Subscriber architectural style. Finally, the subconfiguration that comprises the three
actuators and their corresponding control stations adheres to the layered style. Some
of the components play different roles in different subconfigurations. For example, Con-
trolStation is a server in the first subconfiguration, and a publisher and subscriber in the
second.
The exception flow view for the second alternative design only uses two exceptional
styles: exceptional Publisher/Subscriber (ExceptionalPubSubFam ACME family) and ex-
ceptional Client/Server. It does not adhere to the exceptional layered style because no
exceptions flow between the components of the layered subconfiguration. Figure 3.18 pre-
sents a diagram of the system’s extended architecture description. The larger rectangles
represent components, the circles and the vertical bar are normal connectors, and the
small rectangles and the losangle with the Exc label are exception ducts.
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Discussion
By modeling the flow of exceptions in the architecture of the mining system, we perceived
that, even though proper handling of errors required manual intervention from the sys-
tem’s operator, the latter did not receive any information about the nature of these errors.
This was stressed by the fact that the component responsible for handling exceptions did
not directly interact with the operator, nor provided any information to components that
did. Arguably, applying the Aereal approach to the mining control system gave us a
deeper understanding of the system and, thus, helped in uncovering a design problem.
The experience of using three different approaches to model the mining system was
positive. The ACME language allows the specification of different exceptional styles and
adoption of more than one style by the same architecture description. Since Aereal is
based on ACME and adopts a structural approach for the specification of exception flow,
it leverages the features supported by the language. As shown in Section 3.5.1, it was
possible to describe even complex exceptional style invariants. Furthermore, the task of
describing a multi-style exception flow view was straightforward because all the exceptio-
nal styles have to extend the same ACME family and adhere to a predefined set of design
rules (Section 3.4.1). This approach makes the specification of exception flow views uni-
form and, to a certain degree, independent of different exceptional styles. Furthermore,
the Alloy specification abstracts away style-related information (Section 3.4.4) and re-
tains only structural and exception-related information from the exception flow views.
Therefore, in spite of the differences between the three designs of the mining system, the
generated Alloy specifications for them are almost identical.
The first phase of the case study required approximately 13 developer hours. The
second phase, including the specification of the C2Fam and ExceptionalC2Fam ACME
families, required 16 developer hours.
3.5.2 Financial System Case Study
This case study consisted on developing part of a financial system with strict dependability
requirements. The system belongs to the domain of banking applications and was being
developed by a medium-sized Brazilian company specialized in banking automation. The
part of the system that we used for the case study supports six basic operations:
1. Solicitation of checkbooks. The customer requests a check-book (in person, by phone,
through the Internet, etc.).
2. Delivery of checkbooks. The system manages the delivery of previously requested
check-books.
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3. Cancellation of checks. In cases of loss, theft, or another specific reason, the customer
can cancel checkbooks.
4. Retention of checks. The retention of a check occurs during a deposit in check. These
checks are restrained and processed for future payment.
5. Cancellation of accounting contract. At any time, the customer can lose the credit of
his account. In these cases, the contract of the customer must be canceled.
6. Inclusion of additional limit. Depending on necessity and credit conditions, the cus-
tomer can receive an additional credit limit.
Operations #1-3 can be initiated by an operator or by a customer. Operations #4-6
can only be initiated by an operator of the system. Operations Cancellation of Accounting
Contract and Cancellation of Checks have very strict availability requirements and should
be online 24/7. The operations presented above were described as use cases. In this
paper, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on the Cancellation of Accounting Contract use
case. A very detailed specification of the financial system is available elsewhere [14]. The
specification of each use case includes the input information expected by the system,
normal, alternative, and exceptional scenarios, and assertions (pre and postconditions).
Exceptional scenarios were derived from violations of assertions and alternative scenarios
triggered by errors.
The financial system was developed using the MDCE+ method [54], which is an exten-
sion of the UML Components process [41] that includes activities for specifying a system’s
exceptional activity. The case study was planned by the authors and executed by two
other developers, one of them a specialist in the domain of the application. The validation
of the specified architecture was performed by one of the authors. The goal of this case
study was twofold: (i) to gather experience from the use of Aereal in an industrial setting;
and (ii) to assess the scalability of the Aereal approach.
The architecture of the financial system adheres to the layered architectural style. It
has four layers: user interface, system, business, and database. The system and business
layers implement the application-dependent and application-independent business rules,
respectively. Components in the business layer can be reused across different applicati-
ons from the same domain, since they are application-independent. The user interface
and database layers are self-explanatory. Figure 3.19 presents part of the components
and connectors view of the financial system. Following the previously adopted notation,
components are represented by rectangles and normal connectors by circles. The diagram
depicts the part of the system’s architecture that is relevant to the Cancel Accounting Con-
tract use case. Component AccountOps from the system layer implements the business
logic of the use case. To provide its intended functionality, AccountOps interacts with
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Figura 3.19: Partial components and connectors view of the architecture of the Financial
System
three components from the business layer, AccountMgr, AgencyMgr, and ParticipantMgr.
The existence of two AccountMgr components stems from availability requirements of the
system.
The system can fail in several ways and for a number of different reasons. For example,
the AccountOps component alone signals 15 different types of exceptions. In total, there
are more than 50 types of exceptions that flow between architectural components. This
large number of exceptions stems from a development policy adopted by the organization
where the case study was conducted. According to this policy, even very similar errors and
situations that are not normally treated as errors generate new exception types. Table 3.4
shows some of the exceptions that AccountOps may signal.
Tabela 3.4: Some exceptions signaled by the AccountOps component.
Exception Description
InvalidAgencyException The provided agency number does not belong to
any valid agency.
InvalidAccountException The provided account number does not match
any of the accounts of the customer.
AlreadyCanceledException The accounting contract for the provided account
has already been canceled.
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1 pred dp2 () {
2 all C: Component | let nonHandled = (C.catches - C.handles )
3 | ( all CF : C. catchesFrom | #( CF <: nonHandled ) > 0 =>
4 ((# nonHandled > 0 => #( C.propagates ) > 0) &&
5 all E: CF. nonHandled | #(E.(CF.(C.propagates ))) > 0))
6 }
Figura 3.20: Alloy specification of property DP2.
Applying Aereal
We created four different exception flow views for the architecture of the financial system.
The exception flow views specify the exceptional activity of the system in the execution of
use cases Solicitation of checkbooks, Delivery of checkbooks, Cancellation of checks, Retention
of checks, and Cancellation of accounting contract. It was not necessary to define new
ACME families for this case study because the architecture of the system adheres only
to the layered architectural style. The effort necessary to describe the four exception
flow views based on the development documentation of the system was approximately 8
developer hours.
Exception flow analysis was performed in two phases. In the first phase, we compo-
sed each exception flow view with the architecture description and generated an Alloy
specification for each resulting extended architecture description. During exception flow
analysis, the AA pointed out some misspellings and omissions in the Alloy specificati-
ons. These problems were a consequence of errors in the exception flow views. After
fixing the errors, we attempted to verify the Alloy specifications again, but the AA pro-
duced counterexamples indicating that the specifications did not satisfy desired property
DP2 (Section 3.4.4). Figure 3.20 shows the formal specification of this property in Alloy.
The operators -, =>, and # mean set subtraction, logical implication, and set cardina-
lity, respectively, and the declaration let associates an alias to an expression. For each
component in the Alloy specification, predicate dp2() selects all the exceptions that the
component catches but does not handle and checks if it propagates them. It is important
to stress that the terms “handle” and “propagate” follow the terminology introduced in
Table 3.2.
The fact that the Alloy specification does not satisfy property DP2 can be a problem
or not, depending on (i) the implementation language of the system, and (ii) the design
principles adopted for system implementation. In some languages, such as CLU [118] and
Guide [112], a method must handle all the exceptions it catches, even if handling consists
in simply re-raising the exceptions. Moreover, there are methodologies [54, 154] that
advocate the use of explicit exception propagation even for languages that do not require
it, such as Java and C#. In these two cases, a specification of the flow of exceptions in
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Discussion
Aereal provided valuable assistance in the task of finding mistakes in the specification of
the Financial System’s exceptional activity. Although most of these problems are simple
to correct, failure to address them can result in problems that are harder to correct
in later phases of development. Moreover, it was possible to automatically validate a
policy adopted by the EHSs of some programming languages without having to actually
implement the system. The results we obtained from this case study and the one described
in Section 3.5.1 do not demonstrate the universal usefulness of Aereal in the construction
of software systems with strict dependability requirements. They do show, however, that
the Aereal approach is useful in some cases, and justify further studies that can provide
more substantial evidence.
This case study has shown that scalability is still a limitation of the Aereal approach.
For an Alloy specification comprising 9 components, 8 ducts, and 40 exceptions, it was not
possible to perform exception flow analysis. This problem does not represent a general
trend, as we have successfully conducted five case studies so far and 40 is an unusually large
number of exceptions visible at the architectural level. It requires immediate attention,
nevertheless, because it was detected during the development of a real application, not a
textbook example. Section 3.7 points directions for future work in this area.
3.6 Related Work
3.6.1 Architectural Analysis and ADLs
Several approaches for specifying software architectures so that they are passive to auto-
mated analysis have been proposed. Most of them define new ADLs that target specific
aspects of a software system. These ADLs are usually based on some underlying forma-
lism that is well-supported by tools. Wright [4] specifications can be translated to CSP
and analyzed for deadlock freedom and interface compatibility. Rapide [120] is based on
partially-ordered event sets. The language supports simulation of architecture descripti-
ons and analysis of the event patterns produced by components. Darwin [122] is based
on π-calculus and can be used to specify dynamic software architectures. Abowd and his
coleagues [2] use Z to formalize and compare architectural styles.
ADLs such Wright and Rapide, which target the specification of system behavior, have
many interesting features and could be used to analyze exception flow in architecture
descriptions. However, these languages fail to address some important requirements. For
instance, it is not possible to define a type hierarchy for events in Wright. Hence, it
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is not possible to check if a component catches exceptions by subsumption3. Moreover,
Rapide does not support the notion of architectural style. Although the language allows
certain styles to be simulated, this is not possible in many commonplace situations [137].
A more general problem is that these ADLs do not separate the specification of a system’s
normal and exceptional activities. This separation decreases the impact of error recovery
mechanisms on the overall complexity of the system [5, 56, 146]. Finally, using these ADLs
and associated tools to analyze exception flow in software architectures would require
that developers specify the EHS to be supported from the ground up, a cumbersome and
daunting task. In this work, we propose a more specific approach for analyzing exception
flow in architecture descriptions. On the one hand, it does not present the aforementioned
shortcomings. On the other hand, it has a narrower scope and is not intended to be a
general-purpose solution for architecture design.
Some works have focused on formally characterizing architectural styles and using
them as a basis for analysis of software architectures [76, 165]. Aereal builds upon these
works but focuses on the analysis of exception flow at the architectural level. To the best
of our knowledge, this is an aspect of software architecture that has not been addressed
in the literature.
Approaches that take a formal description of a software architecture as starting point
to produce code that preserves reliability-related properties achieved by the architecture
have been proposed with different motivations. SADL [167] is an ADL for building hierar-
chies of architectural descriptions where descriptions located at lower levels of a hierarchy
are refinements of descriptions at upper levels. Theorem proving techniques are used to
show that refinements are valid and preserve safety, security, and fault tolerance pro-
perties. Saridakis and Issarny [155] attempt to characterize the semantics of software
architectures from the standpoint of reliability properties. This characterization makes it
possible to reuse software architectures in different systems while guaranteeing that the
desired reliability properties are maintained in all refinement steps Our work differs from
these works because it focuses on the verification of specific properties related to exception
flow. These properties can be verified in the context of architectural styles, architectu-
ral elements, or whole systems. The aforementioned works emphasize more general fault
tolerance properties related to the behavior of a system as a whole. In this sense, our
work is complementary to previous efforts. Moreover, Aereal separates the definition of
the normal and exception activities of a system, whereas previous works do not make this
distinction. Finally, these works do not attempt to model the EHS of existing program-
ming languages. This restricts their applicability because exception handling is usually
employed in the implementation of fault tolerance mechanisms.
3An exception E is caught by subsumption if it is caught by a catch clause that targets a supertype
E’ of E.
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3.6.2 Exceptions at the Architectural Level
In recent years, several works proposing the use of exception handling at the architectural
level to build dependable systems have appeared in the literature. Bass et al [10] report
that, during the development of an air-traffic control system, a system with high depen-
dability requirements, it was necessary to devise a new architectural view that explicitly
represented the flow of exceptions between components in the system. This view should
provide enough information to help developers to understand how the system deals with
errors. Section 3.3.1 described this work in detail.
Issarny and Banaˆtre [97] describe an extension to existing ADLs for specifying global
invariants whose violations are called “configuration exceptions”. This work emphasizes
fault treatment [5] at the architectural level, by means of architecture reconfiguration.
The concept of idealized C2 component [56] defines a structure for associating exception
handlers to architectural components that adhere to the C2 architectural style [173].
Castor et al [30] have refined the notion of idealized C2 component and proposed an
architectural EHS and implementation infrastructure addressing the specific concerns of
component-based systems. Unlike the Aereal approach, these works do not provide means
for defining how exceptions flow in different architectural styles. Moreover, they do not
focus on the description and analysis of exceptions at the architectural level. Although
the work on configuration exceptions presents a proposal for extending existing ADLs
with information about exceptions, it focuses on a very specific type of exception that is
not signaled or handled in the traditional sense (because exceptions do not flow between
architectural elements). Hence, it is not straightforward, based on this proposal, to specify
what exceptions are signaled or caught by a given component.
Some authors have proposed frameworks [162, 179] that support the detection and
handling of exceptions in component-based platforms, such as J2EE. These frameworks
provide means to introduce error detection mechanisms, such as monitors, pre, and post-
conditions, in components in a non-invasive way. Moreover, they define hotspots that
simplify the implementation of handlers and the association of these handlers with com-
ponents. These implementation infrastructures are complementary to Aereal. They pro-
vide a link between architecture description and system implementation when designing
for specific architectural styles and component platforms.
3.6.3 Exception Flow Analysis
Several works [64, 150, 156, 186] propose static analyses of source code that generate
information about exception flow. Usually, this information consists in the exception
propagation paths in a program and is used, for example, to discover uncaught exceptions
in languages with polymorphic types, such as ML. Robillard and Murphy [150] present a
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brief survey of these techniques and tools.
Our approach leverages previous proposals for exception flow analysis, most notably
Schaefer and Bundy’s [156], but differs in focus. On the one hand, the Aereal approach
targets the early phases of development and is broader in scope. It prescribes a conceptual
framework for documenting and analyzing the flow of exceptions between architectural
elements, and provides mechanisms to integrate this conceptual framework with existing
tools for architecture-centric software development and software verification. Further-
more, since the emphasis of Aereal is on the architectural design phase, it explicitly takes
into account the concept of architectural style. On the other hand, static analysis tools are
employed when an application is already implemented, mainly to find bugs in exception
handling code and to improve program understanding.
3.7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented Aereal, a framework for analyzing exception flow in software
architectures. Aereal works as an adaptable architectural-level EHS, that is, developers
can add or remove constraints to the EHS according to their needs. Due to its combination
of ACME and a structural approach for representing exception flow, it is possible to define
how exceptions are propagated in a style-specific manner. This is a powerful feature
since different architectural styles usually impose different constraints on how components
communicate.
Developers of systems with strict dependability requirements benefit from using Aereal
in the following ways: (i) by better documenting their decisions about exceptions that
flow amongst architectural elements; (ii) by making explicit their assumptions about the
EHS of the language(s) that will be used during system implementation; (iii) by checking
structural constraints imposed by exceptional styles; and (iv) by verifying inconsistencies
between the architecture description and the assumed EHS. Moreover, Aereal completely
separates the exception flow view of a software architecture from its normal components
and connectors view, and provides tools to compose these views automatically. This
feature promotes better understandability and maintainability because concerns do not
get cluttered in a single architecture description.
There are currently several limitations to the Aereal approach, besides the ones dis-
cussed in Section 3.5. The notion of architectural style is based on ACME’s and, as such,
focuses only on the structure of a system. However, an architectural style involves several
other issues [129, 137], for example, communication, control flow, and data flow. Hence,
our approach for describing exception flow is effective only as long as it is possible to
describe exception flow abstractly in terms of system structure. Also, there are still no
automated means for extracting an exception flow view from the implementation of a
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system. Tools such as Jex [150] provide some help in this task, but do not implement a
complete solution and further studies are required to evaluate how productive this appro-
ach would be. Improving traceability between code and architecture is an active area of
research [1, 81].
The evaluation of Aereal conducted so far indicates directions for future work. First,
and most obvious, is improving scalability. We envision two complementary approaches
to alleviate the scalability problems we discovered while conducting the Financial System
case study. The first is to optimize Aereal’s system model by removing redundant infor-
mation, in order to decrease the amount of RAM memory required to analyze exception
flow. For example, ACME properties signals and catches (Section 3.4.2) and their repre-
sentations in Aereal’s system model could be unified into a single abstraction. The two
exist only because of historical reasons. The second is to implement a tool that checks if
an Alloy specification satisfies all the basic properties of the EHS supported by Aereal.
This would drastically reduce the complexity of the checks the AA performs, hence decre-
asing the amount of memory that verification requires. This change will not compromise
the flexibility of the framework, since the basic properties do not change and any valid
system must satisfy them.
An interesting issue that arises with the composition of exception flow views and
architecture description is what exactly does it mean to adhere to an architectural style.
For example, since one of the invariants of the ClientAndServerFam ACME family states
that a client has exactly one port, does adding a catcher port to a client component
in a Client/Server architecture makes that component conceptually invalid? In terms of
ACME invariants, the answer is “yes”. In this situation, it is necessary to modify violated
invariants of the “normal” style in order for the extended architecture description to be
valid. For the invariant above, this would mean stating that a client has exactly one port
of type ClientPortT. This modified invariant expresses the intent of the original invariant
without being overly restrictive. In the studies we conducted so far (five case studies
involving 10 different ACME families, normal and exceptional), this kind of modification
was sufficient to accommodate the introduction of exceptional styles. Further evaluation
is required, though, to understand if it applies in general.
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3.8 Resumo do Cap´ıtulo 3
Este cap´ıtulo apresentou uma abordagem para tornar mais rigoroso o projeto arquitetural
do comportamento excepcional de sistemas de software. Essa abordagem complementa
metodologias que prescrevem atividades para o projeto do comportamento excepcional
do sistema e e´ centrada no arcabouc¸o Aereal. Foi ilustrado o uso desse arcabouc¸o para
a descric¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional de um sistema, atrave´s da Visa˜o Arquitetural
de Fluxo de Excec¸o˜es, e para a verificac¸a˜o de propriedades relativas a` maneira como
excec¸o˜es fluem entre componentes na arquitetura. Os dois estudos de caso realizados com
o fim de avaliar a abordagem proposta mostraram seus benef´ıcios, em especial a maneira
como ajuda a tornar expl´ıcitas as suposic¸o˜es que arquitetos fazem sobre os componentes
integrados no sistema, e colocaram em evideˆncia suas limitac¸o˜es. Esse estudo de caso
fornece evideˆncia de que a Hipo´tese de Pesquisa 1 (Cap´ıtulo 1, Sec¸a˜o 1.3.1) pode ser
va´lida.
Conforme mencionado anteriormente, Aereal funciona como um mecanismo de trata-
mento de excec¸o˜es arquitetural. O arcabouc¸o especifica regras sobre como excec¸o˜es fluem
entre elementos arquiteturais e o que esses elementos podem fazer com elas. Essas regras
sa˜o descritas de maneira precisa em um modelo, representado na Figura 3.5 pelo oval ro-
tulado Definition of the Exception Handling Mechanism (in Alloy), usado como entrada
para a atividade de ana´lise de fluxo de excec¸o˜es. O pro´ximo cap´ıtulo descreve esse modelo
em detalhes.
Cap´ıtulo 4
Ana´lise de Fluxo de Excec¸o˜es no
Nı´vel Arquitetural
Este cap´ıtulo se refere a` Sec¸a˜o 1.3.4 do Cap´ıtulo 1 e apresenta um modelo gene´rico
que define quais sa˜o responsabilidades de cada componente arquitetural, no tocante ao
lanc¸amento, recebimento e tratamento de excec¸o˜es, e como excec¸o˜es fluem entre esses
componentes. O cap´ıtulo e´ uma continuac¸a˜o direta do Cap´ıtulo 3 e, consequentemente,
tem seu foco na integrac¸a˜o dos componentes de software de um sistema.
O modelo apresentado neste cap´ıtulo inclui um conjunto de regras formalmente espe-
cificadas que descrevem o funcionamento do mecanismo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Esse
modelo pode ser mapeado de forma quase direta para linguagens de especificac¸a˜o bem
conhecidas, como Alloy [98] e B [3], e suas instaˆncias descrevem arquiteturas de sistemas
de software. Atrave´s das ferramentas associadas a essas linguagens, e´ poss´ıvel verificar de
maneira automa´tica se a arquitetura de um sistema satisfaz diversas propriedades de in-
teresse relativas ao seu comportamento excepcional. Adicionalmente, essas propriedades
tornam expl´ıcitas as suposic¸o˜es que arquitetos fazem sobre o comportamento excepcional
dos componentes em um sistema, por exemplo, quais sa˜oas excec¸o˜es que se espera que
um determinado componente efetivamente mascare (e na˜o apenas aquelas que ele e´ capaz
de tratar). Este cap´ıtulo, em particular, foca no mapeamento do modelo proposto para a
linguagem Alloy.
O artigo que este cap´ıtulo conte´m sera´ publicado como um cap´ıtulo do livro Rigorous
Development of Complex Fault-Tolerant Systems [27] da se´rie Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Uma versa˜o preliminar [26] foi apresentada no FM’2005 Workshop on Rigorous
Engineering of Fault-Tolerant Systems, em julho de 2005.
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4.1 Introduction
Exception handling [52] is a well-known mechanism for structuring error recovery in fault-
tolerant software systems. Since exception handling is an application-specific technique,
it complements other techniques for improving system reliability, such as atomic tran-
sactions [83], and promotes the implementation of sophisticated error recovery measures.
Furthermore, in applications where backward error recovery is not possible, such as those
that interact with mechanical devices, exception handling may be the only choice availa-
ble.
Usually, a large part of a system’s code is devoted to error detection and handling [52,
148, 182]. However developers tend to focus on the normal activity of applications and
only deal with code responsible for error detection and handling at the implementation
phase, in an ad hoc manner. Hence, this part of the code is usually the least understood,
tested, and documented [52, 148]. To achieve the desired levels of reliability, mechanisms
for detecting and handling errors should be developed systematically from early pha-
ses of software development [154], starting from requirements, and passing by analysis,
architectural design, detailed design, and, finally, implementation.
The concept of software architecture [159] has been recognized in the last decade
as a means to cope with the growing complexity of software systems. According to
Clements and Northrop [48], software architecture is the structure of the components of
a program/system, their interrelationships and principles, and guidelines governing their
design and evolution over time. It is widely accepted that the architecture of a software
system has a large impact on its capacity to meet its intended quality requirements,
such as reliability, security, availability, and performance, amongst others [11, 47]. There
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are many proposals in the literature [4][76][120] of notations and techniques to formally
describe software architectures to show how they achieve specific quality attributes, such
as adherence to interaction protocols [4], and architectural styles [76]. These approaches
are usually supported by tools that automatically or semi-automatically verify whether
an architecture satisfies some previously-defined properties of interest.
An important challenge faced by developers of fault-tolerant systems is to build fault
tolerance mechanisms that are reliable. If a system should be reliable and exception
handling is one of the mechanisms that can be employed to achieve this goal, it may be
beneficial to consider exception handling-related issues before the implementation phase;
in particular during architectural design. This idea goes hand-in-hand with the notion
that exception handling should be taken into account from early phases of software de-
velopment, in order to define the exceptional activity of the system. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there are currently no approaches for the specification and analy-
sis of exception-related information at the architectural level. As pointed out by Bass
and his coleagues [10], specifying how exceptions flow between architectural components
is a real problem that appears in the development of systems with strict dependability
requirements, such as air-traffic control and financial.
This paper proposes an approach for describing software architectures extended with
information about exception flow based on a formal model that supports reasoning about
exception flow-related properties of interest. Furthermore, our solution allows one to auto-
matically verify whether an architecture satisfies these properties of interest. The ability
to formally specify and verify the flow of exceptions in a system can help in the detection
of ambiguities, mistakes, and incompletenesses, thus improving the system’s overall reli-
ablity. We present a model for reasoning about exception flow in software architectures.
This model specifies the structuring of an architecture in terms of architectural compo-
nents (loci of computation and data stores) and connectors (loci of interaction), as well
as information relative to exception flow amongst these elements. We show how systems
adhering to this model can be automatically verified using the Alloy [98] specification
language and its associated tool set.
This work is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides some background on exception
handling and the Alloy design language. Section 4.3 describes the overall approach that we
propose for extending architecture descriptions with exception flow-related information.
Section 4.4 presents the proposed model for reasoning about the flow of exceptions at the
architectural level. A mix of informal explanations and set theory notation is employed.
Section 4.5 describes how the proposed model can be used to verify exception flow in
architecture descriptions. Section 4.6 compares the proposed model with some related
research. The last section rounds the paper and points directions for future works.
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4.2 Background
4.2.1 Exception Handling
Exception handling [52] is a mechanism for structuring error recovery in software systems
so that errors can be more easily detected, signaled, and handled. It is implemented by
many mainstream programming languages, such as Java, Ada, C++, and C#. These
languages allow the definition of exceptions and their corresponding handlers. The set of
exceptions and exception handlers in a system define its abnormal or exceptional activity.
When an error is detected, an exception is generated, or raised. If the same excep-
tion may be raised in different parts of a program, different handlers may be executed,
depending on the place where the exception was raised. The choice of the handler that
is executed depends on the exception handling context (EHC) where the exception was
raised. An EHC is a region of a program where the same exceptions are handled in the
same manner. Each context has an associated set of handlers that are executed when
the corresponding exceptions are raised. Typical examples of EHCs in object-oriented
languages are blocks, methods, and classes [72]. At the architectural level, contexts are
usually defined by architectural components and connectors [30].
The concept of idealized fault-tolerant component (IFTC) [5] defines a conceptual fra-
mework for structuring exception handling in software systems. An IFTC is a component
(in a broader sense; an object, a software component, a whole system, etc.) in which the
parts responsible for the normal and abnormal activities are separated and well-defined,
within its internal structure. The goal of the IFTC approach is to provide means to
structure systems so that the impact of fault tolerance mechanisms in the overall system
complexity is minimized. This solution eases the detection and handling of errors. Fi-
gure 4.1 presents the internal structure of an IFTC and the types of messages it exchanges
with other components in a system.
When an IFTC receives a service request, it produces a normal response if the request
is successfully processed. If an IFTC receives an invalid service request, it signals an
interface exception. If an error is detected during the processing of a valid request, the
normal activity part of the IFTC raises an internal exception, which is received by the
exceptional activity part of the IFTC. If the IFTC is capable of handling an internal
exception properly, normal activity is resumed. If the IFTC has no handlers for an internal
exception or is unable to handle an exception, it signals a failure exception. Interface and
failure exceptions are collectively called external exceptions. An IFTC might also catch
external exceptions signaled by other IFTCs and attempt to handle them. In this work, it
is assumed that architectural elements behave like IFTCs. Hence, only external exceptions
are taken into account, since internal exceptions are encapsulated inside components and
connectors.
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Figura 4.1: Idealized Fault-Tolerant Component.
4.2.2 Alloy
Alloy [98] is a lightweight modeling language for software design. It is amenable to a fully
automatic analysis, using the Alloy Analyzer (AA) [100], and provides a visualizer for
making sense of solutions and counterexamples it finds. Similarly to other specification
languages, such as Z and B [3], Alloy supports complex data structures and declarative
models.
In Alloy, models are analyzed within a given scope, or size. The analysis performed
by the AA is sound, since it never returns false positives, but incomplete, since the AA
only checks things up to a certain scope. However, it is complete up to scope; the AA
never misses a counterexample which is smaller than the specified scope. As pointed out
by the Alloy tutorial [100], small scope checks are still very useful for finding errors.
4.3 Proposed Approach
The construction of robust fault-tolerant systems requires that developers take fault
tolerance-related issues into account since the outset of software development [154]. Our
ultimate goal is to devise a general approach for the rigorous development of dependable
software systems that use exception handling to implement forward error recovery at the
architectural level. This work addresses specifically the issue of verifying properties of
interest related to exception flow in software architectures. Our solution is supported by
the Aereal [28] framework. This framework aims to assist in documenting, analyzing, and
validating exception flow in software architectures.
Figure 4.2 presents a schematic description of our solution. Developers start by per-
forming traditional activities of a software development process, namely, requirements
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Figura 4.2: Overview of the proposed approach. White rectangles represent activities and
shaded rectangles with dashed borders represent artifacts.
engineering, analysis, and design (both architectural and detailed) of the system. At the
same time, they define the scenarios in which the system may fail (fault model), what
exceptions correspond to each type of error, and where and how the exceptions are han-
dled (exceptional activity). The specification of the system’s fault model and exceptional
activity can be conducted as prescribed by some works in the literature [154]. The result
of these activities is an architecture description of the system that includes information
about the exceptions that can be signaled by each architectural element and what elements
are responsible for handling them. We refer to this specialized architecture description as
the Architectural Exception Flow View [28]. Architectural views represent various aspects
of the same architecture and each view shows how the architecture achieves a particular
quality attribute [11]. In Aereal, exception flow views are specified using the ACME [76]
architecture description language [128] (ADL).
To verify whether the exception flow view exhibits some properties of interest, it is
necessary to translate this view to a formal language with adequate support for automated
verification (verification language). The formal specification produced by this translation
must adhere to a generic meta-model which specifies: (i) the elements that can be part of
an architecture description; (ii) how exceptions flow amongst these elements; and (iii) how
they relate to each other. Hereafter, we call this model Generic Exception Flow Model).
Both the formal specification and the generic exception flow model are described in the
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verification language. Currently, we use Alloy to specify the generic exception flow model.
A system is verified by providing its formal specification as input to a constraint solver for
the verification language, together with the properties to be verified, and the definition
of the generic exception flow model. We used the AA tool to verify formal specifications
in Alloy. When a property of interest does not hold, the AA produces a counterexample.
In the rest of this paper, we focus on specifying the generic exception flow model.
A detailed description of the general approach described in this section is available el-
sewhere [28].
4.4 Generic Exception Flow Model
In our model, special-purpose architectural connectors model exception flow between com-
ponents. These connectors, called exception ducts, are unidirectional point-to-point links
through which only exceptions flow. They are orthogonal to “normal” architectural con-
nectors and do not constrain the way in which the architecture is organized [28]. Mehta
and Medvidovic [129] argue that simple point-to-point connections are suitable general-
purpose abstractions for modelling communication between architectural components in-
dependently of the architectural styles [159] to which an architecture adheres. We use this
structural perspective on exception flow because it is intuitive to architects (who are used
to thinking in terms of components and connectors), compatible with well-established
views on what exception flow is [52], and it does not require the modeling of the com-
plete activity of the application. Architectural elements are assumed to handle only one
exception at a time. We address the case where an EHC might catch multiple excep-
tions concurrently elsewhere [35]. Upon receipt of an exception, the receiving element
interrupts its execution and initiates exception handling. This is how exception handling
works in most programming languages. Modeling issues such as data- and control-flow
is beyond the scope of this work. Furthermore, we assume that the infrastructure sup-
porting the exception handling mechanism (middleware, programming language, etc.) is
correct. Therefore, exceptions are always delivered correctly and timely.
It is important to stress that exception ducts are not implementation-level connec-
tors. They are just a high-level abstraction to describe exception flow. Architects often
need to understand the architecture of a system from various perspectives, according to
specific quality attributes. Since different architectural views target different aspects of
an architecture, they usually employ different modeling constructs [109]. Hence, at the
implementation level, exception flow is materialized by means of the constructs provided
by the underlying programming language or infrastructure. For example, in a publisher/-
subscriber architecture, exception flow can be materialized as events flowing through a
message bus.
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Tabela 4.1: Elements of the proposed exception flow model.
Set Description
Element The type of all architectural elements. Supertype of Component
and Duct.
Component The subtype of Element of which all components in a system are
instances.
Duct The subtype of Element of which all exception ducts in a system
are instances.
RootException The type of which all exceptions in a system are instances.
4.4.1 Representation of Components, Ducts, and Exceptions
In our model, components, exception ducts, and exceptions are represented by objects
of a certain type. The proposed model employs a notion of type that is adopted by
some modern formal specification languages, such as Alloy [98] and B [3]. Moreover, it
is compatible with the notion of types used in OO languages such as Java and C#. A
type T is a set of instances and its subtypes T1, T2, ..., TN of T are disjunct subsets of T .
Only single inheritance is allowed. An exception is any instance of a type that is subtype
of type RootException. The same applies to components and exception ducts, and the
types Component and Duct, respectively. In our model, types Component and Duct
are subtypes of Element (and collectively called “elements”). Table 4.1 lists the basic
elements of the proposed model. The sets in the table can also be seen as unary relations
and are, therefore, subject to operations that apply to relations, such as composition.
We represent exceptions as objects, instead of using symbols or global variables, mainly
because objects are more flexible and can be used to encode arbitrary information regar-
ding the cause of an exception [72]. Moreover, many large and complex software systems
are developed nowadays using object-oriented languages, such as Java and C++, which
represent exceptions as objects.
The supertype of all exceptions is called RootException, instead of a more usual name,
such as Exception or Error, in order to provide to developers the flexibility to organize
exceptions as required, for instance, based on the adopted programming language. For
example, considering the EHS of Java, a developer can define at least four exception
types: (i) Throwable, subtype of RootException; (ii) Exception, subtype of Throwable;
(iii) Error, subtype of Throwable; and (iv) RuntimeException, subtype of Exception.
Application-specific exception types would then be subtypes of one of these types.
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Figura 4.3: A trivial software architecture.
4.4.2 System Structure
We follow the general view of a system configuration as a finite connected graph of com-
ponents and connectors [128]. We specialize this view, however, so that it can be used
to reason about exception flow. In our model, a component is a structural architectu-
ral element that catches and/or signals exceptions and an exception duct is a structural
element that represents flow of exceptions between two components. The structure of a
system is defined in terms of connections between components and exception ducts. The
relations CatchesFrom ∈ Element ↔ Element and SignalsTo ∈ Element ↔ Element
specify these connections.
Given an element B, {B}.CatchesFrom yields the set of elements that signal excep-
tions that B catches. Conversely, {B}.SignalsTo yields the set of elements that catch
exceptions that B signals. The “.” operator represents relational composition (or join).
Given two relations A ⊆ T1×T2×...×Tn and B ⊆ Tn×Tn+1×...×Tn+m, A.B yields a rela-
tion C ⊆ T1×T2×...×Tn−1×Tn+1×...×Tn+m. Relation C comprises all the tuples formed
by combining tuples from A and B whenever the last element of a tuple from A is the same
as the first element of a tuple from B. For example, given A = {(e1, e2), (e2, e3)} and B =
{(e2, e4), (e2, e5), (e3, e6), (e7, e8)}, A.B yields C = {(e1, e4), (e1, e5), (e2, e6)}. Figure 4.3
illustrates relations CatchesFrom and SignalsTo. The figure depicts two components, C1
and C2, connected by an exception duct D. Since exceptions flow from C1 to C2, pas-
sing through D, we can say that C1 ∈ {D}.CatchesFrom and D ∈ {C2}.CatchesFrom.
Conversely, D ∈ {C1}.SignalsTo and C2 ∈ {D}.SignalsTo.
Table 4.2 lists some constraints on relations CatchesFrom and SignalsTo. These
constraints specify properties that a system specification adhering to our model should
exhibit. Each one is identified by a name matching the pattern BPX, where “BP”
stands for basic property and “X” is a positive integer. Properties BP1 and BP2 specify
that the CatchesFrom relation is not reflexive and it never associates elements of the
same type, respectively. Properties BP3 and BP4 do the same for relation SignalsTo.
Property BP5 states that exception ducts signal exceptions to exactly one element and
catch exceptions from exactly one element. If B is a component, {B}.CatchesFrom may
yield an empty set, in which case B does not catch exceptions. If {B}.SignalsTo yields
an empty set, exceptions signaled by B, if any, are caught by an implicit component
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Tabela 4.2: Contraints on the CatchesFrom and SignalsTo relations.
Property Constraint
BP1 ∀B ∈ Element •B /∈ {B}.CatchesFrom
BP2 ∀B′ ∈ Element • (B,B′) ∈ CatchesFrom⇒ ¬(B ∈ Duct ∧B′ ∈ Duct)∧
¬(B ∈ Component ∧ B′ ∈ Component)
BP3 ∀B ∈ Element •B /∈ {B}.SignalsTo
BP4 ∀B′ ∈ Element • (B,B′) ∈ SignalsTo⇒ ¬(B ∈ Duct ∧ B′ ∈ Duct)∧
¬(B ∈ Component ∧ B′ ∈ Component)
BP5 ∀D ∈ Duct • |{D}.CatchesFrom| = 1 ∧ |{D}.SignalsTo| = 1
BP6 ∀B1, B2 ∈ Element •B1 ∈ {B2}.CatchesFrom⇒ B2 ∈ {B1}.SignalsTo
BP7 ∀B1, B2 ∈ Element •B1 ∈ {B2}.SignalsTo⇒ B2 ∈ {B1}.CatchesFrom
BP8 ∀B ∈ Element • {B}.CathcesFrom ∩ {B}.SignalsTo = {}
BP9 ∀C1, C2 ∈ Component • C1 ∈
{C2}. ∗ ((SignalsTo ∪ CatchesFrom).(SignalsTo ∪ CatchesFrom))
OperatingSystem. This is useful to model situations in which a system is not capable
of handling a certain type of error and fails catastrophically by signaling an exception
to the operating system. Properties BP6 states that the set of elements from which an
element catches exceptions consists of all elements that signal exceptions to it. Property
BP7 states that the set of elements to which an architectural element signals exceptions
consists of all elements that catch exceptions from it, respectively. These two properties
provide a link between CatchesFrom and SignalsTo. Property BP8 specifies that the
elements from which an architectural element catches exceptions are different from the
ones to which it signals exceptions. For example, a configuration with only two elements,
C ∈ Component and D ∈ Duct, where C ∈ {D}.CatchesFrom and C ∈ {D}.SignalsTo
is not valid.
For any valid system in the proposed model, the graph formed by using the components
of the system as vertices and the ducts as edges is connected. More formally, let G =
(Component,Duct) be a graph, where Component is the set of all vertexes and Duct is
the set of all edges. An edge D ∈ Duct connects two vertexes C1 ∈ Component and
C2 ∈ Component if D ∈ {C1}.CatchesFrom and C2 ∈ {D}.CatchesFrom. In order for
a graph to be connected, there must be a path between any two vertexes. Property BP9
specifies this constraint formally. It states that the reflexive transitive closure (∗ operator)
of any component with respect to the relation (SignalsTo∪CatchesFrom).(SignalsTo∪
CatchesFrom) contains all the other components of the system. In property BP9, the
∗ operator yields the set of all components reachable by composing component C2 with
(SignalsTo ∪ CatchesFrom).(SignalsTo ∪ CatchesFrom) zero or more times.
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Tabela 4.3: Contraints on the PortMap relation.
Property Constraint
BP10 ∀B ∈ Element • dom({B}.P ortMap) = {B}.CatchesFrom∧
ran({B}.P ortMap) = {B}.SignalsTo
4.4.3 Exception Interfaces and Exception Handling Contexts
As mentioned in previously, we consider a component to be a structural element that
catches and signals exceptions. Exception ducts are similar, but simpler, as they catch
exceptions from exactly one component and signal exceptions to exactly one component.
A component includes (i) a collection of exception interfaces, which specify the exceptions
the component signals; and (ii) a collection of EHCs, which define regions where exceptions
are always handled in the same way. Exception interfaces are associated to components
by the SignalsTo relation and, for each exception duct in the set {C}.SignalsTo, there
is a corresponding exception interface. The same applies for the CatchesFrom relation
and EHCs. This represents the fact that a component may signal different exceptions to
(or catch different exceptions from) the various exception ducts to which it is connected.
As imposed by property BP5 (Table 4.2), each exception duct has exactly one exception
interface and one EHC.
Models for reasoning about exception flow at the programming language level do not
have an explicit separation between exception interfaces and EHCs. This separation is
not necessary because these models focus on fine-grained programming constructs, like
methods and procedures, where multiple contexts are associated to a single exception
interface. At the architectural level, however, this separation is very important, since
a component can have multiple access points (ports) and the latter are explicit in the
system description.
The PortMap ∈ Element ↔ Element ↔ Element relation associates exception
interfaces and EHCs. When an element catches an exception and does not handle it, the
PortMap relation specifies the element to which the exception is signaled, based on the
element that originally signaled it. PortMap associates architectural elements to EHCs
and exception interfaces. Table 4.3 lists the single property associated to the PortMap
relation. Property BP10 specifies that for every element B, PortMap associates all the
elements from which B catches exceptions to some element to which it signals exceptions
and vice-versa.
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4.4.4 Exception Flow
Exception flow is specified in terms of five relations: Generates ∈ Element↔ Element↔
RootException, Masks ∈ Element ↔ Element ↔ RootException, DoesNotMask ∈
Element ↔ Element ↔ RootException ↔ RootException, Catches ∈ Element ↔
Element ↔ RootException, and Signals ∈ Element ↔ Element ↔ RootException.
The first two concern the exception interfaces of an architectural element, whereas the
last three are related to EHCs. In the rest of this section, we describe these relations in
more detail.
The Signals relation defines the exception interfaces of an architectural element. This
relation specifies which exceptions an architectural element signals and the elements that
catch these exceptions. Let ES be a set of exceptions and B1 and B2 be architectural
elements such that B2 ∈ {B1}.SignalsTo. If {B2}.({B1}.Signals) = ES, we say that
the element B1 signals the exceptions in set ES to element B2. Table 4.4 lists some
properties associated to the Signals relation. Property BP11 specifies that elements only
signal exceptions to elements to which they are connected, as specified by the SignalsTo
relation.
Even though, for the sake of uniformity, we have called the second constraint on
Table 4.4 a “property”, it works more as a definition of the Signals relation. Property
BP12 states that the Signals relation is derived from three other relations. Intuitively,
the set of exceptions that a component signals depends on the exceptions it generates
(raises) and on exceptions it catches that were signaled by other architectural elements.
Propagated and Unhandled are auxiliary relations defined in terms of the relations that
specify a component’s EHCs (described in the following paragraphs). The Generates
relation specifies the exceptions that components generate when erroneous conditions are
detected. These conditions are dependent on the semantics of the application and on
the assumed failure model. For reasoning about exception flow, the fault that caused
an exception to be raised is not important, just the fact that the exception was raised.
Let ES be a set of exceptions and B1 and B2 be architectural elements such that B2 ∈
{B1}.SignalsTo. If {B2}.({B1}.Generates) = ES, we say that the element B1 raises
exceptions ES to B2. Property BP13 specifies that all the exceptions an element generates
to another element are also signaled to the latter. This is coherent with the view that
only external exceptions matter at the architectural level.
Exception handling contexts are defined in terms of three relations: Catches, Masks,
and DoesNotMask. Catches specifies, for an arbitrary element B, the exceptions B
receives from the elements in the set {B}.CatchesFrom. Let ES be a set of excepti-
ons and B1 and B2 be architectural elements such that B2 ∈ {B1}.CatchesFrom. If
{B2}.({B1}.Catches) = ES, we say that the element B1 catches exceptions ES from
element B2. Table 4.4 shows the basic properties associated with Catches, Masks, and
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Tabela 4.4: Contraints on the Signals, Generates, Catches, Masks, and DoesNotMask
relations.
Prop. Constraint
BP11 ∀B ∈ Element • dom({B}.Signals) ⊆ {B}.SignalsTo
BP12 Signals = Generates ∪ Propagated ∪ Unhandled
BP13 Generates ⊆ Signals
BP14 ∀B ∈ Element • dom({B}.Catches) ⊆ {B}.CatchesFrom
BP15 ∀B ∈ Element • ∀B′ ∈ {B}.CatchesFrom•
{B}.({B′}.Signals) = {B′}.({B}.Catches)
BP16 ∀B ∈ Element • dom({B}.Masks) ⊆ {B}.CatchesFrom
BP17 ∀B ∈ Element • dom(({B}.DoesNotMask).RootException) ⊆
{B}.CatchesFrom
BP18 ∀B ∈ Element • ∀B′ ∈ {B}.CatchesFrom • |{B′}.({B}.DoesNotMask)| > 0
⇒ (dom({B′}.({B}.DoesNotMask)) ∩ {B′}.({B}.Masks)) = {}
DoesNotMask. Propety BP14 specifies that elements only catch exceptions from ele-
ments to which they are connected, as specified by the CatchesFrom relation. Property
BP15 states that the exceptions that an element catches are the exceptions signaled to
it.
The Masks relation specifies the exceptions that are masked by a component. By
“masked”, we mean that the component is capable of taking some action that stops the
propagation of the exception and makes it possible for the system to resume its normal
activity. Modeling the behavior of the exception handlers is beyond the scope of this
work. We are just interested in the effect the handler has on the flow of exceptions.
Let ES be a set of exceptions and B1 and B2 be architectural elements such that B2 ∈
{B1}.CatchesFrom. If {B2}.({B1}.Masks) = ES, we say that the element B1 handles
exceptions ES from element B2. Only property BP16 in Table 4.4 is directly associated
to theMasks relation. This property states that elements only handle exceptions signaled
by elements to which they are connected. We could also restrict Masks to be a subset
of Catches just like Generates is a subset of Signals. We do not impose this restriction,
however, because sometimes it is useful to specify general handlers, that is, handlers
capable of dealing with any type of exception.
The DoesNotMask relation describes exception handlers that do not stop the propa-
gation of exceptions. These handlers end their execution by signaling the same exception
or a new one. DoesNotMask specifies a cause-consequence relationship between an ex-
ception that an element catches and an exception that it signals. Let E and E ′ be
exceptions and B1 and B2 be architectural elements such that B2 ∈ {B1}.CatchesFrom.
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Tabela 4.5: Properties that define auxiliary relations Unhandled and Propagated.
Property Constraint
BP19 Propagated = { T ∈ Element ×Element × RootException| s(T ) ∈
{f(T )}.SignalsTo ∧ t(T ) ∈
((({f(T )}.P ortMap).{s(T )}).({f(T )}.Catches\{f(T )}.Masks)).
((({f(T )}.P ortMap).{s(T )}).({f(T )}.DoesNotMask)) }
BP20 Unhandled = { T ∈ Element× Element× RootException| s(T ) ∈
{f(T )}.SignalsTo ∧ t(T ) ∈ ((({f(T )}.P ortMap).{s(T )}).
({f(T )}.Catches\{f(T )}.Masks)) \(((({f(T )}.P ortMap).
{s(T )}).({f(T )}.DoesNotMask)).({s(T )}.({f(T )}.P ropagated))) }
If {B2}.({B1}.DoesNotMask) = (E,E
′), we say that the element B1 explicitly pro-
pagates (or simply “propagates”) exception E ′ from E, signaled by B2. The last two
properties in Table 4.4 are directly related to theDoesNotMask relation. Property BP17
states that an element can only propagate exceptions signaled by an element from which
it catches exceptions. Property BP18 specifies that an element can handle or propagate
the exceptions it catches from another element, but not both.
Now we can go back to the definition of Signals and define Propagated and Unhandled.
The Propagated ∈ Element ↔ Element ↔ RootException relation specifies the subset
of Signals comprising exceptions that are explicitly propagated by an element. It asso-
ciates an element to the exceptions it propagates explicitly and the elements that catch
these propagated exceptions. The Unhandled ∈ Element↔ Element↔ RootException
relation associates the set of exceptions that an architectural element implicitly propa-
gates and the elements to which these exceptions are signaled. An exception is said to
be implicitly propagated when an architectural element catches it but the element does
handle it or explicitly propagate an exception from it. Such an exception ends up being
signaled to some other architectural element. Table 4.5 presents formal definitions for
relations Propagated and Unhandled. The constraints in Table 4.5 use three auxiliary
functions, f(), s(), and t(), that take a triple as argument and return the first, second,
and third elements of the triple, respectively.
4.4.5 Exception Propagation Cycles
An exception propagation cycle is a situation where an exception is propagated (im-
plicitly or explicitly) indefinitely, without ever being handled, not even by the special
OperatingSystem component, in an architecture that adheres to the basic properties
BP1−BP20. Furthermore, exceptions in an exception propagation cycle might potenti-
ally have never been raised. For these reasons, valid exception flow views should not have
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exception propagation cycles.
A conservative way of preventing the occurrence of exception propagation cycles is
to completely disallow structural cycles in the graph formed by the components and ex-
ception ducts in a system. For most systems, this solution is sufficient without being
overly restrictive. However, for software architectures where components are peers, like
multi-agent and publisher-subscriber, this approach is not acceptable. At the implemen-
tation level, exception propagation cycles are not a problem, since in exception handling
mechanisms such as Java’s and Ada’s, each EHC is kept in the stack, which is finite, and
removed from it when controls returns from the EHC (possibly due to exception propaga-
tion). Therefore, in a language-level exception propagation cycle, eventually all the EHCs
will be removed from the stack and exception propagation will stop. At the architectural
level, however, this is not always the case, as an exception is not necessarily implemented
as a language-level exception [30, 28].
A simple way to avoid propagation cycles without removing structural cycles is to
introduce a partial ordering on exceptions. This ordering could be introduced through
additional information associated to each exception type. Then each element would be
required to signal exceptions which are greater than the ones it catches. This solution
has two shortcomings. The first is that it requires developers to be aware of this ordering,
which is not required in any existing programming languages. The second problem is
that it complicates the model and could have a negative effect on the performance of
verification. Using the type hierarchy to represent the ordering of exceptions is also not
adequate, since it also requires developers to be aware of the ordering and thus imposes
constraints on the exception type hierarchy. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, this
solution partially defeats the purpose of using different types of exceptions, as the topmost
layers of a system would always receive general exceptions that do not provide accurate
information about the specific error they represent. In the rest of this section, we propose
an alternative solution that is a bit more complex, but avoids these shortcomings. We
formalize the concept of exception propagation cycle and show how such cycles can be
easily detected.
An exception propagation is a tuple φ = (B,E,E ′, B′), with B,B′ ∈ Element
and E,E ′ ∈ RootException. We use the functions f(), s(), t(), and g() to obtain the
first, second, third, and fourth elements of a propagation, respectively. Any propagation
φ must satisfy the following well-formedness predicate:
(g(φ) 6= f(φ)) ∧ (g(φ) ∈ {f(φ)}.SignalsTo) ∧ (f(φ) ∈ {g(φ)}.CatchesFrom) ∧
(t(φ) ∈ {f(φ)}.({g(φ)}.Catches)) ∧ (t(φ) ∈ {g(φ)}.({f(φ)}.Signals)) ∧
∃CF ∈ {f(φ)}.CatchesFrom • ((CF, g(φ)) ∈ {f(φ)}.PortMap) ∧
(s(φ) ∈ {CF}.({f(φ)}.Catches)) ∧ (s(φ) /∈ {CF}.({f(φ)}.Masks)) ∧
(s(φ) ∈ dom({CF}.({f(φ)}.DoesNotMask)) ⇒
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1 void computePropagations (Element B) {
2 foreach catchesP in B.Catches and not in B.Masks {
3 // catchesP is an ( Element, RootException) pair
4 Propagation prop = new Propagation ();
5 foreach portMapP in B.PortMap such that portMapP .f() == catchesP .f() {
6 // portMapP is an ( Element, Element) pair
7 if(there is a Triple propagatesT in B.DoesNotMask such that
8 propagatesT .f() == catchesP .f() && propagatesT .s() == catchesP .s()) {
9 // propagatesT is an ( Element, RootException, RootException) triple
10 prop.t = propagatesT .t();
11 } else { prop.t = catchesP .s(); }
12 prop.s = catchesP .s();
13 prop.f = B;
14 prop.g = portMapP .s();
15 }
16 B.propagations.add(prop);
17 }
18 }
Figura 4.4: An algorithm to compute the exception propagations associated to an element.
t(φ) ∈ {s(φ)}.({CF}.({f(φ)}.DoesNotMask)))
It is easy to compute the set of all exception propagations in a software architecture
adhering to our model. Figure 4.4 presents an algorithm for computing all the exception
propagations associated to an architectural element.
In order to impose a partial order between two exceptions propagations, we introduce
the notion of consecutiveness. Two propagations φ1 and φ2 are said to be consecutive
if they satisfy the following predicate:
(g(φ1) = f(φ2)) ∧ (f(φ1) ∈ {f(φ2)}.CatchesFrom) ∧
(f(φ2) ∈ f(φ1).SignalsTo) ∧ (f(φ1) 6= f(φ2)) ∧ (t(φ1) = s(φ2)) ∧
(t(φ1) ∈ {f(φ1)}.({f(φ2)}.Catches)) ∧ (s(φ2) ∈ {f(φ2)}.({f(φ1)}.Signals))
In this case, φ1 is said to be the predecessor of φ2 and φ2 is the successor of φ1. We
indicate that propagations φ1 and φ2 are consecutive with the notation φ1 ⇀ φ2. A
sequence of propagations ϕ of length n is a set of propagations φ1, φ2, φ3..., φn−1, φn
such that φ1 ⇀ φ2, φ2 ⇀ φ3, ..., φn−1 ⇀ φn. For simplicity, we assume that all sequences of
propagations are finite. A sequence of propagations ϕ = φ1, φ2, ..., φn forms an exception
propagation cycle iff φn ⇀ φ1.
To verify if a software architecture has exception propagation cycles, it is necessary
to build the directed graph formed by all the exception propagations of the architecture.
This graph is constructed in two steps: (1) compute the exception propagations for all
the elements in the architecture and use them as vertexes; and (2) create a directed edge
between two propagations whenever they are consecutive, from the predecessor to the
sucessor. Detecting exception propagation cycles in the resulting graph is only a matter
of using a regular algorithm for finding cycles in directed graphs.
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Figura 4.5: Layered architecture of a mining control system.
4.5 Materializing the Model
We have translated the generic exception flow model described in Section 4.4 to Alloy. In
this section, we show how to specify systems based on this model and how to verify them.
We use a well-known textbook example [163] to make the explanation more concrete.
Addressing both the earlier (requirements definition and analysis) and later (detailed
design, implementation, etc.) phases of software development is outside the scope of this
paper.
Figure 4.5 shows the components and connectors view of a control system for the
mining environment [154]. Rectangles represent architectural components and arrows
represent exception flow. The extraction of minerals from a mine produces water and
releases methane gas to the air. The mining control system is used to drain mine water
from a sump to the surface, and to extract air from the mine when the methane level
becomes high. The system consists of three control stations: one that monitors the level of
water in the sump, one that monitors the level of methane in the mine, and another that
monitors the mineral extraction. For safety reasons, the extraction of minerals should be
interrupted when the amount of methane in the atmosphere exceeds a safety limit. The
air extractor control station monitors the level of methane inside the mine, and when
the level is high an air extractor is switched on to remove air from the mine. The whole
system is controlled from the surface via an operator console.
The system can fail in several ways. For simplicity, we only consider the case where the
AirExtractorControl component fails by signaling the exception AirExtractorOffException.
This exception is caught and handled by the ControlStation component. The handler
ends its execution by signaling the exception EmergencyException. A detailed descrip-
tion of the exceptional activity of the mining system is available elsewhere [154].
Figure 4.6 shows the Alloy specification of the mining system. In Alloy, a signature
(sig keyword) specifies a type. The one keyword indicates that a signature has exactly
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1 open ExceptionHandlingSystem
2 one sig AirExtractorOffException , EmergencyException extends RootException{}
3 one sig ControlStation, OperatorInterface , AirExtractorControl
4 extends Component {}
5 one sig CS_OI , AEC_CS extends Duct{}
6 ...
7 fact SystemStructure { ...
8 ControlStation.CatchesFrom = AEC_CS
9 ControlStation.SignalsTo = CS_OI
10 AEC_CS .CatchesFrom = AirExtractorControl
11 AEC_CS .SignalsTo = ControlStation
12 } fact ExceptionFlow { ...
13 AirExtractorControl.Signals = AEC_CS -> AirExtractorOffException
14 AirExtractorControl. Generates = AEC_CS -> AirExtractorOffException
15 AEC_CS .Catches = AirExtractorControl -> AirExtractorOffException
16 AEC_CS .Signals = ControlStation-> AirExtractorOffException
17 ControlStation.Catches = AEC_CS -> AirExtractorOffException
18 ControlStation.Signals = CS_OI -> EmergencyException
19 no ControlStation.Masks
20 ControlStation.DoesNotMask =
21 AEC_CS -> AirExtractorControlOffException -> EmergencyException
22 } fact PortMap { ...
23 ControlStation.PortMap = AEC_CS -> CS_OI
24 }
Figura 4.6: Partial Alloy specification of the mining control system.
one instance. We use signatures for modeling structural elements and exceptions. The
open clause (Line 1) imports the definitions of the basic types of the generic exception
flow model, Element, Component, Duct, and RootException. It also imports the pre-
dicates that specify the basic properties defined in Section 4.4. The relations defined
in Section 4.4, such as CatchesFrom, Masks, etc., are explicitly instantiated by means
of facts, predicates that the AA must assume to be true when evaluating constraints.
For instance, the fact SystemStructure (Line 7) states, among other things, that com-
ponent ControlStation catches exceptions from the exception duct AEC CS. The latter
connects ControlStation to the AirExtractorControl component. Moreover, the fact
ExceptionFlow (Line 12) states that component ControlStation catches the excep-
tion AirExtractorControl (Line 17), signaled by the AEC CS duct, and signals exception
EmergencyException to the CS OI duct (Line 18). ControlStation translates the former
exception to the latter (Lines 20 and 21).
Verification consists in checking whether the Alloy specification of a system satisfies
Alloy predicates corresponding to properties of interest. The properties of interest that a
system must satisfy are split in three categories: basic, desired, and application-specific.
Basic properties define the well-formedness rules of the model, that is, the characteris-
tics of valid systems. These properties specify the functioning of the exception handling
mechanism and how software architectures are structured. We have formally specified all
the basic properties of the generic exception flow model in Section 4.4. Desired properties
are general properties that are usually considered beneficial, although they are not part
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of the basic exception handling mechanism. They assume that the basic properties hold.
Some examples are the following.
DP1. Architectural elements do not handle exceptions they do not catch.
DP2. All the exceptions caught by an architectural element are handled by it, even if
some of its handlers end their execution by raising exceptions.
DP3. No unhandled exceptions.
Application-specific properties are rules regarding the flow of exceptions in a specific ap-
plication. For the mining system, a possible application-specific property is one which
guarantees that the OperatorInterface component does not receive domain-specific excep-
tions.
AP1. No architectural element signals to the OperatorInterface component an exception
different from EmergencyException.
The Alloy definition of the generic exception flow model includes the specifications of
several basic and desired properties that can be used “as-is”. Developers only specify
additional desired properties and application-specific properties, if any. The AA is em-
ployed to analyze exception flow. If a property of interest is violated, the AA generates a
counterexample with a configuration of the system where the violated property does not
hold. Otherwise it notifies the user that the system is valid.
Figure 4.7 defines four Alloy predicates named bp13, dp2, and ap1, formally specifying
properties BP13, DP2, and AP1, respectively. Alloy predicates are logic sentences that
must be checked by the AA. In the body of the predicates, Generates, Signals, Catches,
DoesNotMask, Masks, and CatchesFrom are names of relations corresponding to the ho-
monymous relations described in Section 4.4. Predicate bp13() states that the set of
exceptions that a component raises is a subset of the exceptions it signals. Predicate
dp2() selects, for each component in the Alloy specification, all the exceptions that the
component catches but does not handle, and checks whether exceptions are propagated
from them. The operators all, <:, &&, and in represent, respectively, universal quanti-
fication, domain restriction, logical conjunction, and subset. The operators -, =>, and #
mean set subtraction, logical implication, and set cardinality, respectively, and the decla-
ration let associates an alias to an expression. Predicate ap1() is a direct translation
from the informal description of property AP1.
4.6 Related Work
Several works propose static analyses of source code that generate information about
exception flow. Usually, this information consists in the exception propagation paths in
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1 /* Basic property BP13 */
2 pred bp13 () { all C : Component | (C.Generates in C.Signals ) }
3 /* Desired property DP2 */
4 pred dp2 () {
5 all C: Component | let nonHandled = (C.Catches - C.Masks )
6 | ( all CF : C. CatchesFrom | #( CF <: nonHandled ) > 0 =>
7 ((# nonHandled > 0 => #( C. DoesNotMask ) > 0) &&
8 all E: CF. nonHandled | #(E.(CF.(C.DoesNotMask ))) > 0))
9 }
10 /* Application- specific property AP1 */
11 pred ap1 () {
12 all D: OperatorInterface.CatchesFrom |
13 OperatorInterface .(D.Signals ) = EmergencyException
14 }
Figura 4.7: Alloy specifications of properties BP13, DP1, DP2, and AP1.
a program and is used, for example, to identify uncaught exceptions in languages with
polymorphic types, such as ML. Chang et al [38] present a set-based static analysis of
Java programs that estimates their exception flows. This analysis is used to detect too
general or unecessary exception specifications and handlers. Yi [186] proposes an abstract
interpretation that estimates uncaught exceptions in ML programs. Fa¨hndrich [64] and
coleagues have employed their BANE toolkit to discover uncaught exceptions in ML.
Schaefer and Bundy’s [156] work describes a model for reasoning about exception flow
in Ada programs. This model is used by a tool that tracks down uncaught exceptions
and provides exception flow information to programmers. The JEX tool, proposed by
Robillard and Murphy [150], analyzes exception flow in Java programs. The tool includes
a GUI to display a program’s exception propagation paths and detects handlers that are
too general.
Our approach leverages previous proposals for exception flow analysis, most notably
Schaefer and Bundy’s [156], but it differs in focus. Out approach targets the early phases
of development and is broader in scope. It describes how an architectural-level exception
handling mechanism works and leverages existing verification tools to check for adherence
to the rules prescribed by this mechanism. Furthermore, it supports the definition of
new properties of interest and their automated verification. Moreover, as mentioned in
Section 4.4.5, existing exception flow models do not take exception propagation cycles
into consideration, as they are not a problem that occurs at the implementation level.
Jiang and coleagues [103] describe an approach for the analysis of exception propa-
gation based on a data structure called exception propagation graph. The goal of the
authors is to use exception propagation graphs as a basis for automatically generating
structural tests. They do not address exception propagation cycles, as their work focuses
on implementation-level exception flow analysis. Moreover, they do not show how the
proposed approach can be employed to check whether a system exhibits some properties
of interest, such as absence of useless handlers.
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Several approaches for specifying software architectures so that they are passive to
automated analysis have been proposed. Most of them define new ADLs that target spe-
cific aspects of a software system. These ADLs are usually based on some underlying
formalisms that are well-supported by tools. Wright [4] specifications can be translated
to CSP and analyzed for deadlock freedom and interface compatibility. Rapide [120] is
based on partially-ordered event sets. The language supports simulation of architecture
descriptions and analysis of the event patterns produced by components. We do not pro-
pose a new ADL. Instead, we use an existing ADL which supports extension, ACME, and
a formal design language, Alloy, to specify and analyze exception flow at the architectural
level. To the best of our knowledge, no ADLs currently available focus on the verification
of properties related to exception flow.
In a previous work, Castor and coleagues [26] described an initial version of the model
presented in this paper. This early work does not unify the definitions of components
and ducts and is harder to use and less scalable. Furthermore, it does not take exception
propagation cycles into account.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper presented a model for reasoning about the flow of exceptions at the architec-
tural level. This model is part of the Aereal framework and supports the specification of
several properties of interest related to exception flow. We have described how systems
adhering to it can be automatically analyzed using the AA, in order to verify whether they
exhibit these properties. The main contributions of this paper are: (i) a formalization of
exception flow in terms of elements that make sense at the architectural level; and (ii)
a decomposition of this formalization in terms of a set of properties that can be easily
verified through existing tools.
In another study [28], we assessed the scalability of the proposed model. We discovered
that, for software architectures with a large number of exceptions (30+), it does not
scale up well. Hence, our most immediate future work is to improve scalability. We
envision two complementary approaches. The first is to optimize the system model by
removing redundant information. The second is to implement a tool that checks if an
Alloy specification satisfies all the basic properties of the EHS supported by Aereal. This
would drastically reduce the complexity of the checks the AA performs, hence decreasing
the amount of memory that verification requires. This change will not compromise the
flexibility of the framework, since the basic properties do not change and any valid system
must satisfy them.
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4.8 Resumo do Cap´ıtulo 4
Este cap´ıtulo propoˆs um modelo que fornece um embasamento teo´rico para a abordagem
proposta no Cap´ıtulo 3. Esse modelo especifica as responsabilidades dos elementos arqui-
teturais, no tocante ao tratamento e lanc¸amento de excec¸o˜es, e regras que estabelecem
como excec¸o˜es podem ser propagadas entre esses elementos. Atrave´s da materializac¸a˜o do
modelo proposto na linguagem Alloy, torna-se poss´ıvel verificar se arquiteturas aderem a`s
regras que ele estabelece. Adicionalmente, desenvolvedores podem especificar proprieda-
des adicionais, tanto gerais quanto espec´ıficas de aplicac¸a˜o, e verifica´-las automaticamente
usando o Alloy Analyzer.
O modelo apresentado neste cap´ıtulo se aplica a sistemas nos quais vigora a suposic¸a˜o
de que erros sa˜o independentes. Consequentemente, e´ poss´ıvel tratar cada excec¸a˜o como
se fosse a u´nica em determinado instante de tempo. O pro´ximo cap´ıtulo lida com siste-
mas que sa˜o concorrentes e cooperativos, o que quer dizer que os diversos componentes
integrados no sistema interagem a fim de alcanc¸ar um objetivo comum e funcionam de ma-
neira ass´ıncrona, em threads separadas. Para tais sistemas, a suposic¸a˜o de independeˆncia
de erros na˜o e´ va´lida. Consequentemente, o tratamento de erros deve ser cooperativo e
envolver todas as unidades de computac¸a˜o participantes, assim como o comportamento
normal do sistema.
Cap´ıtulo 5
Verificac¸a˜o de Tratamento
Coordenado de Excec¸o˜es
A popularizac¸a˜o de infra-estruturas para comunicac¸a˜o por eventos em sistemas baseados
em componentes, como o IBM Websphere MQ [96] e a plataforma Java Entreprise Edition
com seus Message-Driven Beans [92], exige que abordagens para a integrac¸a˜o confia´vel de
componentes de software contemplem os casos em que componentes se comunicam assin-
cronamente e cooperam com o fim de atingir um objetivo comum. Conforme mencionado
anteriormente, em sistemas com essa caracter´ıstica, chamados de concorrentes cooperati-
vos, na˜o e´ poss´ıvel presumir que a manifestac¸a˜o simultaˆnea de mu´ltiplos erros decorre de
falhas distintas.
Este cap´ıtulo se refere a` Sec¸a˜o 1.3.5 do Cap´ıtulo 1 e estende algumas das ide´ias des-
critas nos Cap´ıtulos 3 e 4 e apresenta uma abordagem para a especificac¸a˜o e verificac¸a˜o
de arquiteturas concorrentes e cooperativas que usam tratamento coordenado de excec¸o˜es
para estruturar mecanismos de toleraˆncia a falhas. A abordagem e´ baseada em um mo-
delo gene´rico que descreve como contextos de tratamento de excec¸o˜es sa˜o organizados e
como funcionam o tratamento, resoluc¸a˜o e propagac¸a˜o de excec¸o˜es nesse modelo de sis-
tema. O modelo pode ser traduzido para linguagens de especificac¸a˜o bem amparadas por
ferramentas de verificac¸a˜o, como Alloy e B, e e´ poss´ıvel verificar diversas propriedades
interessantes a partir de aplicac¸o˜es baseadas nele. A utilidade da abordagem proposta
para encontrar falhas de projeto e´ demonstrada atrave´s de um estudo de caso.
O artigo que este cap´ıtulo conte´m foi apresentado no 21st ACM Symposium on Applied
Computing [35].
109
5.1. Introduction 110
Verification of Coordinated Exception Handling
Fernando Castor Filho1 Alexander Romanovsky2
Cec´ılia Mary F. Rubira1
1Institute of Computing
State University of Campinas
Campinas - SP - Brasil
{fernando,cmrubira}@ic.unicamp.br
2School of Computing Science
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Newcastle upon Tyne - UK
{alexander.romanovsky}@newcastle.ac.uk
5.1 Introduction
Applications that can cause risks for human lives or risk of great financial losses are usually
made fault-tolerant [5], so that they are capable of providing their intended service, even if
only partially, when faults occur. Fault-tolerant systems include mechanisms for detecting
errors in their states and recovering from these errors. There are two main types of error
recovery [5]: backward error recovery (based on rolling the system back to the previous
correct state) and forward error recovery (which involves transforming the system into
any correct state). The former usually uses either diversely implemented software or
simple retry; the latter is typically application-specific and relies on an exception handling
mechanism [52].
Usually, a large part of the system code is devoted to error detection and handling [52,
182]. However, since developers tend to focus on the normal activity of applications and
only deal with the code responsible for error detection and handling at the implementation
phase, this part of the code is usually the least understood, tested, and documented [52].
In order to achieve the desired levels of reliability, mechanisms for detecting and handling
errors should be developed systematically from the early phases of development [154].
Ideally, the construction of system fault tolerance mechanisms should follow a rigorous or
formal development methodology [12].
Error recovery in concurrent and distributed systems is known to be complicated by
various factors, such as high cost of reaching an agreement, absence of a global view on the
5.1. Introduction 111
system state, multiple concurrent errors, difficulties in ensuring error isolation, etc. These
systems require special error recovery mechanisms that suit their main characteristics. As
it is not possible to develop general error recovery mechanisms applicable for all types of
concurrent and distributed systems, two classes of techniques were developed to support
recovery in competing and cooperating concurrent and distributed systems [184]. Distri-
buted transactions [83] and atomic actions [20] are well-known examples of techniques for
structuring competing and cooperative fault-tolerant distributed systems, respectively. In
the rest paper, we concentrate mainly on cooperative distributed systems.
The Coordinated Atomic (CA) Actions concept [184] results from combining distri-
buted transactions and atomic actions. Atomic actions are used to control cooperative
concurrency and to implement coordinated exception handling [20] whilst distributed
transactions are used to maintain the consistency of the resources shared by competing
actions. CA actions function as exception handling contexts for cooperative systems and
exceptions raised in an action are handled cooperatively by all the action’s participants.
If two or more exceptions are concurrently raised, an exception resolution mechanism [20]
is employed to find an exception to be handled that represents all the exceptions rai-
sed concurrently (a resolved exception). Many case studies [152, 185] have shown that
CA actions are a powerful and useful tool for structuring large, distributed fault-tolerant
systems.
In order for CA actions to be applicable for the construction of complex, real-world
systems with strict dependability requirements, software development based on CA acti-
ons has to be supported by rigorous models, techniques, and tools. Several approaches
have been proposed for formalizing the CA action concept with the intention either to
give a more complete and rigorous description of the concept [177] or to verify systems
designed using CA actions [185]. However, an important aspect of CA actions that has
not been addressed by existing work is coordinated exception handling. This is surprising,
since exception handling complements other techniques for improving reliability, such as
atomic transactions, and promotes the implementation of specialized and sophisticated
error recovery measures. Moreover, in distributed applications where a rollback is not
possible, such as those that interact with the environment, exception handling may be
the only choice available.
Some authors [17] claim that mechanisms for involving multiple participants in coor-
dinated exception handling are difficult to both implement and use. However, we believe
that programmers will make more mistakes in an ad hoc implementation of coordinated
exception handling than in applying the well-defined mechanisms that general frameworks
such as CA actions provide. Therefore, techniques and tools that mitigate the inherent
complexity of coordinated exception handling and help developers in the specification and
design of systems that make use of this feature are required.
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In this paper, we examine the problem of specifying CA action-based designs in a
way that allows us to verify automatically if these designs exhibit certain properties of
interest regarding coordinated exception handling. Moreover, since coordinated exception
handling is strongly related with action structuring, it is also necessary to model how CA
actions are nested and composed [152] to define multiple exception handling contexts.
We present an approach to modeling CA action-based designs that makes it possible to
verify these designs automatically using a constraint solver. The main component of
the proposed approach is a formal model of CA actions that specifies the structuring of a
system in terms of actions, as well as information relative to exception flow amongst these
actions. This model can be directly specified using well-known specification languages,
like Alloy [98] and B [3], and verified automatically using the tool sets associated with
these languages. With the proposed approach, it is possible to check whether a CA-action
based design satisfies several properties of interest.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides some background on CA
actions and the Alloy design language. Section 5.3 presents an overview of the proposed
approach, including some of the properties that it helps verifying. Section 5.4 presents a
case study to illustrate the feasability and usefulness of the proposed approach. The last
section rounds the paper.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Coordinated Atomic Actions
A CA action is designed as a set of roles cooperating inside it and a set of resources accessed
by them. An action starts when its roles are taken by participants (e.g. processes, threads,
active objects, etc.). In the course of the action, participants can access resources that
have ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability) properties. Action participants
either reach the end of the action and produce a normal outcome or, if one or more
exceptions are raised within the action, they all are involved in coordinated handling.
If handling is successful the action completes by producing a normal outcome, but if
handling is not possible then all responsibility for recovery is passed to the containing
action where an external action exception is signaled.
The CA action scheme enforces a clear difference between internal exceptions, which
are raised in the action and have handlers inside the action, and external exceptions, which
are signaled outside the action when the action cannot deliver the results. The latter is
used to report partial action outcomes, abort effect, failure to achieve a consistent result
by action participants, etc. Internal exceptions are encapsulated in the action, whereas
external ones are visible in the action interface as they have to be dealt with by the
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Figura 5.1: A CA action example.
containing action. When several exceptions are concurrently raised in a CA action, an
exception resolution mechanism is used.
Figure 5.1 shows a graphical representation of a trivial system structured using CA
actions. Top-level CA action A1 has three roles performed by participants P1, P2, and
P3. Participants P2 and P3 also perform roles R4 and R5, respectively, in the nested CA
action A2. Role R5 of A2 spawns composed CA action A3 at some point in time after the
completion of A2. R5 is interrupted from the moment A3 starts until it completes. The
internal exceptions of an action are represented by small squares (labeled E1, E2, E3, and
E4 in the figure). Each exception is placed near the role that raises it.
5.2.2 Alloy Design Language
Alloy [98] is a lightweight modeling language for software design. It is amenable to a fully
automatic analysis, using the Alloy Analyzer (AA), and provides a visualizer for making
sense of solutions and counterexamples it finds. Alloy is based on first-order relational
logic and, similarly to other specification languages, such as Z, Alloy supports complex
data structures and declarative models. In this work, we use Alloy to formally specify
CA action-based designs.
In Alloy, models are analyzed within a given scope, or size (the maximum number of
instances of a type). The analysis performed by the AA is sound, since it never returns
false positives, but incomplete, since the AA only checks things up to a certain scope.
However, it is complete up to scope; the AA never misses a counterexample which is
smaller than the specified scope.
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5.3 Proposed Approach
The construction of robust fault-tolerant systems requires that developers take fault
tolerance-related issues into account since the early phases of development. Our ulti-
mate goal is to devise a general approach for the rigorous development of dependable
distributed systems that use both cooperative and competitive concurrency.
This work addresses specifically the issue of verifying properties of interest related to
system structuring and coordinated exception handling in CA action-based designs. The
following sections present an overview of the proposed approach (Section 5.3.1) and briefly
describe some of the properties that can be verified using this approach (Section 5.3.2).
5.3.1 Overview
Figure 5.2 presents a schematic description of the proposed approach for verifying CA
action-based designs. Developers start by performing traditional activities of a software
development process, namely, analysis and architectural design of the system, assuming
that the system is concurrent and cooperative. At the same time, they define the scenarios
in which the system may fail (fault model), what exceptions correspond to each type
of error, and where and how the exceptions are handled (exceptional activity). The
specification of the system’s fault model and exceptional activity can be conducted as
prescribed by some works in the literature [154]. The result of these activities is a CA
action-based design of the system that includes a description of the exceptions that can
be raised in each CA action and how they are handled. This design is usually described in
a modeling language for CA actions (or simply modeling language), for example, informal
diagrams (as presented in Section 5.2.1), the Coala [177] formal language, or the FTT-
UML [86] profile for the UML.
To verify the CA action-based design, it is necessary to translate it to a formal language
with adequate support for automated verification (verification language). If the modeling
language has a well-defined semantics, like Coala, this translation can be completely
automated by a tool. The translation can also be automated for informal notations,
like UML profiles, but only partially. Usually, some manual intervention is required to
resolve ambiguities. Developers used to formal methods can write the system descriptions
directly in the verification language. The choice of using one or two specification languages
is based solely on usability issues.
The formal specification produced by translating the CA action-based design to the
verification language must adhere to a generic CA actions meta-model specifying the
elements of CA actions and how they relate (hereafter called generic CA actions model).
Table 5.1 lists the elements of the generic CA actions model. The elements of the generic
CA actions model are Action, Role, Participant, and RootException. They are the main
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Figura 5.2: Overview of the proposed approach. White rectangles represent activities and
shaded rectangles with dashed borders represent artifacts.
concepts used in the definition of CA actions. Some of them, like Action and Role, include
additional information represented through relations. For example, the set of roles of
an action is defined by the Roles relation, which associates actions to their respective
roles. Both the formal specification and the generic CA actions model are described in
the verification language. Up to now, we specified generic CA actions models using B and
Alloy as verification languages [34]. Developers can use either of them to formalize CA
action-based designs.
A system is verified by providing its formal specification as input to a constraint solver
for the verification language, together with the properties to be verified. We used the AA
and ProB [115] constraint solvers to verify formal specifications in Alloy and B, respecti-
vely. If any of the properties of interest does not hold, the constraint solver produces a
counterexample. Both constraint solvers, besides generating a counterexample, include a
graphic visualizer that provides additional help in the identification of the problem. We
used the two languages just to show that the proposed approach is not specific to a single
specifrication language. In the rest of the paper, we focus on the last two activities of
Figure 5.2, the ones directly related to system verification.
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Element Description
Action Type that defines actions.
Role Type that defines roles of actions.
Participant Type that defines participants, units of
computation that perform roles.
RootException Type that defines exceptions.
Tabela 5.1: Basic elements of the proposed model. Each element is a type whose instances
are used to specify CA action-based systems.
5.3.2 Properties of Interest
The properties of interest that a system must satisfy are split in three categories: basic,
desired, and application-specific. Basic properties define the well-formedness rules of the
model, the characteristics of valid CA actions. They specify the coordinated exception
handling mechanism and how actions are organized. Examples of basic properties are
presented below, stated informally.
BP1. If a participant performs a role in a nested action, it must also perform some role
in the containing action.
BP2. No cycles in action nesting.
BP3. The exception resolution mechanism of an action resolves all possible combinations
of concurrent internal exceptions, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Desired properties are general properties that are usually considered beneficial, although
they are not part of the basic mechanism of CA actions. In general, they assume that the
basic properties hold. Some examples are the following:
DP1. Top-level CA actions have no external exceptions.
DP2. All internal exceptions of an action are handled in it (i.e. they are either masked
or propagated).
DP3. Any role of an action has masking handlers for all of the action’s internal excepti-
ons, including all resolved ones.
Application-specific properties are rules regarding the flow of exceptions in a specific
CA action-based application. Section 5.4.2 presents an example of application-specific
property. The generic CA actions models we have specified so far include the specifications
of several basic and desired properties that can be used “as-is”. Developers only specify
additional desired properties and application-specific properties, if any.
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, properties of interest are specified in the verification
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language. The following snippet presents a formal specification for property BP1 in Alloy.
predicate parts_ok() { (all A:Action|
(all NA:A.NestedActions| all NAR:NA.Roles|
!(all P:Participant|!(NAR in P.RolesPlayed
&& some (P.RolesPlayed & A.Roles)))))
}
This snippet defines an Alloy predicate named parts ok. Alloy predicates are lo-
gic sentences that must be checked by the AA. In the body of the predicate, Roles,
NestedActions, and RolesPlayed are names of some relations that associate informa-
tion to the elements of the system (actions, participants, etc.) and the “.” operator is
a generalized form of relational composition. For example, A.NestedActions yields the
set of actions nested within action A, assuming that A ∈ Action, where Action is a type
(a set or, more generally, unary relation), and NestedActions is a relation associating
actions to their nested actions. Predicate parts ok states that every role of every nested
action is performed by some participant that also performs some role in the enclosing
action. The operators all, some, !, &&, and & represent, respectively, universal quantifier,
existential quantifier, logical negation, logical conjunction, and set intersection.
The following snippet shows a formal specification in Alloy for property DP1. It states
that all actions that are not nested within some other action and not composed by some
role have no external exceptions. Operator => represents logical implication.
all A1:Action | ((all A2:Action |
!(A1 in A2.NestedActions)) && (all R:Role |
!(A1 in R.ComposedActions))) => (no A1.External)
5.4 Case Study
The Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy [21] (FTIPT) is a control system with strict
reliability requirements for treating patients with diabetes. This system is based on the
Continuous Subcutaneous Insulin Injection technique [21] and involves several sensors and
actuators that must function concurrently and continuously. These sensors and actuators
are wearable devices put on by patients under treatment. The dose of insulin administered
by the system includes two types of insulin: rapid action insulin (RAI) and long action
insulin (LAI).
Sensors and actuators exchange information by means of wireless communication chan-
nels. Sensors send information about the vital signs of a patient to a server located in
a hospital. The latter forwards this information to a doctor who defines the amount of
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insulin to inject. The server then communicates with the actuators which use pumps to
administer the established dose of insulin.
Both sensors and actuators may fail. Sensors can fail by stopping to send information
about a patient’s vital signs. However, when they do send information, the latter is
assumed to be correct. Actuators can also fail in the same manner. Moreover, they may
fail because there is not enough insulin to apply the required dose. Whenever an error is
detected, treatment is interrupted and an alarm located in a remote emergency room is
activated. We assume that the wireless channels do not fail.
5.4.1 CA Action-Based Design
Capozucca et al [21] use CA actions to design and implement the FTIPT. The system
is organized as a set of actions that structure the execution of sensors and actuators.
Coordinated exception handling is used as the main fault tolerance mechanism, since it
is not possible to roll back when insulin is administered to a patient. The CA action-
design devised by the authors is informal and described by means of diagrams and textual
descriptions.
Figure 5.3 shows the informal design of the system. For simplicity, it does not depict
accesses to shared resources or interactions between participants. CA action CAA Cycle
controls the overall execution of the system and determines the amount of insulin that
must be injected for each pump based on the patient’s vital signs. Actions CAA Sensors
and CAA Actuators are spawned by roles ControllerChecking and ControllerExecuting of
actions CAA Checking and CAA Executing, respectively. They are responsible, respectively,
for collecting the vital signs of the patient and administering the insulin. Each of these
composed CA actions has three roles. The roles A RAIP and A LAIP of CAA Actuators
spawn the composed CA actions CAA RAIP and CAA LAIP, respectively. The latter two
control the two pumps that will administer the two types of insulin.
Seven different types of exceptions can be raised in the system (Table 5.2). For most
of these errors, exception handling consists in stopping the treatment and activating the
alarm in the emergency room. In some cases, such as when the value of a sensor cannot
be obtained, the handler will try again once before giving up.
5.4.2 Applying the Proposed Approach
We modeled the CA action-based design described in the previous section in Alloy. The
following snippet shows part of the Alloy specification of the system. The complete
specification of the system is available elsewhere [34].
// Imports generic CA actions model
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Figura 5.3: CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy.
Exc. Description
E1 Heart Rate (HR) sensor does not respond.
E2 Blood Glucose (BGC) sensor does not respond.
E3 Delivery limit reached.
E4 Rapid action insulin pump (RAIP) does not respond.
E5 Rapid action insulin pump (RAIP) stops during delivery.
E6 Long action insulin pump (LAIP) does not respond.
E7 Long action insulin pump (LAIP) stops during delivery.
Tabela 5.2: Exceptions in the CA action-based design.
open CoordinatedExceptionHandling
// CA actions extend ‘‘Action’’.
one sig CAACycle, CAAChecking, CAASensors,
CAAExecuting extends Action{}
// Roles extend ‘‘Role’’.
one sig ControllerChecking, ParamsChecking,
S_CT, BGC, HR extends Role {}
// Exceptions extend ‘‘RootException’’.
one sig E1, E2, E3 extends RootException {}
// Participants extend ‘‘Participant’’.
one sig P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 extends Participant {}
// Used for exception resolution.
one sig K1, K2, K3 extends Key {}
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... // Other declarations.
fact SystemStructure {
CAACycle.NestedActions = CAAChecking
+ CAAExecuting
CAACycle.Roles = ControllerCycle + ParamsCycle
+ Calculus
CAAChecking.Roles = ControllerChecking
+ ParamsChecking
no CAAChecking.NestedActions
ControllerChecking.ComposedActions = CAASensors
CAASensors.Roles = S_CT + BGC + HR
P1.RolesPlayed = ControllerCycle + ControllerChecking
...// Other definitions. }
fact ExceptionFlow {
CAASensors.Internal = E1 + E2
&& CAASensors.External = AlarmEXC
&& BGC.Generates = E1 && BGC.Raises = E1
&& HR.Raises = E2 && HR.Generates = E2
...// Other definitions. }
fact ExceptionResolution {
CAASensors.ToResolve = E1->K1 + E2->K2
CAASensors.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC
...// Other definitions.}
In Alloy, a signature (sig keyword) specifies a type. The one keyword indicates
that a signature has exactly one instance. We use signatures for modeling actions, ro-
les, participants, and exceptions (signature Key is explained later on). Additional in-
formation is associated to these elements by means of relations. These relations are
explicitly instantiated by facts, predicates that the AA must assume to be true when eva-
luating constraints. For instance, the fact SystemStructure in the snippet above states,
among other things, that CA action CAAChecking has two roles, ControllerChecking and
ParamsChecking, and no nested actions. It also states that participant P1 performs the
roles ControllerChecking and ControllerCycle of actions CAAChecking and CAACycle,
respectively. Moreover, the fact ExceptionFlow states, among other things, that roles
BGC and HR raise exceptions E1 and E2, and that the latter are internal exceptions of CA
action CAASensors. The open clause in the beginning of the specification imports the
definitions of the basic types of the proposed model, Action, Role, Participant, and
RootException. Moreover, it imports the predicates that specify the basic properties of
CA actions and some predefined desired properties.
Fact ExceptionResolution in the specification above describes the exception resolu-
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tion tree of the FTIPT. It uses instances K1 and K2 of signature Key to associate internal
and external exceptions of action CAASensors. Key is an auxiliary signature defined in
the Alloy version of the generic CA actions model. It is necessary because the exception
resolution tree of an action is a function from sets of exceptions to exceptions. Since it is
not possible to define high order relations (or functions) in Alloy, we used a pair of relati-
ons, one associating internal exceptions to keys (ToResolve), one key for each mapping,
and the other associating each key to an external exception (ResolvedTo). In the snippet
above, fact ExceptionResolution states that exceptions E1 and E2 are both resolved
to exception AlarmEXC. It is important to stress that this workaround for specifying the
exception resolution tree of an action is not necessary in the B version of the generic CA
actions model.
Let us now discuss some positive experience we had while developing the formal spe-
cification of the FTIPT case study. This work helped us in identifying a number of
shortcomings in the original informal description of the system. These shortcomings were
discovered when we were formalizing the system and during verification.
According to the original system description, the handlers for exceptions E4 and E6
“must stop the delivery of insulin and ring the danger alarm”. Just by reading this
statement, though, it is not possible to know the CA action that will be responsible for
ringing the alarm when one of these exceptions is raised. Even though we are not explicitly
modeling the actual alarm, this information is still relevant. If the alarm is to be activated
by a CA action other than the one where the exception was raised, an exception should
be propagated from the CA action where the error was detected to the one that will ring
the alarm. However, no such exception exists in the original design of the system.
For simplicity, we could assume that some role in the CA action where an exception
is raised is responsible for ringing the alarm. However, this is not the best option since
it scatters the responsibility of activating the alarm throughout the whole application,
partially defeating the purpose of decomposing the system into actions. In the end,
we decided to add a new exception named AlarmEXC to the system specification. This
exception is signaled by actions CAASensors, CAARAIP, and CAALAIP and propagated all
the way up to CAACycle, where it is handled. Later, discussing the matter with the
authors of the original case study, we discovered that, to our surprise, that was actually
what they meant but forgot to state explicitly in the specification. To explicitly capture
the idea that AlarmEXC can only be handled by CAACycle, we specified this constraint as
the following application-specific property. Assuming the basic properties hold, it states
that, for any action other than CAACycle, if AlarmEXC is an internal exception, it is also
external. Moreover, it states that CAACycle handles AlarmEXC.
(AlarmEXC in CAACycle.Handles)
&& (all A:(Action - CAACycle)
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| AlarmEXC in A.Internal => AlarmEXC in A.External)
After finishing the specification of the system in Alloy, we tried to verify the basic
CA action properties using the AA. In a couple of minutes, the latter presented a coun-
terexample indicating that the specification failed to satisfy some property of interest.
Careful study of the counterexample revealed that property BP3 of Section 5.3.2 was
being violated. This problem happened because the case where exceptions E1 and E2 are
raised concurrently in action CAASensors was not covered by the exception resolution
mechanism of the action. To fix the specification, we extended the action’s resolution me-
chanism so that, when these two exceptions are raised concurrently, they are resolved to
AlarmEXC. However, discussing this problem with the authors of the original case study we
found out that these two exceptions are actually never raised concurrently. The authors
unknowingly ommitted this information from the system specification. Hence, we modi-
fied the Alloy specification to say explicitly that E1 and E2 are never raised concurrently
in CA action CAASensors. The generic CA actions model defines a relation, Excluding,
whose goal is to exclude from the exception resolution tree of an action combinations of
internal exceptions that are never raised concurrently. This relation is already taken into
account by the basic CA properties defined by the generic CA actions model. By default,
no combinations are excluded. The following line was introduced in the specification of
the system:
CAASensors.Excluding = (E1 + E2) -> K3
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we presented an approach for specifying and verifying cooperative concurrent
systems that use coordinated exception handling to achieve fault tolerance. This approach
aims at guaranteeing that the fault tolerance mechanisms used to build a reliable system
are also reliable. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a formalization of
CA actions that makes it possible to check automatically whether a CA action-based
design satisfies several properties of interest regarding coordinated exception handling.
The usefulness of the proposed approach was demonstrated by a case study. Even for
a very simple application, the proposed approach helped us to uncover some implicit
assumptions in the original, informal design of the system. The problems we found were
directly related to the use of coordinated exception handling. In other formal models for
specifying CA actions, it would be harder to spot problems like the ones we found because
they focus on different aspects of CA action-based systems, such as temporal ordering of
events [185] and dynamic CA action structuring [172].
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This work does not address some important aspects of systems structured as CA acti-
ons. For example, it is not possible to model consistent access to external resources or the
dynamic structure of nested actions. In the near future, we intend to expand the system
model used in our approach to address these issues and provide a more comprehensive
framework for verifying CA action-based systems.
Another future work consists in extending the fault model of the FTIPT with the
assumption that wireless communication channels can fail. In the least, this modification
requires new types of errors and their corresponding exceptions to be defined. Further-
more, some peculiarities of wireless channels need to be taken into account. For example,
sometimes wireless channels stop working for short periods of time because the signal is
weak. This situation cannot immediately be treated as an error, though, since it is usually
temporary.
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5.6 Resumo do Cap´ıtulo 5
Este cap´ıtulo apresentou uma abordagem para a modelagem e verificac¸a˜o de sistemas
concorrentes cooperativos que usam tratamento de excec¸o˜es coordenado para estruturar
seu comportamento excepcional. Usamos aplicac¸o˜es baseadas em CA actions como re-
presentantes dessa classe de sistema. O principal componente da abordagem proposta e´
um modelo formal de CA actions que especifica a estruturac¸a˜o de um sistema em termos
de ac¸o˜es, assim como informac¸o˜es relativas ao fluxo de excec¸o˜es entre essas ac¸o˜es. Esse
modelo pode ser especificado de maneira direta usando linguagens bem conhecidas, como
Alloy e B. Neste cap´ıtulo foi apresentada uma visa˜o geral da abordagem proposta, sem
descrever em detalhes o modelo de sistema no qual ela e´ baseada. Os Apeˆndices A, B e
C complementam este cap´ıtulo e apresentam, respectivamente: (A) um modelo gene´rico
de CA actions escrito em Alloy; (B) a especificac¸a˜o completa em Alloy do estudo de caso
da Sec¸a˜o 5.4; e (C) especificac¸o˜es parciais do modelo gene´rico de CA actions e do estudo
de caso na linguagem B.
Este cap´ıtulo encerra a primeira parte desta dissertac¸a˜o. Ate´ agora este trabalho fo-
cou na integrac¸a˜o dos componentes de um sistema de software. Foram propostas te´cnicas
para a descric¸a˜o e ana´lise das arquiteturas desses sistemas, da perspectiva do seu com-
portamento excepcional. Essas te´cnicas visam reduzir o nu´mero de erros decorrentes de
suposic¸o˜es conflitantes ou incompletas feitas por componentes sobre o comportamento
excepcional dos outros componentes integrados no sistema. Os pro´ximos dois cap´ıtulos
da dissertac¸a˜o lidam com a construc¸a˜o dos componentes, mais especificamente, com a
estruturac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional desses componentes atrave´s do emprego de
programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos.
Cap´ıtulo 6
Um Estudo Quantitativo sobre a
Modularizac¸a˜o de Tratamento de
Excec¸o˜es com Aspectos
Este cap´ıtulo e o pro´ximo focam na estruturac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional de com-
ponentes de software usando programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos (AOP). Em outras pa-
lavras, ele trata da construc¸a˜o de componentes de software nos quais o co´digo de recu-
perac¸a˜o de erros e´ explicitamente separado do co´digo responsa´vel pelo comportamento
normal. Este cap´ıtulo se refere a` Sec¸a˜o 1.4.2 do Cap´ıtulo 1 e apresenta um estudo que
avalia as vantagens de se usar AOP para modularizar tratamento de excec¸o˜es. O es-
tudo consistiu em refatorar para aspectos o co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es de quatro
aplicac¸o˜es diferentes, treˆs delas baseadas em componentes. Treˆs dessas aplicac¸o˜es foram
implementadas originalmente em Java, enquanto a quarta foi escrita em AspectJ.
A linguagem AspectJ foi empregada como representante do paradigma orientado a
aspectos para separar tratamento de excec¸o˜es dos outros interesses de cada sistema. Para
medir os atributos de qualidade das verso˜es originais e refatoradas dos sistemas-alvo do
estudo, foi usado um conjunto de me´tricas [73]. Este inclui me´tricas relativas a quatro
atributos de qualidade: separac¸a˜o de interesses, concisa˜o, coesa˜o e acoplamento. A in-
vestigac¸a˜o incluiu tambe´m uma ana´lise dos sistemas refatorados levando em conta (i) a
reusabilidade do co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es e (ii) a escalabilidade de AOP para
modularizar tratamento de excec¸o˜es na presenc¸a de outros interesses transversais.
O artigo que este cap´ıtulo conte´m foi publicado nos anais do 14th ACM SIGSOFT
Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering, que foi realizado em novembro de
2006. Uma versa˜o preliminar foi apresentada no ECOOP’2005 Workshop on Exception
Handling in Object-Oriented Systems [32], em julho de 2005. Adicionalmente, uma versa˜o
estendida deste u´ltimo apareceu no livro Advanced Topics in Exception Handling Techni-
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ques [23], publicado este ano pela se´rie Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
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6.1 Introduction
Exception handling [80] mechanisms were conceived as a means to improve modularity
of programs that have to deal with exceptional situations [51]. Their designs are aimed
at promoting an explicit textual separation between normal and abnormal code, in order
to support the construction of programs that are more concise, reusable, evolvable, and
reliable [51, 80]. Several researchers [66, 117, 178] have explored new programming tech-
niques in order to reap the promised benefits of existing exception handling mechanisms.
In spite of this, achieving modular implementations of error handling code is still difficult
for software engineers. The main problem is that realistic software systems exhibit very
intricate relationships involving the normal-processing code and error recovery concerns.
Moreover, exception handling is known to be a global design issue [72] that affects almost
all the system modules [117], mostly in an application-specific fashion [5]. Also, a large
part of the system code is usually devoted to error detection and handling [52, 182], but
this part of the code is often the least understood, tested, and documented [52].
Given the broadly-scoped character of exception handling, aspect-oriented program-
ming (AOP) techniques [106] emerge as a natural candidate to promote enhanced modu-
larity, reusability, and conciseness of programs in the presence of exceptions. In fact, it
is usually assumed that the exceptional behaviour of a system is a crosscutting concern
that can be better modularized by the use of AOP [106, 114, 117]. Some recent rese-
arch works [107, 117, 164] have investigated the degree to which AOP can improve the
separation of concerns relative to some forms of fault tolerance mechanisms.
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The most well-known study focusing specifically on exception handling was performed
by Lippert and Lopes [117]. The authors had the goal of evaluating if AOP could be used
to separate the code responsible for detecting and handling exceptions from the normal
application code in a large object-oriented (OO) framework. According to this study, the
use of AOP brought several benefits, such as less interference in the program texts and a
drastic reduction in the number of lines of code (LOC). However, this first study has not
investigated the “aspectization” of application-specific error handling, which is often the
case in large-scale software systems. In addition, in spite of the assumption made by many
authors that using AOP for separating exceptional code from the normal application code
is beneficial, the involved trade-offs are not yet well-understood. For instance, previous
investigations have not analyzed whether aspect-oriented (AO) solutions scale well in
the presence of complex relationships involving the normal application code and error
recovery code. Also, the interaction between exception handling aspects and aspects that
implement other concerns still has not been explicitly studied. Hence, some important
research questions remain unaddressed:
• Does AOP promote an improvement in well-accepted quality attributes other than
separation of concerns, such as coupling cohesion, and size?
• Is exception handling a reusable aspect in real, deployable, software systems?
• When is it beneficial to aspectize exception handling? When is it not?
• How do exception handling aspects affect aspects implementing other concerns?
This paper presents an in-depth study that assesses the adequacy of AspectJ [114], a
general-purpose aspect-oriented extension to Java, for modularizing exception handling
code. The study consisted of refactoring four different applications so that the code
responsible for handling exceptions was moved to aspects. Three of these applications
were originally written in Java and one was implemented in AspectJ. This study differs
from the Lippert and Lopes study for a number of reasons. First, the targets of the
study are complete, deployable systems, not reusable infrastructures, such as a framework.
Hence, the exception handling code also implements non-uniform, complex strategies,
making it harder to move handlers to aspects. Second, we employ a metrics suite [73]
to quantitatively assess attributes such as coupling, conciseness, cohesion, and separation
of concerns in both the original and the refactored system. Third, we evaluate how
exception handling aspects interact with aspects implementing other concerns. Fourth,
we do not attempt to move error detection code to aspects. Error detection involves
checking the state of a program against a certain predicate when its control flow graph
reaches a certain node, at runtime [52]. Thus, in many cases, error detection code is very
strongly coupled with the code that implements a system’s normal behavior. We believe
this subject deserves a separate in-depth study.
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This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the setting of our study.
The results of the study are presented in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 analyzes the obtained
results and points some constraints on the validity of our study. Section 6.5 discusses
related work. The last section points directions for future work.
6.2 Study Setting
This section describes the configuration of our study. Section 6.2.1 briefly explains how
we moved exception handling code to aspects. Section 6.2.2 describes the targets of our
study. Section 6.2.3 presents the metrics suite we have used to quantitatively evaluate
the original and refactored versions of each system.
6.2.1 Aspectizing Exception Handling
AspectJ [114] extends Java with constructs for picking specific points in the program
flow, called join points, and executing pieces of code, called advice, when these points are
reached. Join points are points of interest in the program execution through which cross-
cutting concerns are composed with other application concerns. AspectJ adds a few new
constructs to Java. A pointcut picks out certain join points and contextual information
at those join points. Join points selectable by pointcuts vary in nature and granularity.
Examples include method call and class instantiation. Advice may be executed before,
after, or around the selected join points. In the latter case, execution of the advice may
potentially alter the flow of control of the application, and replace the code that would be
otherwise executed in the selected join point. AspectJ also lets programmers suppress the
static checks that the Java compiler makes regarding checked exceptions. This feature is
called exception softening and is useful when it is necessary to move exception handlers
to aspects. Exceptions are softened within a set of join points. When exceptions are
thrown in these join points, they are automatically wrapped by a pre-defined unchecked
exception called SoftException.
Our study focused on the handling of exceptions. We moved try-catch, try-finally,
and try-catch-finally blocks in the four applications to aspects. Hereafter, we refer
to these types of blocks collectively as try-catch, or handler, blocks, unless otherwise
noted. We use the terms try block, catch block (or handler), and finally block (or
clean-up action) to explicitly refer to the parts of a try-catch block. Method signatures
(throws clauses) and the raising of exceptions (throw statements) were not taken into
account in this study because these elements are related to exception detection.
We used the Extract Fragment to Advice [135] refactoring to move handlers to as-
pects. After extracting all the handlers to advice, we looked for reuse opportunities and
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eliminated identical handlers. The following code snippet shows a trivial example of as-
pectization of handlers using an around advice. Due to space constraints, we do not show
how we extracted handlers to after advice.
// original code // refactored code
class C { class C {
void m() { ==> void m() {
try {...} ... //former body of
catch(E e) {...} } // the try block
} }
} aspect A {
pointcut pcd :
execution(void C.m());
void around() : pcd() {
try { proceed(); }
catch(E e) {...}
} declare soft : E : pcd();
}
We implemented handlers in the aspects using after and around advice. Whenever
possible, we used after advice, since they are simpler. After advice are not appropriate,
though, for implementing handlers that do not raise an exception (handlers that mask
the exception). AspectJ requires that an after advice end its execution in the same way
as the join point to which it is associated. Therefore, if the code of an after advice is
executed following the raising of an exception, the runtime system of AspectJ assumes
that the advice ends its execution by raising an exception (either the original or a new
one), even if that does not happen explicitly. Thus, it is not possible to implement as
an after advice a handler that logs the caught exception and ignores it (the advice would
have to raise some exception). In these cases, around advice were employed, since they
do not have this restriction. Clean-up actions were implemented as after advice. New
advice were created on a per-try-block basis, excluding cases where handlers could be
reused. In situations where multiple catch blocks are associated to a single try block,
we created a single advice that implements all the catch blocks. This helps decreasing
the number of advice and, at the same time, avoids problems related to ordering multiple
advice associated to the same join point.
For each target system, we employed a different strategy for organizing exception
handling aspects. This approach helped us in understanding how different organizations
influence handler reuse. Various approaches are possible. Extreme alternatives include
putting all the exception handling code in a single aspect, creating several simple aspects
that encapsulate the possible handling strategies for each type of exception, or creating
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a separate aspect for each handling strategy. More moderate approaches include creating
a handler aspect per class that includes exception handling code or one aspect for each
package. For a system where other concerns have been aspectized a priori, a feasible
strategy would be to create one exception handling aspect per aspectized concern. Each
organization has pros and cons that revolve around the code size vs. modularity trade-off.
This is further discussed in Section 6.3.1.
Whenever possible, we associated exception handling advice to methods through
execution pointcut designators. These pointcut designators have a simple semantics
and, unlike the call pointcut designator, do not require that the exception handling
advice deal directly with SoftException when it is necessary to soften exceptions. For
cases where it was not possible to use the execution pointcut designator, we looked for
alternate solutions, depending on the circumstances, usually employing the call, new,
withincode, and cflow pointcut designators.
In several occasions, we modified the implementation of a method in order to expose
join points that AspectJ could select more directly or contextual information required by
exception handlers, for example, the values of local variables. Usually, this amounted to
extracting new methods whose body is entirely contained within a try block, and whose
parameters were the contextual information required by the handler. This was often
necessary when try-catch blocks were tangled with the normal code, for example, nested
within a loop. In these situations, using a pointcut to select the execution of the whole
method might not be appropriate. After exception handling, when a tangled try-catch
block does not end its execution by raising an exception, it is necessary to resume the
execution of the normal code from the statement that textually follows the handler block.
However, if no refactoring is performed, this behavior cannot be achieved for cases where
it is imposible to specify a pointcut that captures exclusively the statements within the
try part of the try-catch block.
6.2.2 Our Case Studies
We manually refactored four different applications in our study, three of them OO and
one of them AO. Hereafter we call them “target systems”. We believe that these appli-
cations are representative of how exception handling is typically used to deal with errors
in real software development efforts for several reasons. First, these systems were selec-
ted mainly because they include a large number of exception handlers that implement
diverse exception handling strategies that range from trivial to sophisticated. Second,
they encompass different characteristics, diverse domains, and involve the use of distinct
real-world software technologies. Finally, they present heterogeneous crosscutting rela-
tionships involving the normal code, the handler code, the clean-up actions, and other
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crosscutting concerns. The rest of this subsection describes the four targets systems of
the study.
The original implementation of the first three systems was written in Java and, af-
terwards, all the exception handling code was refactored to aspects. Telestrada is a
traveler information system being developed for a Brazilian national highway administra-
tor. For our study, we have selected some self-contained packages of one of its subsystems
comprising approximately 3350 LOC (excluding comments and blank lines) and more
than 200 classes and interfaces. Java Pet Store1 is a demo for the Java Platform, En-
terprise Edition2 (Java EE). The system uses various technologies based on the Java EE
platform and is representative of existing e-commerce applications. Its implementation
comprises approximately 17500 LOC and 330 classes and interfaces. The third target
system is the CVS Core Plugin, part of the basic distribution of the Eclipse3 platform.
The implementation of the plugin comprises approximately 170 classes and interfaces and
approximately 19000 LOC. It is the target system with the most complicated exception
handling scenarios.
Health Watcher was the only system originally implemented in AspectJ. It is a web-
based information system that was developed for the healthcare bureau of the city of
Recife, Brazil. The original system version involved the aspectization of distribution,
persistence, and concurrency control concerns. Furthermore, the system includes some
very simple exception handling aspects whose handling strategy consists in printing error
messages in the user’s web browser. The implementation of Health Watcher comprises
6630 LOC and 134 components (36 aspects and 98 classes and interfaces). The refactoring
of Health Watcher consisted in moving exception handling code from classes to aspects.
Moreover, we also moved exception handling code from aspects related to other concerns
to aspects dedicated exclusively to exception handling.
6.2.3 Metrics Suite
The quantitative assessment was based on the application of a metrics suite to both
the original and refactored versions of the target systems. This suite includes metrics
for separation of concerns, coupling, cohesion, and size [73] to evaluate both original
and refactored implementations and have already been used in several experimental stu-
dies [19, 32, 79, 84]. The coupling, cohesion, and size metrics were defined based on
some classic OO metrics [43]. The original OO metrics were extended to be applied in
a paradigm-independent way, supporting the generation of comparable results. Also, the
metrics suite introduces three new metrics for quantifying separation of concerns. They
1http://java.sun.com/developer/releases/petstore/
2http://java.sun.com/j2ee
3http://www.eclipse.org
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Attributes Metrics Definitions
Concern Diffusion Counts the number of components that contribute to the
over Components implementation of a concern and other components which
access them.
Separation Concern Diffusion Counts the number of methods and advice which
of Concerns over Operations contribute to a concern’s implementation plus the
number of other methods and advice accessing them.
Concern Diffusion Counts the number of transition points for each concern
over LOC through the LOC. Transition points are points in the code
where there is a “concern switch”.
Coupling Between Counts the number of components declaring methods or
Coupling Components fields that may be called or accessed by other components.
Depth of Inheritance Counts how far down in the inheritance hierarchy a class
Tree or aspect is declared.
Lack of Cohesion Measures the lack of cohesion of a class or an aspect in
Cohesion in Operations terms of the amount of method and advice pairs that do
not access the same field.
Lines of Code (LOC) Counts the lines of code.
Size Number of Attributes Counts the number of fields of each class or aspect.
Number of Operations Counts the number of methods and advice of each class
or aspect.
Vocabulary Size Counts the number of components (classes, interfaces, and
aspects) of the system.
Tabela 6.1: Metrics Suite
measure the degree to which a single concern (exception handling, in our study) in the
system maps to the design components (classes and aspects), operations (methods and ad-
vice), and lines of code. For all the employed metrics, a lower value implies a better result.
Table 6.1 presents a brief definition of each metric, and associates them with the attributes
measured by each one. Detailed descriptions of the metrics appear elsewhere [73].
6.3 Study Results
This section presents the results of the measurement process. The data have been col-
lected based on the set of defined metrics (Section 6.2.3). The presentation is broken
in three parts. Section 6.3.1 presents the results for the separation of concerns metrics.
Section 6.3.2 presents the results for the coupling and cohesion metrics. Section 6.3.3
presents the results for the size metrics.
We present the results by means of tables that put side-by-side the values of the me-
trics for the original and refactored versions of each target system. We break the results
for the three OO target systems in two parts, in order to make it clear the contribution of
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classes and aspects to the value of each metric. For the AO application (Health Watcher),
we break the results in three parts, in order to make it clear the contribution of classes,
exception handling aspects, and aspects related to other concerns to the value of each
metric. Hereafter, we use the term “class” to refer to both classes and interfaces. Rows
labelled “Diff.” indicate the percentual difference between the original and refactored
verions of each system, relative to each metric. A positive value means that the origi-
nal version fared better, whereas a negative value indicates that the refactored version
exhibited better results.
6.3.1 Separation of Concerns Measures
Table 6.2 shows the obtained results for the separation of concerns metrics. In general,
the refactored versions of the target systems performed better than the original ones. In
the refactored versions, all the code related to exception handling that was not machine-
generated was moved to aspects. We did not consider machine-generated code because it
typically does not need to be maintained by developers. Among the target systems, only
the Java PetStore includes machine-generated code, produced by the Java EE compiler.
Application Concern Diffusion Concern Diffusion Concern Diffusion
over Components over Operations over LOC
Original Refactored Original Refactored Original Refactored
Telestrada Classes 22 0 42 0 208 0
Aspects - 18 - 44 - 0
Total 22 18 42 44 208 0
Diff. -18.18% +4.76% -100%
Java Pet Classes 110 20 256 21 1168 84
Store Aspects - 37 - 179 - 0
Total 110 57 256 200 1168 84
Diff. -48.18% -21.88% -92.81%
Eclipse CVS Classes 59 0 236 0 1118 0
Core Plugin Aspects - 4 - 180 - 0
Total 59 4 236 180 1118 0
Diff. -93.22% -23.73% -100%
Health Classes 35 0 115 0 488 0
Watcher EH Aspects 5 10 9 70 0 0
Other Aspects 7 0 12 0 48 0
Total 47 10 136 70 536 0
Diff. -78.72% -48.53% -100%
Tabela 6.2: Separation of Concerns Metrics.
Even though the measures of Concern Diffusion over Components diverged strongly
amongst the four target systems, it is clear that the refactored solutions fared better. This
divergence is a direct consequence of the adopted strategy for creating new handler aspects
in each target system. In Telestrada, for complex classes with 7 or more catch blocks, we
created a new aspect whose sole responsibility is to implement the handlers for that class.
Furthermore, each package includes an aspect that modularizes exception handling code
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Application Coupling between Depth of Lack of Cohesion
Components Inheritance Tree in Operations
Original Refactored Original Refactored Original Refactored
Telestrada Classes 179 142 186 186 408 524
Aspects - 39 - 2 - 0
Total 179 181 186 188 408 524
Diff. +1.12% +1.08% +28.43%
Java Pet Classes 783 729 245 245 7095 7595
Store Aspects - 65 - 13 - 71
Total 783 794 245 258 7095 7666
Diff. +1.4% +5.31% +8.05%
Eclipse CVS Classes 1481 1412 181 181 18326 19287
Core Plugin Aspects - 77 - 4 - 0
Total 1481 1489 181 185 18236 19287
Diff. +0.54% +2.21% +5.24%
Health Classes 217 197 69 69 766 867
Watcher EH Aspects 5 27 3 3 4 130
Other Aspects 66 61 17 17 210 210
Total 288 285 89 89 980 1207
Diff. -1.04% 0% +23.16%
Tabela 6.3: Coupling and Cohesion Metrics.
for simpler classes. In the Java Pet Store a single exception handling aspect was created
per package. In Health Watcher, an exception handling aspect was created for each other
crosscutting concern. For the CVS Plugin, the programmer was left free to create aspects
as he deemed necessary. The results for Concern Diffusion over Components in Table 6.2
reflect these design choices. Telestrada is the system whose refactored version achieved the
worst results (a reduction of 18.2%), since a great number of exception handling aspects
were created. The refactored Java Pet Store achieved a middle ground between Telestrada
and Health Watcher, with a reduction of 48.18%. In the refactored Health Watcher, the
small number of exception handling aspects (10) represented a reduction of 78.7% in the
value of the metric. For the CVS Plugin, only 4 exception handling aspects were created,
resulting in a reduction of 93.22%.
Concern Diffusion over LOC was the metric where the refactored systems performed
best, when compared to the original ones. The refactored versions of three out of four
target systems did not have any concern switches and thus had value 0 for this metric.
The only exception was Java Pet Store, because the machine-generated code was not
moved to aspects. In spite of this, the measure for the refactored version was still more
than 90% lower. Also, the measures of Concern Diffusion over LOC do not seem to be
influenced by the size or characteristics of each target system. This can be seen as an
indication that AOP scales up well when it comes to promoting separation of exception
handlers in the program texts.
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6.3.2 Coupling and Cohesion Measures
Table 6.3 shows the obtained results for the two coupling metrics, Coupling between
Components and Depth of Inheritance Tree, and the cohesion metric, Lack of Cohesion
in Operations. On the one hand, aspectizing exception handling did not have a strong
effect on the coupling metrics. On the other hand, the measure of Lack of Cohesion in
Operations for the refactored target systems was much worse than for the original ones.
The increase in the value of Depth of Inheritance Tree for some of the target systems
was due to the creation of abstract aspects from which other handler aspects inherit.
The greater the number of concrete aspects in a system that inherit from a newly created
abstract aspect, the greater the value of the metric. Amongst all the metrics we employed,
Coupling between Components was the least affected by the aspectization of exception
handling. None of the target systems had a difference greater than 1.5% between the
original and refactored versions. New couplings were introduced only when exception
handling aspects had to capture contextual information from classes.
Lack of Cohesion in Operations was the metric for which the refactored target systems
presented the worst results. The refactored versions of all target systems performed
worse in this metric. For the refactored versions of Health Watcher and Telestrada,
the measure of Lack of Cohesion in Operations was more than 20% higher than the
corresponding original systems. In the Java Pet Store and the CVS Plugin, the increase
was of approximately 8% and 5%, respectively. The main reason for the poor results
is the large number of operations that were created to expose join points that AspectJ
can capture. These new operations are not part of the implementation of the exception
handling concern (and therefore do not affect Concern Diffusion over Operations), but are
a direct consequence of using aspects to modularize this concern. Refactoring to expose
join points is a common activity in AOP, since current aspect languages do not provide
means to precisely capture every join point of interest.
Even though cohesion was worse in the refactored target systems, this was caused
mostly by the classes. As shown in Table 6.3, the value of the cohesion metric for the
aspects in the refactored version of Telestrada and the CVS Plugin was 0. In the Java
Pet Store, the aspects accounted for less than 1% of the total value of the metric. Only
Health Watcher was different. In this system exception handling aspects accounted for
10.8% of the total value.
6.3.3 Size Measures
Contradicting the general intuition that aspects make programs smaller [114, 117] due
to reuse, the original and refactored versions of the four target systems had very similar
results in two of the four size metrics: LOC and Number of Attributes. The measure of
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Application Lines of Number of Number of Vocabulary
Code Attributes Operations Size
Original Refac. Original Refac. Original Refac. Original Refac.
Telestrada Classes 3352 2885 127 127 423 437 224 224
Aspects - 459 - 0 - 44 - 18
Total 3352 3334 127 127 423 481 224 242
Diff. -0.54% 0% +13.71% +8.04%
Java Pet Classes 17482 15593 542 542 2075 2135 339 339
Store Aspects - 2045 - 6 - 180 - 37
Total 17482 17638 542 548 2075 2315 339 376
Diff. +0.89% +1.11% +11.57% +10.91%
Eclipse CVS Classes 18876 17803 852 854 1832 1848 257 257
Core Plugin Aspects - 1620 - 0 - 180 - 4
Total 18876 19423 852 854 1832 2028 257 261
Diff. +2.82%% +0.23%% +9.66% +1.43%
Health Classes 5732 4641 152 152 542 553 98 98
Watcher EH Aspects 86 853 3 7 9 73 5 10
Other Aspects 812 701 12 12 104 104 31 31
Total 6630 6195 167 171 655 730 134 139
Diff. -6.56% +2.4% +11.45% +3.73%
Tabela 6.4: Size Metrics.
Vocabulary Size grew as expected, due to the introduction of exception handling aspects.
Moreover, the Number of Operations of the refactored versions of all the target systems
grew significantly. Table 6.4 summarizes the results for the size metrics.
In Telestrada and Java Pet Store, the number of LOC of the original and refactored
versions is similar (less than 1%). In Health Watcher there was a sensible decrease in
the amount of exception handling code, even though the influence of this change on the
overall number of LOC of the system was only modest (approximately -6.6%). In the
CVS Plugin, there was an increase of 2.9% in the number of LOC of the refactored
version. Although this is a small percentage of the overall number of LOC of the system,
it accounts for almost 550 LOC introduced due to aspectization. The obtained values for
LOC were expected. Although some reuse of handler code could be achieved, this was
not anywhere near the results obtained by Lippert and Lopes in their study. Moreover,
most handlers comprise a few (between 1 and 10) LOC and the use of AspectJ incurs in
a slight implementation overhead because it is necessary to specify join points of interest
and soften exceptions in order to associate handlers to pieces of code. In the end, the
economy in LOC achieved due to handler reuse was more or less compensated by the
overhead of using AspectJ.
The Number of Operations was sensibly higher in the refactored target systems. It
grew 13.7% in the refactored version of Telestrada, 11.6% in the Java Pet Store, 10.7%
in the CVS Plugin, and approximately %11.5 in Health Watcher. The main reason for
this result was the creation of advice implementing handlers. Since there is a one-to-
one correspondence between try blocks and advice (except for cases where handlers are
reused) and handlers do not count as methods in the original systems, this increase was
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expected. Another reason for the increase in the Number of Operations was the refactoring
of methods to expose join points that AspectJ can capture.
6.4 Discussion
This section makes a qualitative analysis of the obtained results (Section 6.3) focusing on
the research questions posed in Section 6.1. We also base the analysis on our experience
in modularizing exception handling in the four target systems. Furthermore, we discuss
the constraints on the validity of our empirical evaluation.
6.4.1 Coupling, cohesion, and conciseness
Our empirical study confirms some of the findings of the study conducted by Lippert and
Lopes [117], who claim that the use of aspects decreases interference between concerns in
the program texts. The results achieved by the refactored versions of the target systems
in the separation of concerns metrics (Section 6.3.1) provide convincing evidence for this.
When exception handling is aspectized using AspectJ, it is sometimes necessary to
soften exceptions to suppress the static checks performed by the Java compiler. The issue
with exception softening is that it creates an implicit, compile-time dependency of the
base code on the exception handling aspect. The dependency is implicit because it cannot
be inferred just by looking at the base code. Moreover, if the exception handling aspects
are not present, the base code will not compile. An important benefit of aspectizing design
patterns is the fact that dependencies are inverted and code implementing design patterns
will depend on the participants of the pattern, but not the other way around [91]. This
principle does not apply to the aspectization of exception handling with AspectJ because,
in many situations, it is not possible to eliminate the dependency of the base code on
the aspects. A direct consequence of this is that, in AspectJ, exception handling is not
a pluggable aspect, differently from other concerns, such as distribution [164], assertion
checking [117], and some design patterns [91].
As seen in Section 6.3.3, handler advice accounted for a significant increase in the
Number of Operations of all the target systems (+10.4% in Telestrada +8.7% in the Java
Pet Store, and +9.8 in the CVS Plugin and Health Watcher). As with all size metrics,
this value cannot be evaluated in isolation. Although a developer getting acquainted
to the refactored version will have to understand more operations, these operations are
smaller and do not mix a system’s normal activity with the code that handles exceptions.
Therefore, the increase in the Number of Operations caused by the handler advice should
not be seen as a negative factor.
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Operations extracted in order to expose join points that AspectJ could capture cor-
responded to 3.3% of the total Number of Operations in Telestrada, 2.9% in the Java Pet
Store, 0.79% in the CVS Plugin, and 1.7% in Health Watcher. Unlike the increase caused
by handler advice, the increase caused by refactored operations, albeit small, is negative
in most situations. These new operations are not part of the original design of the system
and possibly do not clearly state the intent of the developer. In some cases, a refactored
operation comprises just a few lines that do not make sense when separated from their
original contexts.
The increase in Lack of Cohesion in Operations in the refactored versions of Java Pet
Store and the CVS Plugin is much lower than the increase in the same metric in Te-
lestrada and Health Watcher. In Telestrada, almost 90% of the increase in the cohesion
metric is due to only three classes. These classes have a large number of complex methods,
constrasting with the other classes of the system. Since the classes on the system are, in
general, very simple (the Number of Operations/Vocabulary Size ratio of the original Te-
lestrada is less than 2), we believe that the large increase in the cohesion metric exhibited
by the refactored system was mainly due to the its small size. In Health Watcher, unlike
the other target systems, the large increase in the cohesion metric was caused mainly by
the exception handling aspects. Three such aspects can be accounted for almost 50% of
the increase in the cohesion metric. It is important to stress that this result does not seem
to be related to the existence of aspects in the system that implement other concerns.
6.4.2 Is exception handling a reusable aspect?
Reuse of handler code is not the main expected benefit of using aspects for modularizing
crosscutting concerns in software systems. Rather, an implementation of concern code
which is localized and consistent is a stronger reason for using aspects. However, some
researchers [91, 114, 117, 164] claim that reuse is often a natural consequence of aspecti-
zation, specially when it comes to exception handling code [114, 117]. In our study, we
found that reusing handlers is much more difficult than is usually advertised [114, 117].
This can be noticed by observing the measures for Concern Diffusion over Operations
in Section 6.3.1. In the target system where the highest amount of reuse of exception
handling code was achieved, a reduction of 48.5% was observed for this metric. Albeit
very positive, this result still contrasts strongly with the findings of Lippert and Lopes,
who claim to have achieved a reduction of more than 85% in the number of exception
handlers in the target of their study.
Handler reuse directly depends on several factors. In our study, the factors that had
the strongest influence on reuse were: (i) the type of exception being handled; (ii) what
the handler does and whether it ends its execution by returning, raising an exception, etc.;
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1 // ADVICE #1
2 boolean around () : ... {
3 try { return proceed (); }
4 catch ( CVSException e) { CVSProviderPlugin.log(e); }
5 return false ;
6 }
7 // ADVICE #2
8 boolean around () : ... {
9 try { return proceed (); }
10 catch ( IOException e) { CVSProviderPlugin.log(
11 IStatus .ERROR ,e.getMessage (),e); }
12 return false ;
13 }
14 // ADVICE #3
15 boolean around () : ... {
16 try { proceed () ; }
17 catch ( CVSException e){ CVSProviderPlugin.log(e); }
18 return false ;
19 }
Figura 6.1: Three similar advice that cannot be combined.
(iii) the kind of contextual information required, if any; and (iv) what the method that
handles the exception returns and what exceptions appear in its throws clause. Some of
these factors can assist in determining if aspectizing exception handling in a given context
is beneficial or harmful (Section 6.4.3), independently of reuse.
The difficulty of reusing handler code is illustrated by Figure 6.1. The figure shows
three advice that look similar, but cannot be merged into a single one because of small
differences. Advice #1 and #2 cannot be combined because they log different error
messages and handle different exceptions. A possible solution to the second problem
is to implement a single advice that catches a supertype of both CVSException and
IOException. Since the nearest common supertype is Exception, the advice should
re-throw unchecked exceptions to avoid changing the system’s behavior. It is also not
possible to combine advice #1 and #3. The former returns a value that depends on the
call to proceed() (Line 3) while the latter always returns false (Lines 17 and 19). For
the same reasons, advice #2 and #3 cannot be combined.
The value of Concern Diffusion over Operations in the refactored version of Telestrada
was almost 5% higher than in the original one (Section 6.3.1). This happened because,
in some packages, reuse of handler code was virtually inexistent and some classes had
operations with more than one try-catch block. Hence, when exception handling code
in these classes was moved to aspects, each handler had to be put in a separate advice,
contributing to the increase.
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6.4.3 When to aspectize exception handling
From our experience in refactoring the four target systems, we derived a simple classifi-
cation for exception handling code. This classification aims to help developers to identify
the situations where moving exception handlers to aspects is beneficial and when it is
not worth the effort. We use three categories to classify exceptional code in Java-like
languages: (i) placement of try-catch blocks; (ii) dependency on local variables; and
(iii) flow of control after handler execution. In the rest of this section, we describe these
categories and show how they capture many of the situations that developers are likely
to find when attempting to aspectize exception handling.
Placement of try-catch Blocks. The first category is related to where in the text
of a method a handler block appears. This impacts the pointcut designators employed
to capture the body of the try block and whether refactoring is required in order to
expose join points of interest. If all the statements implementing the normal behavior
of a method, including variable declarations, appear within a try block, we say that the
placement of the containing try-catch block is basic. Aspectizing exception handling for
a basic try-catch block is a simple matter of refactoring handlers and clean-up actions
to advice, softening exceptions as necessary, and defining a pointcut to capture the whole
method execution. No additional refactoring is required and the pointcut definition is
usually quite simple.
If a try-catch block is not basic, it is tangled. It is usually much harder to modularize
exception handling with aspects for tangled try-catch blocks. It is often necessary to
perform some a priori refactoring that makes the try-catch block basic. Furthermore,
depending on the context of the tangling, it may be necessary to define complex pointcuts
to correctly capture the implementation of the try block. If all the statements that
appear outside of a top-level (non-nested) tangled try-catch block can be moved to
its corresponding try block without altering the behavior of the parent method, this
try-catch block is considered basic.
A try-catch block can be further classified as nested or top-level. A nested try-catch
block is contained within a try block, whereas a top-level try-catch block is not. A
nested try-catch block is considered basic if it is the only statement in the try block of
a basic try-catch block.
Dependency on Local Variables. The second category is used to separate exception
handlers in two groups: those that do and those that do not depend on local variables. By
“local variables” we mean variables defined within the containing context. Dependency
on local variables hinders aspectization, as the joint point models of most AO languages
(AspectJ included) cannot capture information stored by these variables. If a handler
reads the value of one or more local variables, moving it to an aspect usually requires the
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use of the Extract Method refactoring, in order to expose the variables as parameters of a
method. If the handler performs assignments to local variables, other refactorings might
be necessary, depending on whether the variables are primitive or object types. Although
ths discussion focuses on exception handlers, it also applies to clean-up actions.
Flow of Control after Handler Execution. The third category, flow of control after
handler execution, is related to how an exception handler ends its execution. After a
termination exception handler executes its last statement, the statement that textually
follows the corresponding try-catch block is executed. A propagation exception handler
finishes its execution by signaling an exception. In this case, system execution resumes
when some other handler catches the signaled exception. A return exception handler
is, in some ways, similar to a propagation handler. The difference is that, in the former,
system execution resumes from site where the handler’s method was called. Finally, a loop
iteration exception handler occurs when a try-catch block is nested within a loop and
at least one of its catch blocks executes a statement such as break or continue. Flow of
control after handler execution affects several design choices related to the aspectization of
exception handling. For example, propagation handlers can be easily implemented using
after advice, whereas termination and return handlers cannot. Moreover, it is generally
straightforward to define a pointcut that selects a tangled, top-level try-catch block if its
handlers are all propagation or return. However, the same does not apply to termination
handlers.
Using the proposed classification, it is possible to describe several interesting scena-
rios. These scenarios represent recurring situations with which a developer would have
to deal if faced with the task of modularizing exception handling code using aspects. Ta-
ble 6.5 enumerates the ones that we encountered the most frequently while conducting
our study. Each row represents one or more scenarios. To avoid repetition, if a category
is marked more than once in the same row (e.g. “basic” and “tangled” marked), the
row represents more than one scenario and an OR semantics is adopted. For category
Placement of try-catch Block, we assume that the two subcategories (basic/tangled and
nested/top-level) count as different categories. For example, row 1 refers to scenarios
where the placement of try-catch blocks is basic and either nested or top-level. Also,
the catch block does not depend on local variables and can end its execution by termina-
ting, propagating an exception, or returning. It is important to stress that the resulsts in
Table 6.5 are directly dependent on the aspect-oriented language we employed, AspectJ.
The rightmost column of Table 6.5 indicates whether it is beneficial (“yes”) or harmful
(“no”) to modularize exception handling with aspects in the presented scenarios. In
general, we considered aspectization to be beneficial in a given scenario if it has a positive
effect on the values of the metrics of Section 6.2.3, when comparing the original and
aspectized code for instances of the scenario. Moreover, in some rows, the rightmost
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# Placement of Dependency Flow of control after Should be
try-catch blocks on local vars. handler execution aspectized?
basic tangled nested top-level yes no term. prop. ret. loop
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Yes.
2 2 2 2 2 2 Yes.
3 2 2 2 2 Depends.
4 2 2 2 2 2 No.
5 2 2 2 2 Depends.
6 2 2 2 2 2 2 Depends.
7 2 2 2 2 2 2 No.
8 2 2 2 2 2 2 No.
Tabela 6.5: Some exception handling scenarios according to the proposed classification
# Reason
3 Aspectization is beneficial in this scenario if: (i) the code within the try block can be selected by a pointcut
without the need for additional refactoring; or (ii) it is necessary to use Extract Method to expose a joint
point that AspectJ can capture but the new method makes sense by itself, i.e., it could have been created by
the developers of the system.
4 & 7 In our experience, combinations of tangling and nesting, and nesting and access to local variables usually
result in complex code that needs to be refactored before it can be aspectized. In many cases more than one
new operation needs to be created, negatively affecting the cohesion and conciseness of the code.
5 If the outer try-catch blocks do not have handlers for the exception caught by the innermost handler
nor to the exceptions signaled by it, aspectization is beneficial because the advice implementing the
handler can be associated to the execution of the whole method.
6 Aspectization is only beneficial if: (i) the handler accesses just a few variables (< 4) and only for reading;
and (ii) the refactoring employed to expose these variables creates a method that makes sense by itself.
8 Loop iteration handlers are usually too strongly coupled with the context where they appear.
Tabela 6.6: Justification for the “no” and “depends” scenarios of Table 6.5.
column column indicates that the choice of aspectizing exception handling in a given
scenario depends on factors that are not taken into account by the proposed classification.
These cases are marked as “depends”. We have chosen not to include these factors in
the classification because they are very specific and subjective, and to keep it simple.
Table 6.6 justifies the “no” and “depends” scenarios.
6.4.4 Exception handling and other aspects
This section analyzes the scalability of AOP when there are interactions between the
implementation of exception handling and other crosscutting behaviors. The idea is to
examine how easy it is to aspectize such crosscutting concerns in the presence of excep-
tion handling aspects. Our investigation was carried out mainly in the context of the
Health Watcher system. However, as discussed in the previous sections and evidenced
by the measurements (Section 6.3), this system has a simple exceptional behavior, when
compared to the other three target systems. To obtain a more comprehensive perspective
of the possible difficulties caused by interactions between exception handling and other
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aspects, we have also refactored part of the AspectJ version of the CVS Plugin, where
the exception handling concern was already modularized with aspects. We have chosen
this system, instead of the other two, because it was the case study that exhibited the
most complex exception handling strategies. In the CVS Plugin, we have opted for as-
pectizing security (access control) and distribution (remote access through HTTP and
SOCKS5 proxies) concerns, which would otherwise be naturally tangled and scattered
through several classes. We selected these concerns because they are well-known as tradi-
tional crosscutting concerns in the literature, and tend to have a broadly-scoped influence
in the system. More importantly, we have detected a number of different relationships
between exception handling and these crosscutting concerns. These relationships were
not captured in the Health Watcher system, which generally exhibited a loose coupling
between the exception handling aspects and aspects implementing other concerns.
We have observed different categories of interactions involving the exception handling
code and other crosscutting behaviors. They range from (i) simple invocations linking ex-
ceptional behaviors and methods relative to the other concern to (ii) the sharing of one or
more module members by two different concerns. The set of interactions analyzed in this
study was classified into 5 categories, which are described in the following. These catego-
ries involve either class-level interlacing or method-level interlacing. Our categorization
is a specialization of interaction categories defined in a previous study where we have
analyzed design pattern compositions [19]. Here we refine the previous categorization by
also taking exception handling structures into account, namely protected regions (try {
}), handlers (catch (E) { }), and clean-up actions (finally { }). To illustrate these
categories, we use Figure 6.2. In the figure, Concern 1 (C1) corresponds to exception
handling and Concern 2 (C2) is a second concern. In Health Watcher, C2 can be part
of the concurrency control, distribution, or persistence concerns, whereas in the Eclipse
CVS plugin it is part of the security or distribution concerns.
Class-level Interlacing. The first category is concerned with class-level interlacing of
exceptional behavior and other crosscutting behaviors. In this case, the implementati-
ons concerns C1 and C2 have one class in common. However, each concern encompasses
disjoint sets of methods and attributes in the same class. As illustrated in the left-hand
side of Figure 6.2, C1 and C2 have a coinciding participant class, but there is no method
or attribute pertaining to the two concerns. This interaction category did not bring any
kind of problem while aspectizing elements of C2. Hence we can say that AspectJ has
scaled up well in scenarios involving class-level interlacing.
Method-level Interlacing. Four categories involve some form of method-level inter-
lacing: unprotected-region level, protected-region level, handler level, and cleanup-action
level. Differently from class-level interlacing, all these categories have a similar characte-
ristic: the implementations of concerns C1 and C2 have one or more methods in common.
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Figura 6.2: Aspect interaction categories.
Hence exception handling code is interlaced at the method level with elements of C2.
In the right-hand side of Figure 6.2, method x() has code pertaining both C1 and C2.
In most of the situations in Health Watcher and the CVS plugin involved, interaction
between concerns C1 and C2 consisted of calls to methods from C2 by code pertaining C1.
The distinguishing feature of the four categories of method-level interlacing is where such
a call is placed in terms of the exception handling elements.
The right-hand side of Figure 6.2 depicts all the 4 types of interactions encountered in
the two systems. The interaction types influenced the way in which the AspectJ code of
the two systems was refactored to expose the appropriate join points to the aspects of C2.
The aspectization of crosscutting behaviors relative to C2 was straightforward when the
situation exhibited interlacing at the unprotected- or protected-region level. The reason
was that there was no explicit link between the exception handling aspects and the C2
code being aspectized. In Health Watcher, all the instances of method-level interlacing
fit into one of these two categories. More explicit aspect interactions appear in methods
with catch- and finally-level interlacings. These cases complicated the aspectization of
distribution and security in the CVS Plugin: the advice in the exception handling aspects,
which implemented handlers and clean-up actions, also contained calls to C2 methods that
were being moved to aspects. In this case, we needed to change the implementation of
the handler advice in order to (i) use reflective features of AspectJ to access the elements
of C2, or (ii) use the execution of handler advice as join points of interest in poincuts of
the C2-specific aspects.
The situation becomes more complicated when a handler advice depends on local
variables (Section 6.4.3) that are initialized through calls to C2-specific methods, such
as the z variable in Figure 6.2. After refactoring, exception handling aspects would be
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advising such a method call (C2.a()) in order to save the value being assigned to z in
an aspect variable. However, with the aspectization of C2, the call C2.a() would either
be moved to an aspect related to C2 or be advised by such aspect. This would require
the exception handling aspect to take this C2-specific aspect into account, creating a
dependency between the two aspects.
6.4.5 Limitations of this Study
This study does not attempt to assess how different refactoring strategies for moving
exception handlers to aspects affect the results. Furthermore, only one team of developers
was responsible for conducting the study. More general results could be obtained by
employing different teams of developers and performing measurements on the refactored
systems produced by each team. Another limitation is that we have not evaluated how
aspects affect execution time in the target systems.
Our study focuses on a single AO language, namely, AspectJ. Although many ideas
presented here also apply to other AO languages, some surely do not. More powerful join
point models would make it possible to deal more appropriately with some complicated
cases, such as those where handler blocks are tangled or nested, thus affecting the study
results. For example, using the loop pointcut designator of the LoopsAJ language [93]
it is possible to associate handlers to exceptions raised and not handled within loops.
Moreover, one of the extensions to AspectJ proposed by the developers of the abc AspectJ
compiler [7] allows the selection of throw statements as join points. In some situations,
this feature makes it possible to easily aspectize termination handlers (Section 6.4.3) that
are nested or tangled in the original code (scenarions 3, 6, and 7 of Table 6.5).
Arguably, the employed metrics suite is a limitation of this work. There are a number
of other existing metrics and other modularity dimensions that could be exploited in our
study. We have to decided to focus on the metrics described in Section 6.2.3 because they
have already been proved to be effective quality indicators in several case studies [19, 32,
79, 84]. In fact, despite the well-known limitations of these metrics, they complement
each other and are very useful when analyzed together. In addition, there is no way to
explore all the possible measures in a single study.
6.5 Related Work
Even though introductory texts [106, 114] often cite exception handling as an example of
the (potential) usefulness of AOP, only a few works attempt to evaluate the suitability
of this new paradigm to modularize exception handling code. The study of Lipert and
Lopes [117] employed an old version of AspectJ to refactor exception handling code in a
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large OO framework, called JWAM, to aspects. The goal of this study was to assess the
usefulness of aspects for separating exception handling code from the normal application
code. The authors presented their findings in terms of a qualitative evaluation. Quantita-
tive evaluation consisted solely of counting LOC. They found that the use of aspects for
modularizing exception detection and handling in the aforementioned framework brought
several benefits, for example, better reuse, less interference in the program texts, and a
decrease in the number of LOC.
The Lippert and Lopes study was a important initial evaluation of the applicability
of AspectJ in particular and aspects in general for solving a real software development
problem. However, it has some shortcomings that hinder its results to be extrapolated
to the development of real-life software systems. First, the target of the study was a
system where exception handling is generic (not application-specific). However, exception
handling is an application-specific error recovery technique [5]. In other words, the “real”
exception handling would be implemented by systems using JWAM as an infrastructure
and not by the framework itself. Most of the handlers in JWAM implemented policies
such as “log and ignore the exception”. This helps explaining the vast economy in LOC
that was achieved by using AOP. Second, the qualitative assessment was performed in
terms of quality attributes that are not well-understood, such as (un)pluggability and
support for incremental development. The authors did not evaluate some attributes that
are more fundamental and well-understood in the Software Engineering literature, such
as coupling and cohesion. Third, quantitative evaluation was performed only in terms of
number of LOC. Although the number of LOC may be relevant if analyzed together with
other metrics, its use in isolation is usually the target of severe criticisms.
An initial assessment of the use of AspectJ for modularizing exception handling in
software systems with non-trivial exception handling code has appeared elsewhere [32].
This previous assessment was based solely on a small part of Telestrada (+- 2000 LOC).
Furthermore, it did not attempt identify the situations where modularizing exception
handling with aspects is beneficial or harmful. Also, it did not investigate how exception
handling aspects interact with aspects implementing other concerns.
One of the first studies of the applicability of AOP for developing dependable systems
has been conducted by Kienzle and Guerraoui [107]. The study consisted of using AOP
to separate concurrency control and failure management concerns from other parts of dis-
tributed applications. It employed AspectJ and transactions as a representative of AOP
languages and a fundamental paradigm to handle concurrency and failures, respectively.
This work is similar to ours in its overall goal, namely, to assess the benefits of using
aspects to modularize error recovery code. However, there are some fundamental diffe-
rences: (i) we use exception handling to deal with errors, instead of transactions; (ii) we
substantiate our conclusions with measurements based on a metrics suite for AO software,
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instead of examples; (iii) we do not address concurrency; (iv) our study is more general
and based on a varied set of applications with diverse error handling strategies.
Soares and his colleagues [164] employed AspectJ to separate persistence and distribu-
tion concerns from the functional code of a health care application written in Java. The
authors found that, although AspectJ presents some limitations, it helps in modularizing
the transactional execution of methods in many situations that occur in real systems.
Furthermore, they employed aspects to modularize part of the exception handling code
of an application, but did not attempt to assess the suitability of AspectJ for this task.
An early position paper by Fradet and Su¨dolt [69] discusses the features that an
AO language for detecting errors in numeric computations should provide. It proposes
pointcut designators that work as global invariants whose violations trigger the execution
of recovery code (advice). This work is complementary to ours because it focuses on error
detection while ours emphasizes error recovery.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented an in-depth study to assess if AOP improves the quality of
the application code when employed to modularize non-trivial exception handling. We
found that, although the use of AOP to separate exception handling code and normal
application code can be beneficial, that depends on a combination of several factors. As
discussed in the previous sections, if exception handling code in an application is non-
uniform, strongly context-dependent, or too complex, aspectization can bring more harm
than good. We believe that effective use of AOP requires a priori planning and must
be incorporated in the software development process. For exception handling, ad-hoc
aspectization is beneficial only in simple scenarios. The main contributions of this work
are: (i) a substantial improvement, based on experience acquired from refactoring four
different applications, to the existing body of knowledge about the effects of AOP on
exception handling code; (ii) a set of scenarios that can be used by developers to better
understand when it is beneficial to aspectize exception handling and when it is not; and
(iii) an initial assessment of the effects of aspect interaction when exception handling gets
in the mix.
As mentioned in Section 6.1, this work does not attempt to measure the effects of
aspectizing exception detection code. We believe that investigating if AOP can be em-
ployed to modularize error detection is an exciting direction for future work. We also
intend to study the feasibility of devising a tool that (semi-)automatically detects and
refactors exception handling code that is beneficial to aspectize.
Empirical studies about interactions between aspects have only now started to sur-
face [19]. In the specific case of interactions between exception handling and other aspects,
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the presented empirical study provides an important starting point, but much remains
to be done. For example, our study does not assess how handler and clean-up method-
level interlacing (Section 6.4.4) affect the employed metrics. Also, the classification of
Section 6.4.3 does not apply to systems where other concerns are modularized as aspects
a priori.
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6.7 Resumo do Cap´ıtulo 6
Este cap´ıtulo apresentou um estudo em profundidade com o objetivo de avaliar os be-
nef´ıcios trazidos pelo uso de AOP para modularizar o comportamento excepcional de
sistemas de software, com uma eˆnfase especial em sistemas baseados em componentes.
De acordo com os resultados desse estudo, o uso de AOP para separar os comporta-
mentos normal e excepcional de um sistema e´ bene´fico em diversas situac¸o˜es comuns no
desenvolvimento de software, mas isso depende de uma combinac¸a˜o de diversos fatores.
Quando o co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es na˜o e´ uniforme, tem um acoplamento forte
com o contexto onde aparece ou envolve pontos de junc¸a˜o que a linguagem orientada a
aspectos empregada na˜o consegue capturar diretamente, aspectizac¸a˜o ad hoc pode na˜o
ser poss´ıvel ou piorar a qualidade do sistema.
Em especial, a coesa˜o de todos os sistemas-alvo do estudo, conforme medida pela
me´trica que empregamos, piorou depois que tratamento de excec¸o˜es foi modularizado
com aspectos. Isso se deveu em grande parte a` necessidade de, em alguns casos, modificar
o co´digo original antes de extrair o tratamento de excec¸o˜es para aspectos, principalmente
nos casos listados acima. Ale´m disso, o grau de reuso de co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es
foi baixo. Embora esse resultado tenha sido esperado, tendo em vista a natureza espec´ıfica
de aplicac¸a˜o do co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es [5], ele contradiz os resultados de um
estudo anterior bastante conhecido [117]. Neste u´ltimo, uma das consequeˆncias do uso
de AOP foi uma grande economia de linhas de co´digo devido ao reuso de tratadores.
Finalmente, o estudo mostrou que interesses transversais que afetam uma mesma parte
do co´digo podem dificultar a aspectizac¸a˜o. Isso e´ evidenciado nos casos de entrelac¸amento
no n´ıvel do me´todo envolvendo blocos tratadores e ac¸o˜es de limpeza.
O estudo tambe´m propoˆs uma classificac¸a˜o para co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es
com base em alguns dos fatores que tiveram maior influeˆncia sobre a modularizac¸a˜o com
aspectos. Essa classificac¸a˜o e o conjunto de cena´rios derivados dela sa˜o um importante
primeiro passo na direc¸a˜o de um cata´logo para auxiliar desenvolvedores a decidir quando
aspectizar o comportamento excepcional de um sistema. O pro´ximo cap´ıtulo expande a
classificac¸a˜o proposta e descreve em detalhes um cata´logo de cena´rios que inclui diversas
situac¸o˜es que na˜o sa˜o contemplados por este cap´ıtulo. Esse cata´logo visa fornecer o ferra-
mental necessa´rio para a construc¸a˜o de componentes de software onde os comportamentos
normal e excepcional sa˜o devidamente separados.
Cap´ıtulo 7
Extrac¸a˜o de Tratamento de Excec¸o˜es
para Aspectos: Um Cata´logo de
Pra´ticas
A partir dos resultados do estudo apresentado no Cap´ıtulo 6, este cap´ıtulo propo˜e uma
classificac¸a˜o para co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Essa classificac¸a˜o leva em consi-
derac¸a˜o os fatores que, no estudo que realizamos, tiveram maior influeˆncia sobre a ex-
trac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional de um sistema para aspectos. Adicionalmente,
propomos um cata´logo de cena´rios que consiste de combinac¸o˜es desses fatores. O objetivo
desse conjunto de cena´rios e´ guiar a tarefa de modularizar tratamento de excec¸o˜es usando
aspectos, tanto para sistemas ja´ existentes quanto para sistemas novos, de modo a auxiliar
na construc¸a˜o de componentes de software que sa˜o mais fa´ceis de manter, entend´ıveis e
simples. Para atingir esse fim, o cata´logo indica em quais cena´rios o uso de AOP melhora
a qualidade do sistema e em quais piora.
Consideramos o uso de aspectos bene´fico em determinado cena´rio quando: (i) o co´digo
normal, depois de ter os tratadores de excec¸o˜es extra´ıdos para aspectos, na˜o exibe “maus
cheiros” [68]; (ii) pouco ou nenhum redesenho do sistema a priori e´ necessa´rio; (iii) a
soluc¸a˜o empregada para extrair os tratadores para aspectos e´ gene´rica, no sentido de que
pode ser usada em todas os quase todas as instaˆncias do cena´rio; e (iv) o co´digo extra
introduzido devido ao uso de aspectos na˜o e´ muito grande, ou seja, idealmente, para cada
bloco try-catch extra´ıdo para um aspecto, no ma´ximo um novo advice deve ser criado.
Adicionalmente, considerando os fatores que influenciam a “aspectizac¸a˜o”, elaboramos
um sistema de pontuac¸a˜o simples para decidir mais objetivamente se um dado cena´rio e´
bene´fico ou prjudicial.
Este cap´ıtulo se refere a` Sec¸a˜o 1.4.3 do Cap´ıtulo 1. O artigo que este cap´ıtulo conte´m
foi submetido para a IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance 2007. Ale´m
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disso, uma versa˜o preliminar aparece na se´rie de relato´rios te´cnicos do IC-UNICAMP [33].
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7.1 Introduction
Exception handling [80] mechanisms were conceived as a means to improve modularity
and maintainability of programs that have to deal with exceptional situations [51]. Ide-
ally, an exception handling mechanism should make it possible to write programs where:
(i) the code for error detection, error handling, and the normal behavior are lexically
separate so that they can be modified independently [142]; (ii) the impact of the code
responsible for error handling in the overall system complexity is minimized [146]; and
(iii) an initial version that does little recovery can be evolved to one which uses sophisti-
cated recovery techniques without a change in the structure of the system [142]. The use
of exception handling in the construction of several real-world systems and its inclusion
in many mainstream programming languages, such as Java, Ada, and C++, attest its
importance to the current practice of large-scale software development.
In spite of the pivotal role of modular error handling in the overall system quality,
there is not much implementation/design guidance in the literature on how to use excep-
tion handling mechanisms to develop error handling code that is modular. Most of the
software development methodologies used in practice pay little attention to the design of
a system’s exceptional behavior. Furthermore, most of the good programming and design
cookbooks and catalogues, like the refactoring [68] and design pattern [70] catalogues,
either concentrate on the system’s normal behavior or are too generic to be successfully
applied to modular exception handling.
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The popularization of new techniques for separation of concerns, such as aspect-
oriented programming (AOP) [106], further aggravates this problem as new decompositi-
ons of the system’s exceptional behavior become possible. Although it is usually assumed
that the exceptional behavior of a system is a crosscutting concern that can be better
modularized by the use of AOP [114, 117], the ad hoc use of this new paradigm is so-
metimes detrimental to the quality of a system [24, 85]. If developers do not receive the
proper guidance, software systems whose exceptional behavior is refactored to aspects
can manifest a number of problems that stem from poorly designed or implemented er-
ror handling code. Examples include limited reusability [24], swallowed exceptions [125],
incorrect handler binding [24], and unforeseen control flow [150].
In this paper, we address this problem by providing design guidance regarding the use
of AOP to modularize exception handling. We propose a classification for error handling
code based on the factors that we found out have more influence on the task of refactoring
exception handling to aspects. We use the proposed classification to devise a set of
scenarios that comprise combinations of these factors and indicate whether aspectization
is beneficial or harmful in each of these scenarios. Our goal is twofold: (i) to assist
developers of new systems to modularize the exceptional behavior with aspects, so that
they can focus on the beneficial scenarios and avoid the harmful ones; and (ii) to assist
maintainers of existing systems in the task of refactoring error handling code to aspects
by showing when aspectization is worth the effort and when it is not.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 provides background on exception
handling, introduces the AOP language we have used, AspectJ [114], and discusses the
interplay between aspects and exceptions. Section 7.3 presents the proposed classification
for error handling code, whereas Section 7.4 introduces a catalog of scenarios that can
be derived from the interactions among the elements of the classification. Section 7.5
presents an evaluation of our approach. Section 7.6 reviews some related work. The last
section rounds the paper and points directions for future work.
7.2 Background
7.2.1 Exception Handling
Exception handling [52] is a technique for structuring the error recovery code of a system
so that errors can be more easily detected, signaled, and handled. Many mainstream
programming languages, such as Java, Ada, C++, and C#, implement exception handling
mechanisms. These languages provide constructs to signal the occurrence of an error (raise
or throw an exception) and to associate a set of recovery measures with the error, in order
to remedy the problem (handle the exception).
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When a part of a program raises an exception, the underlying exception handling
mechanism is responsible for changing the normal control flow of the computation within
the program to its exceptional control flow. Therefore, raising an exception results in
the interruption of the normal activity of the component, followed by the search for an
appropriate exception handler (or simply handler) to deal with the signaled exception.
After the execution of an exception handler, control returns to the code that immediately
follows the handler.
Exception handling contexts (EHCs) are regions in a program where the same excep-
tions are always treated in the same way. An EHC can have a set of associated handlers,
among which a handler is chosen when exceptions are raised within the context. Additio-
nally, a context may have an associated clean-up action, which is executed independently
of exceptions being raised. In Java, try blocks define exception handling contexts, catch
blocks define handlers, and finally blocks define clean-up actions.
7.2.2 AspectJ Basics
AspectJ [114] is a general purpose aspect-oriented extension to Java. It extends Java
with constructs for picking specific points in the object call graph, called join points,
and executing pieces of code, called advice, when these points are reached. A pointcut
picks out certain join points and contextual information at those join points. AspectJ
includes operators for the definition of pointcuts formed by the combination of various
join points. Examples of join points include method call (the caller’s context), method
execution (callee ’s context), and field access. Line 2 of Figure 7.1 declares a pointcut,
named pch, that selects calls to the constructor of class C.
Advice are pieces of code executed before, after, or around a selected a join point. In
the latter case, the advice may alter the flow of control of the application and replace the
code that would be otherwise executed in the selected join point. Lines 3-6 declare an
advice that is executed after the join points selected by pch when their execution ends by
throwing E1 (Line 3). The advice handlers the thrown exception (accessible in the advice
through variable e1) by throwing a new exception, an instance of E2.
Aspects are units of modularity for crosscutting concerns. They are similar to classes,
but may also include the AspectJ-specific elements. Figure 7.1 defines an aspect named
ConnectionPoolHandler.
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1 public aspect A {
2 pointcut pch () : execution (* C.new (..));
3 after () throwing (E1 e1) throws E2 : pch () {
4 throw new E2(e1.getMessage ());
5 }
6 ...
7 }
Figura 7.1: A simple exception handling aspect.
7.2.3 AOP and Exceptions
The ideas we present in this paper are derived from lessons learned from several systena-
tuc studies we have conducted to assess the benefits of modularizing various crosscutting
concerns with aspects [24, 73, 85, 111]. In one of them, we have specifically targeted the
aspectization of exception handling code [24]. This study consisted of refactoring some
existing applications to move the code implementing heterogeneous error handling stra-
tegies to separate aspects. We have performed quantitative and qualitative assessments
of four systems, three written in Java and one in AspectJ. These systems were developed
by third parties from industry and academia.
Our study has focused on the handling of exceptions. We have moved try-catch-finally
blocks in the four applications to aspects. Handlers in the aspects were implemented using
after and around advice. Whenever possible, we have used after advice, since they are
simpler. Clean-up actions were implemented exclusively as after advice. New advice were
created on a per-try-block basis. We employed pointcuts to select the code that th-
rows exception. Method signatures (throws clauses) and the raising of exceptions (throw
statements) were not modified because they are part of the error detection concern. In
several occasions, we have modified the implementation of a method in order to expose
join points that AspectJ can select more directly or contextual information required by
exception handlers, for example, the values of local variables. We restricted the “allowed”
modifications to well-known refactorings [68] and their aspect-oriented counterparts [135]
and did not use refactorings that modified more than one class.
One of the most important lessons we learned from the aforementioned study was that,
although the use of AOP to separate exception handling from base code can be beneficial,
that depends on a combination of several factors. In many common situations, in order
to evolve a system to use aspects to implement error handling, some a priori redesign
is necessary. If the exception handling code in an application is non-uniform, strongly
context-dependent, or too complex, ad hoc aspectization might not be possible or lead
to code which: (i) worsens the overall quality of the system; (ii) does not represent the
original design of the system; and/or (iii) exhibits “bad smells” [68], such as temporary
field and middle man.
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7.3 Classification for Exception Handling Code
The existence of many situations where aspectization is not a good idea motivated us
to try to understand precisely what factors make it easier or harder to modularize error
handling with aspects. In this paper we propose a simple classification for exception
handling code. This classification emphasizes factors that have the strongest impact on
the aspectization of exception handling.
We classify exception handling code in Java-like languages according to the following
categories: (i) tangling of try-catch blocks; (ii) nesting of try-catch blocks; (iii) depen-
dency of exception handlers on local variables; (iv) placement of exception-throwing code;
and (v) flow of control after handler execution. In the rest of this section we describe
each of these categories.
Tangling of try-catch Blocks. The first category describes where in the body of
a method a try-catch block appears. We consider a try-catch block tangled if it is
textually preceded or followed by a statement in the body of the method where it appears.
Declarations and statements that appear textually before a try-catch block make it
tangled by prefix. Accordingly, statements that appear after a try-catch block make it
tangled by suffix. A try-catch block appearing within a loop is considered tangled by
prefix and suffix, independently of the placement of other statements. A try-catch block
whose try block surrounds the whole method body is considered untangled. Figure 7.2(a)
presents an untangled try-catch block. The shaded try-catch block in Figure 7.2(b)
is tangled by suffix because it is followed by a call to n(). The try-catch block in
Figure 7.2(c) is tangled by prefix, because the declaration of variable i precedes it.
Tangling of try-catch blocks impacts the selection of an exception handling context
as a join point of interest. It also might make it difficult for an aspect to simulate the flow
of control after handler execution of the original implementation. It is important to stress
that, in our experience, tangling by prefix try-catch has no impact on aspectization.
Hence, hereafter, whenever we say that a try-catch block is tangled, we mean that it is
tangled by suffix.
Nesting of try-catch Blocks. A try-catch block can be also classified as nested or
non-nested. A nested try-catch block is one that is contained within a try block. The
shaded code snippet of Figure 7.2(d) is an example of nested try-catch block. Nesting
of try-catch blocks can make it difficult to understand the flow of exceptions in a given
context. Moreover, implementing nested try-catch blocks as advice may require these
advice to be ordered, so that they mimic the behavior of the original code. This is
necessary if some of these advice are associated with the same join points. We do not
consider nested a try-catch block that appears within a catch or finally block, as such
a try-catch block is naturally part of the system’s exceptional behavior. The shaded
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class C0 {
void m(){
try{...}
catch(E e){...}
} //m()
} //C0
class C1 {
void m(){
try{...}
catch(E e){...}
n();
} //m()
} //C1
class C2 {
void m(){
int i = 0;
try{...}
catch(E e){...}
} //m()
} //C2
class C3 {
void m(){
try{
try{...}
catch(E1){...}
}catch(E2 e){...}
} //m()
} //C3
(a) (b) (c) (d)
class C4 {
void m(){
try{...}
catch(E1 e){
try{...}
catch(E2){...}
} //catch
} //m()
} //C4
class C5 {
void m(){
try{
n(); //throws E
p(); // throws E
}catch(E e){...}
q();
} //m()
} //C5()
class C6 {
void m(){
int x = 0;
try{ x = n();//throws E
}catch(E e){ p(x); }
} // m()
} //C6
class C7 {
void m(){
int x = 0;
try{ x = n(); //throws E
}catch(E e){ x = p(); }
q(x);
} // m()
} //C7
(e) (f) (g) (h)
class C8 {
void m(){
try{ n();//throws E
}catch(E e){
System.out.println(e);
}
p();
} //m()
} //C8
class C9 {
void m() throws E2{
try{ n();//throws E1
}catch(E1 e){
throw new E2(e);
}
} // m()
} //C9
class C10 {
void m(){
try{ n();//throws E
}catch(E e){
return;
}
} // m()
} //C10
class C11 {
void m(){
for(int i=0;i++;i<10){
try{ n();//throws E
}catch(E e){break;}
} //for
} //m()
} //C11
(i) (j) (k) (l)
Figura 7.2: Examples of the categories of the proposed classification for error handling
code.
try-catch block in Figure 7.2(e) is not nested for the purposes of aspectizing error
handling. Instead, it is considered part of the outer catch block.
Placement of Exception-Throwing Code. An exception-throwing statement is a
statement within a try block that can throw exceptions that some handler wihin the
same method catches. Exception-throwing code (ETC) is the set of exception throwing-
statements within the same try block. An exception-throwing statement is terminal if it
is not followed by any statements in the try block. When referring to a try-catch block,
we consider its ETC terminal if all of its exception-throwing statements are terminal. In
the general case, terminal ETC includes a single terminal exception-throwing statement.
However, there are special cases such as when a try-catch has multiple if statements. In
Figure 7.2(f), the call to method n(), which throws exception E, is non-terminal because
it is followed by a call to p(). On the other hand, the call to p() is terminal because it
is the last statement of the try block. This factor influences aspectization because it can
make it difficult for aspects to simulate the control flow of the original program.
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Dependency of Exception Handlers on Local Variables. This category classifies
exception handlers in two groups: those that do and those that do not depend on local
variables. By “local variables” we mean variables defined within the containing block of
a given try-catch block. Dependency on local variables hinders aspectization, as the
joint point models of the most popular AO languages (AspectJ included) cannot capture
information stored by these variables. If a handler reads the value of one or more local
variables, we say that it is context-dependent. Moving such a handler to an aspect
often requires the use of the Extract Method refactoring [68] to expose the variables as
parameters of a method. Often, it is possible to avoid such refactoring by selecting the
join point where the value is generated (e.g. the return value of a method) and saving it
for later retrieval during errror handling (e.g. in a table in the error handling aspect). In
Figure 7.2(g), the catch block reads the value of local variable x. If a handler performs
assignments to local variables, we call it a context-affecting handler. In this case, more
radical refactoring may be necessary. The resulting code almost always exhibits bad smells
such as “Temporary Field” [68]. The handler in Figure 7.2(h) performs an assignment to
local variable x.
Flow of Control After Handler Execution. The fifth category describes how a
catch block ends its execution. After the execution of a masking handler, control passes
to the statement that textually follows the corresponding try-catch block. Figure 7.2(i)
presents a masking handler. After its execution, method p() is invoked. A propagation
handler finishes its execution by throwing an exception, as shown in Figure 7.2(j). In this
case, control is transferred to the nearest handler that catches the exception. A return
exception handler ends its execution with a return statement, as shown in Figure 7.2(k).
After the handler returns, system execution resumes from the site where the handler’s
method was called. Finally, a loop iteration handler is declared inside a loop and executes
a statement such as break or continue. Figure 7.2(l) presents an example that ends with
a break statement.
Flow of control after handler execution affects several design choices related to the
aspectization of exception handling. For example, propagation handlers can be easily
implemented using after advice, whereas masking and return handlers have to be imple-
mented using around advice, as they stop the propagation of the exceptions they catch.
Moreover, it is generally straightforward to simulate the flow of control of the original
program (i.e. the program before error handling is aspectized) for a tangled try-catch
block if its handlers are all propagation or return. These types of handlers ignore the
code that follows the try-catch block, and thus the fact that it is tangled. However, the
same does not apply to masking handlers.
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7.4 A Catalog of Exception Handling Scenarios
Using the classification we presented in the previous section, it is possible to describe
several exception handling scenarios representing recurring situations in software deve-
lopment, in the specific context of Java-like languages. We derive these scenarios by
analyzing combinations of the factors of the proposed classification. Table 7.1 consoli-
dates the most frequent ones we have identified. Each scenario is named after its most
distinctive features. For example, the first scenario of Table 7.1 is simply named “Un-
tangled handlers”, because it deals with untangled try-catch blocks. The second one
is named “Tangled, Non-masking handlers”, because it refers specifically to try-catch
blocks that include propagation or return handlers. To avoid repetition, if a category
is marked more than once in the same row (e.g. tangled and untangled marked), the
row represents more than one scenario and an OR semantics is adopted. For simplicity,
hereafter we use the term “scenario” to refer to all the scenarios that each row represents.
For example, scenario Untangled Handler describes situations where a try-catch block
is untangled, independently of nesting and placement of ETC. Also, the corresponding
catch block does not depend on local variables and can end its execution by masking,
propagating an exception, or returning.
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Scenario Tangled Nested Placement of Handler depends Flow of control Score Should
try-catch try-catch exception- on local variables after handler extract?
blocks blocks throwing code execution
yes no yes no non-t. term. read write no mask. prop. ret. loop
Untangled X X X X X X X X X 0-1 Yes.
Handler
Tangled, X X X X X X X 0 Yes.
Non-Mask.
Handler
Nested, X X X X X X X 1 Yes.
Non-Mask.
Handler
Tangled X X X X X 0 Yes.
Handler,
Term. ETC
Nested X X X X X 1 Yes.
Handler,
Term. ETC
Block X X X X X 2 Depends.
Handler,
Nested X X X X X 3 Depends.
Block
Handler
Context- X X X X X X X X X 2-4 Depends.
Dependent
Handler
Nested, X X X X X X X X X 3-5 No.
Context-
Dependent
Handler
Context- X X X X X X X X X X 3-6 No.
Affecting
Handler
Loop Iter. X X X X X X X X X 5-9 No.
Handler
Tabela 7.1: Exception handling scenarios according to the proposed classification
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Score Description Factors
1 Hinders aspectization in a general and non-limiting way. - Nesting of try blocks
2 Some priori refactoring or a considerable implementation - Combinations of non-term. ETC, masking handler,
overhead are usually necessary. However, the process and tangled try-catch block
involves well-known refactorings and results in a generic
solution that may or may not exhibit bad smells. - Handler that reads from local variables
3 Refactoring is almost always necessary and the solutions - Handlers that write to local variables
that apply to each instance of the scenario are usually - Loop iteration handlers
context-dependent.
Tabela 7.2: Scores for the factors that hinder the aspectization of error handling.
The rightmost column of Table 7.1 indicates whether it is beneficial (“Yes”) or harmful
(“No”) to modularize exception handling with aspects in a given scenario. In some rows,
it indicates that the choice of aspectizing exception handling in a given scenario depends
on factors that are not taken into account by the proposed classification. These cases
are marked as “Depends”. We considered aspectization to be beneficial in a scenario
if: (i) the code, after aspectization, does not generally exhibit bad smells; (ii) little or
no a priori redesign is necessary; (iii) the solution we used to extract the handlers to
aspects applies to most or all of the instances of the scenario; and (iv) the implementation
overhead introduced by aspectization is not very large, i.e., ideally, for each try-catch
block extracted to an aspect, at most one new advice should be created.
Additionally, considering the various factors that influence aspectization, we devised
a simple scoring system to more objectively judge whether a given scenario is beneficial
or harmful. The scores for each scenario appear in the column labeled “Score”. They can
be obtained by summing the score associated to each factor that is (potentially) present
in each scenario. Table 7.2 provides a key for calculating the scores. Basically, a score
between 0 and 1 indicates a “Yes” scenario, a score between 2 and 3 is a “Depends”
scenario, and a score of 4+ is a “No” scenario. For example, scenario Untangled Handler
has a score that ranges between 0 and 1. Its only complicating factor is nesting, whose
score is 1, and even then it does not appear in all the instances of the scenario (hence
the range, instead of a fixed value). In the rest of this section we explain each scenario of
Table 7.1.
Untangled Handler. Since the try-catch block is not tangled, it is possible to select the
entire execution of the method as the join point of interest. Moreover, it is straightforward
to extract the handlers to an aspect. It does not matter whether the exception-throwing
code is terminal or not. Flow of control after handler execution is not a problem, as long
as it is not loop iteration. If there are nested try-catch blocks, it may be necessary to
rank the handler advice (i.e. advice implementing exception handlers after aspectization
has taken place) if some of them are associated with the same join points.
Tangled, Non-Masking Handler. In this scenario, the try-catch block is tangled but
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it is possible to specify a pointcut that captures the execution of the whole method and
associate the handler advice with it. In the original code, the handler ends its execution
by either returning or throwing an exception, thus ignoring whatever comes after the
try-catch block. Hence, the tangling does not matter because the code that textually
follows the try-catch block is never executed when an exception is thrown from the try
block. The exception-throwing code does not matter in this case because the execution
of the whole method is the join point of interest.
Nested, Non-Masking Handler. This scenario bears strong resemblance to the pre-
vious scenario, but the nesting of try-catch blocks introduces some complications that
hinder aspectization. Since the try-catch block is nested, it may be necessary to order
handler advice associated with the same join points. Moreover, many (3+) levels of nes-
ting combined with tangled try-catch blocks often result in complex code and special
care should be taken in order to avoid the introduction of subtle bugs and changing the
system behavior. In spite of these complications, aspectization is still beneficial in this
scenario. In the general case, no a priori refactoring has to be applied to the original code
and the aspectized code often exhibits good structuring that reflects the original design
of the exceptional behavior.
Tangled Handler, Terminal ETC. It is easy to aspectize exception handling in this case
because it is possible to directly associate a handler advice with the exception-throwing
statement. Since the latter is terminal and the handler has a termination behavior,
after execution of the aspectized handler, control passes to the statement that follows
the try-catch block in the original implementation. The code snippet below presents a
simple instance of this scenario and a possible implementation of the handler as part of
an aspect.
// within class C
void m(){
try{
n();
p(); // throws E
}catch(E e){log(e);}
q();
} //m()
// within aspect A
pointcut callP():
call(* C.p()) &&
withincode(* C.m());
around() : callP() {
try { proceed();}
catch(E e) {log(e);}
} //advice
On the left-hand side, the call to p() is a terminal exception-throwing statement and
the handler has a termination behavior. The right-hand side defines a pointcut that
selects calls to method p() made within the code of method m(). An around advice
implements the handler. The proceed() statement is defined by AspectJ and executes
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the selected join point from an around advice, in this example, the call to p(). After
exception handling, control will return to the following statement, the call to q(). This
mimics exactly the behavior of the original program.
Nested Handler, Terminal ETC. Nesting makes it slightly harder to modularize error
handling with aspects in this scenario, when compared to the previous one. In general,
though, it does not negatively affect the quality of the final code. Therefore, we believe
aspectization is beneficial in this scenario.
Block Handler. Moving the error handling code to an aspect in this scenario is hard
because of the combination of non-terminal ETC, tangled try-catch block, and a handler
that has a masking behavior. These factors make it difficult to mimic the behavior of the
original code using an aspectized handler. Figure 7.3 presents an example of this scenario.
void m(){
try{ n(); // throws E
p();
}catch(E e){ log(e); }
q();
} //m()
Figura 7.3: A Block Handler example
Based on Figure 7.3, we assume a situation where an n() raises an exception and
control is transfered to the handler. If we refactor the handler to an advice and associate
the latter with the call to method n(), after exception handling the call to method p()
will be executed. However, in the original implementation, control should be passed to
the statement following the try-catch block, in the example, the call to q(). On the
other hand, if we associate the handler advice with the execution of method m(), control
will return to m()’s caller after exception handling. This implies that the call to q()
will not be executed. The bottom line is: we would like to associate a handler advice
to a block containing more than one statement, just like a try block, instead of a single
statement or a whole method. For this reason, we say that the combination of factors of
this scenario results in a block exception handler, or simply block handler.
To the best of our knowledge, no current aspect-oriented languages provide constructs
for implementing block handlers. A possible workaround to this limitation is to extract
the code within the try block to a new method and associate a handler advice to the
execution of the extracted method. This solution has drawbacks, however: (i) it modifies
the original design of the system’s normal behavior; (ii) it might result in methods that
do not make sense by themselves; and (iii) it is not effective in all cases because it is
not always possible to extract a piece of code to a new method [68]. In general, in this
7.4. A Catalog of Exception Handling Scenarios 165
Approach Problems
Transform - Conceptually bad because local variables only make
variable sense in the method where they appear;
into field - Must deal explicitly with multi-threaded programs;
- Suffers from the “Temporary Field” bad smell;
Capture - Not always possible to capture the join point of interest;
assignment - Imposes an additional implementation overhead;
to variable - Must also deal explicitly with multi-threaded programs.
Extract - Modifies the design of the system’s normal behavior;
a new - Might result in methods that do not make sense;
method - Not effective in all cases.
Extend - The resulting exception classes might include
exception information specific to certain handling strategies;
class - Requires non-local changes to the program.
Tabela 7.3: Limitations of various approaches to expose local variables to handlers.
scenario, aspectization is only beneficial if it is possible to extract the code within the
try block to a new method that could as well have been created by the developers of the
system.
Nested Block Handler. This scenario presents the same complications as the scenario
we just described, but includes nested try-catch blocks. Although nesting generally
complicates aspectization, nested block handlers do not follow this trend. If one uses
the aforementioned solution for aspectizing block handlers, the nesting hierarchy of try
blocks can be decomposed according to the extracted methods. This strategy neutralizes
the effects of nesting.
Context-Dependent Handler. Aspectizing handlers that use local variables of the
enclosing method in AspectJ is difficult because the language does not make it possible
for advice to access the local variables visible at a join point of interest. To try to address
this problem, we analyzed four general ways of exposing a local variable to an advice:
(#1) to transform the variable into a field of the enclosing class; (#2) to capture some
use of the variable and store this information for later retrieval; (#3) to extract the piece
of code where the variable is used to a new method and expose this variable as a parameter
of the extracted method; and (#4) to extend the class that defines the thrown exception
so that its instances can store the values of the variables. We concluded that none of
them is ideal. Table 7.3 lists the drawbacks of each of these solutions.
The decision of refactoring the handler to an advice in this scenario depends on: (i)
whether it is possible to expose the values of the local variables of interest in a way that
is conceptually reasonable and does not impose a large implementation overhead; and (ii)
whether it would be beneficial to aspectize the handler if we ignored the dependency of
the handler on the method’s local variables and classified the code scenarios previously
described.
Nested Context-Dependent Handler. Combinations of nested try-catch blocks
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and handlers that read values of local variables are, in general, difficult to aspectize
and not worth the effort. Code adhering to this scenario is often very complex and
includes handlers accessing local variables defined various nesting levels above. In order
to modularize exception handling, it is almost always necessary to intensively refactor
the OO implementation. The resulting aspect-oriented code often includes a sensible
implementation overhead. Moreover, the design of the normal code is often altered beyond
recognition.
Context-Affecting Handler. In this scenario the catch block performs assignments
to local variables of the containing method. Amongst the four solutions we presented for
exposing local variables to advice, only the first one makes it possible for the aspect to
change the value of the variable without duplicating code. As pointed out previously, this
solution has some severe problems. The task of moving a catch block to an advice is des-
cribed by the Extract Fragment to Advice [135] refactoring, an aspect-oriented adaptation
of the Extract Method refactoring. Hence, similar constraints apply. In general, it is not
possible to extract a code snippet to a new method if this snippet performs assignments
to local variables of the containing method [68]. The same holds when one tries to extract
a code snippet to an advice. Thus, as a rule, it is harmful to aspectize exception handling
in this scenario.
Loop Iteration Handlers. In this scenario, the problem is that commands break
and continue appear inside a catch block and are part of the error handling concern.
However, the loop where the corresponding try-catch block appears is part of the normal
behavior of the system. Since these commands have to be associated with a loop, otherwise
a compile-time error occurs, it is not possible to extract the catch block to an advice “as-
is”. As a consequence, loop iteration handlers inevitably require some redesign of the
original code before they can be aspectized.
Table 7.4 summarizes the general strategies that should be applied to extract error
handling to aspects in each scenario. The second and third columns of the table specify the
type of advice and the type of pointcut to use, respectively. The fourth column indicates
whether it is necessary to order handler advice associated to the same join points in each
scenario. In some rows, this column is marked “maybe”, meaning that each instance of
the scenario must be independently analyzed. The fifth column indicates the scenarios
that exhibit block handlers. The sixth points out the scenarios where it is necessary to
expose local variables read or written by the exception handlers. The rightmost column
indicates the worst-case scenarios, those where some redesign of the system’s normal
behavior might be necessary.
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Scenario Advice Type of Order Block Expose Redesign
Pointcut Advice Handler Variables
Untangled Handlers after or around execution no no no no
Tangled, Non-Masking Handlers after execution no no no no
Nested, Non-Masking Handlers after execution yes no no no
Tangled Handlers, Terminal ETC around call and withincode no no no no
Nested Handlers, Terminal ETC around call and withincode yes no no no
Block Handler around execution no yes no no
Nested Block Handler around call or execution yes yes no no
Context-Dependent Handler after or around call or execution no maybe yes no
Nested, Context-Dependent Handler after or around call or execution yes maybe yes no
Context-Affecting Handler around call or execution maybe yes yes yes
Loop Iteration Handler around call or execution maybe yes yes yes
Tabela 7.4: General strategies for structuring error handling with aspects in each scenario.
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Attributes Metrics Definitions
Concern Number of components that
Separation Diffusion over contribute to the implementation
of Components of a concern.
Concerns Concern Number of methods and advice
Diffusion over that contribute to a concern’s
Operations implementation.
Coupling Coupling Number of components declaring
Between methods or fields that may be called
Components or accessed by other components.
Lack of Measures the lack of cohesion of a
Cohesion Cohesion in class or an aspect in terms of the
Operations number of method and advice pairs
that do not access the same field.
Size Lines of Code Number of lines of code.
Number of Number of methods and advice
Operations of each class or aspect.
Tabela 7.5: Metrics Suite
7.5 Evaluation
To evaluate the efficacy of the proposed catalog, we conducted a case study targeting two
different systems. The main goal of the case study was to assess whether a developer
following the recommendations of the catalog to aspectize error handling code produces
code of higher quality than a developer not using it. We measured the quality of the target
systems using the metrics described in Table 7.5. This metrics suite includes metrics that
serve as indicators of measure attributes that are directly and indirectly related to reuse
and maintainance [73, 111]. A detailed description is available elsewhere [73]. Based
on these quality attributes, we compared three versions of the systems: (i) an object-
oriented (OO) version, implemented in Java; (ii) an aspect-oriented version where all the
try-catch blocks were refactored to aspects ; and (iii) an aspect-oriented version where
all the instances of “Yes” scenarios (Section 7.4) were refactored to aspects.
The case study targeted two of the systems, Telestrada and the Java Pet Store. Teles-
trada is a traveler information system being developed for a Brazilian national highway
administrator. For our study, we have selected some self-contained packages of one of its
subsystems comprising approximately 3350 LOC (excluding comments and blank lines)
and more than 200 classes and interfaces. The Java Pet Store1 is a demo for the Java
Platform, Enterprise Edition2 (Java EE). The system uses various technologies based on
the Java EE platform and is representative of existing e-commerce applications. Its imple-
mentation comprises more than 18000 LOC and approximately 300 classes and interfaces.
In this case study, we considered each try-catch block a scenario instance.
The results of the evaluation for the three versions of the two systems are depicted
1http://java.sun.com/developer/releases/petstore/
2http://java.sun.com/j2ee
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System Metric Concern Concern Coupling Lack of Lines Number of
Diffusion over Diffusion over between Cohesion of Code Operations
Version Components Operations Components in Operations
Original 22 42 188 434 3424 432
Telestrada Entirely 18 42 182 469 3368 471
Aspectized
Partially 18 42 185 409 3431 465
Aspectized
Original 110 256 812 7258 18442 2174
Java Pet Store Entirely 57 200 820 7808 18544 2408
Aspectized
Partially 54 197 818 7328 18247 2316
Aspectized
Tabela 7.6: Results of measuring the three versions of the target systems.
in Table 7.6. For all the metrics, lower values imply in better results. The “Partially
Aspectized” (PA) version of each system is the one where we used the catalog to guide
aspectization. The “Entirely Aspectized” (EA) version is the one where aspectization
was ad hoc. The measures for the two separation of concerns metrics (Concern Diffusion
over Components and Concern Diffusion over Operations) highlight the main advantage
of using aspects: to improve the textual separation between the base code and error
handling. The aspect-oriented verions of the target systems performed substantially (up
to 50%) better than the OO versions. For Coupling between Components and Lines of
Code, the three versions exhibited similar results. The two metrics where the aspect-
oriented versions performed worse were Number of Operations and Lack of Cohesion in
operations. In the former, the two aspect-oriented versions performed worse because each
handler advice counts as a new operation, unlike try-catch blocks in the OO version.
This is a natural consequence of using aspects to modularize error handling.
The most interesting result that Table 7.6 presents pertains the cohesion metric. In
our previous studies, systems where exception handling was modularized through aspects
consistently exhibited worse results for this metric [24]. In some cases, the measure for
the aspect-oriented version of a system was more than 25% higher than the corresponding
OO implementation. This trend persists when we compare the OO and EA versions of
the two target systems. The measures for Lack of Cohesion in Operations are 8.06 and
7.58% higher for the EA versions of Telestrada and the Java Pet Store, respectively.
The proposed scenario catalog had a significant positive impact on the cohesion of
the PA versions of the systems. In general, the catalog marks as harmful the scenarios
where a priori refactoring is necessary. In our experience, these are exactly the scenarios
that increase Lack of Cohesion in Operations [24]. As a consequence, the measure of the
cohesion metric for the PA version of the Java Pet Store is only 0.96% higher than the
measure for the OO version. Comparing the two aspectized versions, the measure for the
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EA version is 6.55% higher. For Telestrada, the results were even better. The measure
for the EA version was almost 15% higher than the results for the EA version. Also,
the value of the cohesion metric for the OO version of Telestrada was 6.11% higher that
the value fot eh PA version. These results indicate that the proposed catalog may be
advantageous. For this case study, the PA versions of the two systems exhibited the same
benefits as the EA version while avoiding its drawbacks.
7.6 Related Work
Since the publication of the first design pattern catalog [70], several catalogs that try to
amass design/implementation time-tested knowledge regarding OO software development
activities have appeared. Most of them focus on general purpose refactorings [68] and
design patterns [70]. A few describe specific solutions and guidelines, based on practical
experience, concerning error handling [60, 125].
In recent years, some works have surfaced which try to gather together similar kno-
wledge regarding aspect-oriented software development activities [49, 90, 114, 135]. Many
authors have devoted attention to developing refactoring catalogs [49, 90, 113, 135] for
aspect-oriented software. A few of them [113, 49] include specific procedures for moving
exception handling code to aspects. Laddad presents the “Extract Exception Handling”
refactoring. The refactoring centers around the effects of using it to extract trivial error
handling code, but does not explain when it is useful (or possible) to apply it in prac-
tice. Cole and Borba describe a set of behavior-preserving programming laws that can
be combined in order to specify a refactoring that works along the same lines as “Ex-
tract Exception Handling”. These laws include preconditions that indicate when it is
possible to apply them. While refactorings targeting error handling code concentrate on
the mechanics of moving a try-catch block to an aspect, the work we present identifies
situations where this is beneficial and where it is not.
Some authors describe their experience in the application of exception handling to
real OO software systems in the form of best practices [60] and anti-pattern [22, 125]
catalogs. An early paper by Cargill [22] describes some of the problems that often hap-
pen in C++ programs due to the complex control flow that exception handling creates.
Doshi [60] presents two small catalogs of best practices: one for specifying APIs whose
services can throw exceptions and another one for developing the client code of these
APIs (the actual exception handlers). A recent article by McCune [125] presents a list
of error handling anti-patterns, some of them well-accepted (e.g. “catch and ignore” and
“throwing Exception”). Bruntink and colleagues [16] have analyzed how error handling
is implemented in a large embedded software system that uses the return-code idiom for
signaling exceptions. They have assessed the fault-proneness of this idiom and proposed:
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(i) a characterization for it; (ii) a fault model; and (iii) a set of macros that summarize
best practices for dealing with its most error-prone instances. Best practices and anti-
pattern catalogs provide guidelines on what exception handlers should and should not
do. Our work complements these approaches by providing design guidance to developers
using AOP techniques to enhance the modularity of error handling code.
The most well-known study focusing on the interplay between exception handling and
AOP was performed by Lippert and Lopes [117]. The authors used AOP to modularize
exception handling in a large OO framework and also attempted to identify situations
where it was easy to aspectize error handling code and highlighted a few where it was
not. However, since the study targeted a reusable infrastructure, instead of a full-fledged
application, it is difficult to extrapolate their findings to the development of real-world
systems where error handling is application-specific.
7.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper makes two contributions to the current body of knowledge about the interplay
between AOP and error handling. First, a classification of exception handling code in
terms of factors that we found out have more influence on aspectization. Second, an
analysis of the interactions amongst these factors, grouped as sets of scenarios. An initial
evaluation has shown that the proposed approach may help to improve the quality of a
system, when used to guide the refactoring of exception handling to aspects. The general
conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that AOP does not fix poor designs. In
other words, in OO systems where exception handling code is already well-structured,
AOP further improves the structure by completely separating the system’s normal and
exceptional activities. However, for systems with very complex and/or poorly structured
exception handling code, AOP merely adds insult to injury and worsens the overall quality
of the system. A very preliminary version of the work we presented in this paper first
appeared elsewhere [24].
This work focused on a single aspect-oriented language, namely, AspectJ. We have not
attempted to assess whether the proposed classification and scenarios catalog apply to
other aspect-oriented languages. More powerful join point models would make it possible
to deal more appropriately with more complicated cases, such as those where handler
blocks are tangled or nested, thus affecting the study results. In the future, we intend
to experiment with other languages in order to understand: (i) to what extent the ideas
we present here are generally applicable; and (ii) how other language features impact the
aspectization of exception handling. A priori, we intend to evaluate the pros and cons of
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using CaesarJ [130] and the JBoss AOP framework3 to modularize error handling code.
3http://labs.jboss.com/portal/jbossaop
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7.8 Resumo do Cap´ıtulo 7
Este cap´ıtulo apresentou um cata´logo de cena´rios referente a co´digo de tratamento de
excec¸o˜es. O uso de AOP para modularizar o tratamento de excec¸o˜es e´ bene´fico em diversas
situac¸o˜es, mas em outras resulta em co´digo que: (i) na˜o representa o projeto original
do sistema; (ii) exibe maus-cheiros; e (iii) tem uma influeˆncia negativa na qualidade
do programa, conforme medido pelo conjunto de me´tricas que empregamos. O cata´logo
proposto organiza essas situac¸o˜es de modo que desenvolvedores podem tomar a decisa˜o de
estruturar o comportamento excepcional de um programa usando AOP de maneira mais
ra´pida e com um conhecimento objetivo sobre as consequeˆncias dessa decisa˜o. O cata´logo
e´ baseado em uma classificac¸a˜o que indica os fatores que teˆm maior influeˆncia na tarefa
de aspectizar tratamento de excec¸o˜es. Essa classificac¸a˜o expande a que foi apresentada
no Cap´ıtulo 6 com uma categoria adicional e refina duas das categorias ja´ existentes, de
modo a tornar mais precisas as diretrizes providas pelo cata´logo. O cata´logo foi avaliado
atrave´s de um estudo de caso envolvendo dois sistemas. Os resultados do estudo de caso
indicam que, atrave´s do uso do cata´logo, desenvolvedores de componentes podem ganhar
as principais vantagens de se usar AOP (melhor separac¸a˜o de interesses) evitando alguns
de seus problemas (coesa˜o piorada, aspectizac¸o˜es “artificiais”).
Os resultados deste cap´ıtulo e do Cap´ıtulo 6 mostram que a Hipo´tese de Pesquisa 2
(Cap´ıtulo 1, Sec¸a˜o 1.4.1) e´ va´lida, embora isso na˜o se aplique a todos as circunstaˆncias
e na˜o seja o caso para um uso ad-hoc de programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos. Esses dois
cap´ıtulos mostraram as situac¸o˜es em que o uso de AOP e´ prejudicial e apresentaram
soluc¸o˜es para que AOP contribua de maneira positiva para a qualidade do co´digo de
tratamento de excec¸o˜es.
Cap´ıtulo 8
Concluso˜es
Este cap´ıtulo revisita o problema que esta tese visa resolver, as soluc¸o˜es propostas e lista
as contribuic¸o˜es deste trabalho para o estado da arte. O cap´ıtulo tambe´m propo˜e algumas
extenso˜es e descreve resumidamente os resultados obtidos ao longo do meu doutorado que
na˜o foram inclu´ıdos nesta tese.
8.1 Problema e Soluc¸a˜o Proposta
Este trabalho se situa na intersec¸a˜o das a´reas Engenharia de Software e Toleraˆncia a Fa-
lhas. Da primeira lanc¸amos ma˜o de avanc¸os recentes nas a´reas de Arquitetura de Software,
Verificac¸a˜o de Sistemas de Software e Programac¸a˜o Orientada a Aspectos. Da segunda
usamos a ide´ia de Tratamento de Excec¸o˜es como um meio de estruturar mecanismos de to-
leraˆncia a falhas. Ale´m disso, o trabalho e´ fortemente calc¸ado num dos princ´ıpios ba´sicos
da cieˆncia da computac¸a˜o: Dividir para Conquistar. Nesta pesquisa, esse princ´ıpio se
manifestou atrave´s da ide´ia de que a separac¸a˜o entre os comportamentos normal e excep-
cional de um sistema resulta em sistemas que sa˜o mais fa´ceis de se construir, manter e
compreender.
A tese abordou o problema de se construir sistemas tolerantes a falhas baseados em
componentes. O enfoque do trabalho foi restrito a sistemas de software nos quais a se-
parac¸a˜o entre comportamento normal e comportamento excepcional e´ feita atrave´s de
tratamento de excec¸o˜es. A investigac¸a˜o consistiu de duas partes, uma relativa a` inte-
grac¸a˜o de componentes de software e outra relativa a` sua construc¸a˜o, ja´ que essa divisa˜o
de responsabilidades e´ inerente ao desenvolvimento baseado em componentes. Como con-
sequeˆncia da dicotomia construc¸a˜o/integrac¸a˜o, a tese propoˆs soluc¸o˜es para responder duas
perguntas de pesquisa:
1. Como reduzir o nu´mero de erros, em sistemas baseados em componentes, decorrentes
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de suposic¸o˜es conflitantes ou incompletas sobre o comportamento excepcional dos
componentes integrados no sistema?
2. Como melhorar a estruturac¸a˜o interna de componentes de software, de modo a mi-
nimizar o impacto do comportamento excepcional desses componentes sobre a sua
complexidade total?
As soluc¸o˜es propostas sa˜o resumidas pelas seguintes teses, detalhadas e justificadas ao
longo dos seis cap´ıtulos anteriores:
Tese 1: A descric¸a˜o rigorosa de como excec¸o˜es fluem entre componentes
no n´ıvel arquitetural e a verificac¸a˜o automa´tica de propriedades relativas ao
comportamento excepcional do sistema nesse n´ıvel de abstrac¸a˜o aumentam a
chance de que falhas de projeto relacionadas ao comportamento excepcional
sejam detectadas antes que o sistema seja implementado.
Tese 2: O uso de programac¸a˜o orientada a aspectos para modularizar o co´digo
de tratamento de excec¸o˜es de um programa melhora a qualidade desse pro-
grama, tanto do ponto de vista do comportamento normal quanto do excepci-
onal.
8.2 Resumo das Contribuic¸o˜es
As principais contribuic¸o˜es desta tese sa˜o as seguintes:
1. Um mecanismo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es que funciona no n´ıvel da arquitetura de
software e leva em considerac¸a˜o algumas das particularidades de sistemas baseados
em componentes. Esse mecanismo e´ centrado em um estilo arquitetural espec´ıfico,
C2 [173], e evidencia a influeˆncia que estilos arquiteturais teˆm na propagac¸a˜o de
excec¸o˜es (Sec¸a˜o 1.3.2 e Cap´ıtulo 2).
2. Uma abordagem para dar suporte a` descric¸a˜o e a` ana´lise de arquiteturas de software,
da perspectiva do seu comportamento excepcional. Essa abordagem leva em con-
siderac¸a˜o a maneira como diferentes estilos arquiteturais influenciam a propagac¸a˜o
de excec¸o˜es e complementa metodologias de desenvolvimento cujo foco e´ o compor-
tamento excepcional do sistema (Sec¸a˜o 1.3.3 e Cap´ıtulo 3).
3. Um modelo formal que indica as responsabilidades de cada elemento arquitetural,
no que se refere ao lanc¸amento, recebimento e tratamento de excec¸o˜es, e que permite
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que certas propriedades u´teis relativas ao fluxo de excec¸o˜es entre esses elementos se-
jam verificadas de maneira automa´tica. Essas propriedades foram organizadas de tal
maneira que cada uma pode ser verificada independentemente e o conjunto de todas
elas descreve um mecanismo arquitetural de tratamento de excec¸o˜es (Sec¸a˜o 1.3.4 e
Cap´ıtulo 4).
4. Uma abordagem para a especificac¸a˜o e verificac¸a˜o de sistemas concorrentes coopera-
tivos da perspectiva do seu comportamento excepcional (Sec¸a˜o 1.3.5 e Cap´ıtulo 5).
5. Uma ana´lise dos fatores que tiveram influeˆncia na modularizac¸a˜o do co´digo de tra-
tamento de excec¸o˜es usando aspectos, com base na experieˆncia adquirida atrave´s da
refatorac¸a˜o de quatro aplicac¸o˜es distintas (Sec¸a˜o 1.4.2 e Cap´ıtulo 6).
6. Uma avaliac¸a˜o inicial dos efeitos da estruturac¸a˜o de tratamento de excec¸o˜es usando
aspectos quando outros interesses transversais tambe´m sa˜o modularizados atrave´s
de aspectos (Sec¸a˜o 1.4.2 e Cap´ıtulo 6).
7. Um cata´logo de cena´rios de tratamento de excec¸o˜es que indica, para cada cena´rio,
se e´ vantajoso usar aspectos para separar comportamento normal e comportamento
excepcional (Sec¸a˜o 1.4.3 e Cap´ıtulo 7).
8.3 Outros Resultados
Ale´m dos resultados descritos em detalhes nos cap´ıtulos desta tese, diversos outros foram
obtidos ao longo do meu doutorado. Quase todos resultaram de colaborac¸o˜es com colegas
do IC-UNICAMP e de outras instituic¸o˜es. Esses trabalhos sa˜o sucintamente descritos a
seguir.
8.3.1 Me´todos para o Projeto e Implementac¸a˜o do Comporta-
mento Excepcional
Conforme mencionado na Sec¸a˜o 1.3, a abordagem proposta para a descric¸a˜o e ana´lise
do comportamento excepcional dos componentes integrados em um sistema exige uma
metodologia de desenvolvimento que inclua atividades espec´ıficas para o levantamento
do modelo de falhas do sistema e a especificac¸a˜o do seu comportamento excepcional.
Tendo isso em vista, trabalhei junto com outros colegas do IC-UNICAMP e com o Prof.
Roge´rio de Lemos, da Universidade de Kent at Canterbury, no refinamento e extensa˜o da
metodologia MDCE [65]. A MDCE complementa metodologias de desenvolvimento “tra-
dicionais” com uma abordagem sistema´tica para o projeto dos mecanismos de detecc¸a˜o e
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o tratamento de erros. A MDCE e´ baseada no processo Catalysis [61] e o seu foco esta´
nas atividades de especificac¸a˜o de requisitos e projeto detalhado. Um artigo [154] des-
crevendo a MDCE e apresentando algumas melhorarias com relac¸a˜o a` sua versa˜o original
foi publicado no perio´dico Software – Practice and Experience. O t´ıtulo desse artigo e´
“Exception handling in the development of dependable component-based systems” e eu
participei como co-autor.
Em um outro trabalho, a metodologia MDCE [154] foi estendida e adaptada ao pro-
cesso UML Components [41] para desenvolvimento baseado em componentes. A metodo-
logia resultante, batizada de MDCE+, apresenta algumas melhorias com relac¸a˜o a` MDCE.
Primeiro, ela inclui algumas atividades para o projeto da arquitetura do sistema [28]. Se-
gundo, ela inclui diretrizes para a implementac¸a˜o desses sistemas. Essas diretrizes sa˜o o
resultado de um outro trabalho, descrito no pro´ximo para´grafo. Terceiro, a MDCE+ in-
clui atividades para testar o comportamento excepcional dos componentes de um sistema,
baseadas no trabalho de outros pesquisadores do IC-UNICAMP [151]. Um artigo [54] des-
crevendo a MDCE+ foi apresentado no 2nd Latin-American Symposium on Dependable
Computing. O t´ıtulo do artigo e´ “A Method for Modeling and Testing Exceptions in
Component-Based Software Development”. Uma versa˜o preliminar desse artigo foi apre-
sentada no IV Workshop Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento Baseado em Componentes. Nos
dois artigos eu participei como co-autor.
Foi elaborado tambe´m um conjunto de diretrizes e padro˜es para a implementac¸a˜o de
componentes de software compat´ıveis com diferentes estrate´gias de toleraˆncia a falhas.
Esse trabalho argumenta que sistemas baseados em componentes exigem: (i) estrate´gias
para tratamento de excec¸o˜es decorrentes da composic¸a˜o de componentes; e (ii) estrate´gias
locais a cada componente para lidar com erros internos ao componente. Dois artigos fo-
ram publicados como resultado dessa pesquisa. O primeiro [87] foi uma versa˜o resumida
apresentada na 30th Euromicro Conference. O t´ıtulo desse artigo e´ “Structuring Excep-
tion Handling for Dependable Component-Based Software Systems”. Neste trabalho eu
participei como co-autor. O segundo artigo [29] foi publicado no perio´dico Journal of the
Brazilian Computer Society, em uma edic¸a˜o especial sobre sistemas confia´veis, e seu t´ıtulo
e´ “A Systematic Approach for Structuring Robust Component-Based Software”. Eu fui
o primeiro autor desse artigo.
8.3.2 Um Arcabouc¸o Baseado em Aspectos para Sistemas Con-
correntes Cooperativos
Implementamos um arcabouc¸o baseado em aspectos para a construc¸a˜o de sistemas to-
lerantes a falhas orientados a objetos que apresentam concorreˆncia e distribuic¸a˜o como
requisitos na˜o-funcionais. A principal caracter´ıstica desse arcabouc¸o e´ a modularizac¸a˜o
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de cada um desses requisitos como um conjunto de aspectos, classes e interfaces. Desse
modo, e´ poss´ıvel adicionar e remover realizac¸o˜es desses requisitos a uma aplicac¸a˜o baseada
no arcabouc¸o de maneira quase completamente transparente. Um artigo [37] descrevendo
sua implementac¸a˜o foi apresentado no VIII Simpo´sio Brasileiro de Linguagens de Pro-
gramac¸a˜o. O t´ıtulo desse artigo e´ “Implementing Coordinated Exception Handling for
Distributed Object-Oriented Systems with AspectJ” e eu sou seu primeiro autor. Esse
artigo tambe´m apareceu em uma edic¸a˜o especial do perio´dico Journal of Universal Com-
puter Science [36].
8.3.3 Evoluc¸a˜o de Sistemas Baseados em Componentes
Participei da elaborac¸a˜o de uma abordagem sistema´tica para a evoluc¸a˜o de componentes
de software. Essa abordagem visa melhorar a substitutabilidade de novas verso˜es de com-
ponentes e facilitar a evoluc¸a˜o dos sistemas nos quais esses componentes esta˜o inseridos.
A soluc¸a˜o proposta consiste de treˆs partes: (i) um modelo de versionamento para compo-
nentes de software; (ii) um conjunto de regras de evoluc¸a˜o que limitam as formas como
componentes podem evoluir; e (iii) um esquema de numerac¸a˜o para verso˜es que leva em
considerac¸a˜o o impacto das mudanc¸as feitas ao longo da evoluc¸a˜o do componente. Um
artigo [119] descrevendo a este trabalho foi apresentado no ECOOP’2005 Workshop on
Architecture-Centric Evolution. O t´ıtulo desse artigo e´ “A Systematic Approach for the
Evolution of Reusable Software Components”. Eu particiei como co-autor desse trabalho.
8.3.4 Um Ambiente para o Desenvolvimento de Sistemas Base-
ados em Componentes
Atualmente, o grupo de pesquisa de Engenharia de Software e Confiabilidade do IC-
UNICAMP, do qual fac¸o parte, esta´ desenvolvendo, como parte de um grande projeto
envolvendo outras instituic¸o˜es, como a UFPB, a empresa CiT e o Centro de Estudos e
Sistemas Avanc¸ados do Recife (CESAR), um ambiente centrado na arquitetura para o de-
senvolvimento de sistemas baseados em componentes. Esse ambiente, batizado Bellatrix,
esta´ sendo implementado como um conjunto de plugins para a plataforma Eclipse [62].
O ambiente visa dar suporte a`s atividades definidas pelo processo UML Components e
consiste de um conjunto de ferramentas, entre as quais: (i) editor de interfaces; (ii) edi-
tor de configurac¸o˜es arquiteturais; (iii) reposito´rio de componentes; (iv) framework para
testes unita´rios de componentes; e (v) gerador de esqueletos de co´digo em conformidade
com a arquitetura. Um trabalho [174] descrevendo o Bellatrix foi apresentado no IV
Workshop Brasileiro em Desenvolvimento Baseado em Componentes. O t´ıtulo desse ar-
tigo e´ “Bellatrix: um Ambiente com suporte Arquitetural ao Desenvolvimento Baseado
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em Componentes” e eu sou co-autor.
8.4 Extenso˜es
Ha´ va´rias direc¸o˜es poss´ıveis para trabalhos futuros no que concerne a`s duas partes desta
tese. Algumas dessas propostas sa˜o listadas a seguir:
Formalizac¸a˜o da execuc¸a˜o de sistemas concorrentes cooperativos. A principal li-
mitac¸a˜o da abordagem proposta nos Cap´ıtulos 3, 4 e 5 e´ que essa abordagem se
baseia em uma visa˜o esta´tica da arquitetura do sistema. Embora os estudos de
caso descritos nos Cap´ıtulos 3 e 5 tenham mostrado que essa visa˜o esta´tica permite
que algumas propriedades u´teis sejam verificadas e que algumas falhas de projeto
sejam identificadas, as propriedades mais interessantes e dif´ıceis de verificar esta˜o
relacionadas a` execuc¸a˜o do sistema. Isso e´ especialmente verdade para sistemas con-
correntes, nos quais o na˜o-determinismo torna uma verificac¸a˜o “manual” invia´vel.
Para que tais propriedades possam ser verificadas, e´ necessa´rio estender a forma-
lizac¸a˜o proposta anteriormente para que inclua uma noc¸a˜o de tempo relativo, de
modo que seja poss´ıvel modelar a ordem de eventos como trocas de mensagens,
o lanc¸amento de uma excec¸a˜o e a execuc¸a˜o de um tratador. Ja´ ha´ alguns traba-
lhos nessa linha na literatura [172, 185], mas eles na˜o teˆm um foco ta˜o forte em
tratamento de excec¸o˜es.
Prova de teoremas na verificac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional. Conforme foi
visto no Cap´ıtulo 3, uma limitac¸a˜o da abordagem proposta e´ escalabilidade. Este
e´ um problema geral de te´cnicas automa´ticas de verificac¸a˜o [44], apesar dos mui-
tos avanc¸os da a´rea nos u´ltimos 20 anos. Consequentemente, uma outra direc¸a˜o
poss´ıvel para pesquisas futuras e´ empregar a te´cnica de prova de teoremas para
verificar se a especificac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional de um sistema satisfaz
certas propriedades de interesse. Embora essa te´cnica exija intervenc¸a˜o manual,
ferramentas modernas [45, 140] conseguem realizar uma grande parte dessas provas
de forma automa´tica. Essa linha de pesquisa poderia, inclusive, ser combinada com
a anterior.
Refatorac¸a˜o automa´tica de tratamento de excec¸o˜es para aspectos. No tocante a`
estruturac¸a˜o de tratamento de excec¸o˜es usando aspectos, um trabalho futuro con-
siste em automatizar duas tarefas: (i) detecc¸a˜o de situac¸o˜es nas quais a modula-
rizac¸a˜o do comportamento excepcional com AOP e´ bene´fica; e (ii) refatorac¸a˜o do
co´digo de tratamento de excec¸o˜es para aspectos nesses casos. Neste trabalho seria
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especialmente interessante elaborar estrate´gias para realizar a extrac¸a˜o de tratado-
res de excec¸o˜es em trechos de co´digo envolvendo uma mistura de diversos cena´rios
e separa´-los de maneira coerente nos aspectos.
Novas construc¸o˜es para linguagens orientadas a aspectos. O estudo descrito no
Cap´ıtulo 6 mostrou que e´ dif´ıcil modularizar com aspectos o co´digo de tratamento
de excec¸o˜es em algumas situac¸o˜es comuns no desenvolvimento de software. Na
maior parte dos casos, isso se deve a duas limitac¸o˜es da linguagem AspectJ: (i) a
linguagem na˜o permite a selec¸a˜o de blocos arbitra´rios como pontos de junc¸a˜o; e (ii)
a linguagem na˜o permite que tratadores ou ac¸o˜es de limpeza refatorados para aspec-
tos fac¸am refereˆncia a varia´veis locais dos me´todos onde originalmente apareciam.
Essas limitac¸o˜es na expressividade de AspectJ apontam na direc¸a˜o de duas linhas
para pesquisas futuras: (1) propostas de novas construc¸o˜es para a linguagem As-
pectJ visando contornar essas limitac¸o˜es; e (2) a avaliac¸a˜o da adequac¸a˜o de outras
linguagens orientadas a aspectos para modularizar tratamento de excec¸o˜es.
Estruturac¸a˜o de detecc¸a˜o de erros usando aspectos. Finalmente, uma linha futura
de pesquisa bastante interessante consiste em avaliar a adequac¸a˜o de AOP para mo-
dularizar o co´digo responsa´vel por detectar erros. Na literatura de Toleraˆncia a
Falhas [5], ha´ um consenso de que o co´digo de detecc¸a˜o de erros e´ dependente de-
mais do co´digo que implementa o comportamento normal. Logo, na˜o vale a pena
tentar separar essas duas partes pois a chance de se introduzir falhas de projeto no
processo e´ grande demais. Embora AOP ja´ tenha sido usada para modularizar a
implementac¸a˜o de contratos [117] (pre´- e po´s-condic¸o˜es), na˜o esta´ claro se esse pa-
radigma e´ apropriado para separar co´digo de detecc¸a˜o de erro em outras situac¸o˜es
comuns, quando esse co´digo esta´ misturado ao co´digo responsa´vel por outros inte-
resses.
Apeˆndice A
Generic CA Actions Model in Alloy
module CoordinatedExceptionHandling
abstract sig RootException {}
abstract sig Keys {}
abstract sig Role {
Signals : set RootException,
Raises : set RootException,
GeneratesSignaling : set RootException,
GeneratesRaising : set RootException,
Resolved : set RootException,
// Encountered exceptions are assumed to be raised and never
// signaled. On the one hand, this simplifies the semantics
// of the model for cases where one wants to specify that an
// encountered exception is directly signaled (without being
// raised or resolved or propagated or anything). Moreover,
// allowing encountered exceptions to be signaled requires
// recursive definitions for Raises and Signals in order to
// avoid ambiguity. On the other hand, designers have to be
// slightly more explicit when specifying CA actions and roles
// (because the encountered exception has to be raised, resolved
// and, only then, signaled).
Encounters : set RootException,
// Two views on action-oriented exception handling: (i) only
// actions are contexts; and (ii) both actions and roles may be
// contexts. We support the second, but its easy to support the
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// first as well. No modifications to the model are required.
Handles : set RootException,
ComponentActions : set Action,
Propagates : RootException->RootException,
Aborts : set RootException
}
abstract sig Action {
Internal : set RootException,
// Alloy can not express a relation of the type
// (set RootException)->RootException. The problem with this is
// that we have to use RootException->RootException relations,
// which are not adequate. For example, let E1, E2, and E3 be
// exceptions. If E1 is raised in isolation and resolved to E1
// and (E1 + E2) raised concurrently are resolved to E3, this
// can not be expressed.
ToResolve : RootException->Keys,
ResolvedTo : Keys->RootException,
// Sets of exceptions that do not need to be resolved because
// the developer knows that the exceptions in each set will never
// be raised concurrently.
Excluding : RootException->Keys,
External : set RootException,
Roles : set Role,
NestedActions : set Action,
// The exceptions to be signaled when the action aborts or fails,
// respectively.
AbortException : lone RootException,
FailException : lone RootException
}
abstract sig Participant {
// The roles the participant plays.
RolesPlayed : set Role
}
pred action_consistent(A : Action) {
A.Internal = A.Roles.Raises + A.NestedActions.External
A.External = A.Roles.Signals + A.AbortException + A.FailException
(A.ResolvedTo) :> (A.Roles.Resolved) = A.ResolvedTo
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(let RES = (A.Internal).((A.ToResolve).(A.ResolvedTo)) |
(let Aborted = {E:RES | all R:A.Roles | E in R.Aborts } |
(#Aborted > 0 => (some A.AbortException))
&& (#Aborted = 0 => no A.AbortException)
)
&&
// If the action signals at least two different exceptions and
// the action does not abort nor handle all of its resolved
// exceptions, then it may fail. A.Roles.Signal is used,
// instead of A.External, in order to cover the case where
// A.FailException is in A.External, because we do not want to
// take into account A.FailException, unless it is one of the
// exceptions signaled by the roles (independently of being
// A.FailException).
(#(RES - { E: RES | all R:A.Roles |
E in R.Handles || E in R.Aborts}) > 0 =>
( (#(A.Roles.Signals + A.FailException) > 1 =>
some A.FailException)
&&
(#A.Roles.Signals =< 1 => no A.FailException)
)
)
)
(all K_E:Keys | #(A.Excluding).K_E > 0 => (no K_TR:Keys |
(A.ToResolve).K_TR = (A.Excluding).K_E))
// Exception raising is consistent.
all_keys_conc_raising_consistent(A, A.ToResolve)
// Groups of exceptions that can be raised concurrently but
// should not be taken into account by resolution are also
// consistent.
all_keys_conc_raising_consistent(A, A.Excluding)
participants_consistent(A)
// Requires high-order quantification.
/* (all ES : some (A.Internal) |
concurrent_raising_consistent(A, ES) => !(all K : Keys |
(A.ToResolve).K != ES && (A.Excluding).K != ES)
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)
*/
}
pred participants_consistent(A:Action) {
// Consistency of nested actions. All the roles in a nested
// action are played by participants who also play some role
// in the enclosing action.
(all NA : A.NestedActions | all NAR : NA.Roles |
!(all P : Participant |
!(NAR in P.RolesPlayed && some (P.RolesPlayed & A.Roles))))
// All roles of action A are associated to some participant
(Participant.RolesPlayed & A.Roles) = A.Roles
// No Participant can play two roles in the same action.
(no P : Participant | #(P.RolesPlayed & A.Roles) > 1)
}
pred all_keys_conc_raising_consistent(A:Action,
ExcMap:RootException->Keys){
(all K:Keys | let ES = ExcMap.K |
concurrent_raising_consistent(A, ES))
}
// Auxiliary predicate. Checks whether, for a set of exceptions
// ES in the domain of A.ToResolve, each exception E in ES was
// (could have been) raised by a different participant.
pred concurrent_raising_consistent(A:Action, ES:set RootException) {
#ES =< #{R:A.Roles | #(R.Raises & ES) > 0}
+ #{NAA:A.NestedActions | #(NAA.External & ES) > 0} }
pred actions_consistent() {
all A:Action | action_consistent(A)
}
assert ActionsConsistent {
actions_consistent()
}
pred role_consistent(R:Role, A:Action) {
R.Encounters = R.ComponentActions.External
R.Resolved = Keys.(A.ResolvedTo)
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no (R.Handles & R.Aborts)
R.Aborts in R.Resolved
thrown_exceptions_set_consistent(R, R.Signals,
R.GeneratesSignaling, R.Resolved)
// role_is_context(R)
role_is_not_context(R)
}
// Consistency checks for EHS where roles ARE exception
// handling contexts.
pred role_is_context(R:Role) {
// Computes the Raises set of a role for EHS where both roles
// and actions are EH contexts.
thrown_exceptions_set_consistent(R, R.Raises, R.GeneratesRaising,
R.Encounters)
(R.Encounters + R.Resolved - R.Handles) <:
(R.Propagates) = R.Propagates
(R.Propagates) :> (R.Signals + R.Raises) = R.Propagates
R.Handles in (R.Resolved + R.Encounters)
}
// Consistency checks for EHS where roles ARE NOT exception
// handling contexts.
pred role_is_not_context(R:Role) {
// Computes the Raises set of a role for EHS where only actions
// are EH contexts (therefore, encountered exceptions can not be
// handled or explicitly propagated).
R.Raises = R.Encounters + R.GeneratesRaising
(R.Resolved - R.Handles) <: (R.Propagates) = R.Propagates
(R.Propagates) :> (R.Signals) = R.Propagates
R.Handles in R.Resolved
}
// This predicate checks whether a set of thrown exceptions is
// consistent. "Thrown" means either signaled or raised.
// "Generated" is the set of exceptions that are generated by
// role "R". "Received" means either "Encountered" or "Resolved",
// depending on the meaning of "Thrown".
pred thrown_exceptions_set_consistent(R:Role,
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Thrown:set RootException, Generated:set RootException,
Received:set RootException) {
(let RealRes = (Received - R.Handles) | Thrown = Generated
+((RealRes - {E:RealRes|some E.(R.Propagates)})
+ RealRes.(R.Propagates)))
}
pred roles_consistent() {
all A:Action | all R:A.Roles | role_consistent(R, A)
}
assert RolesConsistent {
roles_consistent()
}
// Desired property -> No top-level (non-nested, non-component)
// CA action has external exceptions. This is not a fundamental
// property of CA actions, but a desirable property that indicates
// a safe use of CA actions.
pred top_level_actions_safe() {
all A1:Action | ((no A2:Action | A1 in A2.NestedActions)
&& (no R:Role | A1 in R.ComponentActions)) => (no A1.External)
}
assert TopLevelActionsSafe {
top_level_actions_safe()
}
// Desired property -> No internal exception of a CA action is
// visible to the outside world. "Internal", in this case,
// includes the action’s Internal set and the Resolved sets of
// its roles. All internal exceptions are either handled (and
// normal activity is resumed) or propagated to something else.
// It must be stressed that this predicate does not impose any
// restrictions on an the external exceptions of an action.
pred internal_exceptions_not_visible_outside() {
all A:Action | no (A.External & A.Internal) &&
no (A.External & A.Roles.Resolved)
}
assert InternalExceptionsNotVisibleOutside {
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internal_exceptions_not_visible_outside()
}
// Basic-property -> No action nesting/composition cycles. This
// property must take into account situations where action and
// composition are combined. It is not enough to just verify if the
// action A is in the (non-reflexive) transitive closure of
// A.NestedActions and A.Roles.ComponentActions (a top-down
// approach). The check must be performed bottom-up.
pred no_action_nesting_cycles() {
no A:Action| A in A.^(~(Roles.ComponentActions + NestedActions))
}
assert NoActionNestingCycles {
no_action_nesting_cycles()
}
pred basic_properties() {
all A:Action | action_consistent(A) && all R:A.Roles |
role_consistent(R, A)
}
assert BasicProperties {
basic_properties()
}
Apeˆndice B
Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump
Therapy in Alloy
module FTIPT
open CoordinatedExceptionHandling
// ACTIONS
one sig CAACycle, CAAChecking, CAAExecuting extends Action {}
one sig CAASensors extends Action {}
one sig CAAActuators extends Action {}
one sig CAARAIP, CAALAIP extends Action {}
// ROLES
one sig ParamsCAACycle, ParamsCAAChecking, ParamsCAAExecuting
extends Role {}
one sig ControllerCAACycle, ControllerCAAChecking,
ControllerCAAExecuting extends Role {}
one sig Calculus extends Role {}
one sig S_CT, BGC, HR extends Role {}
one sig A_CT, A_RAIP, A_LAIP extends Role {}
one sig RAIP, SensorRAIP extends Role {}
one sig LAIP, SensorLAIP extends Role {}
one sig K1, K2, K3 extends Keys {}
one sig Params_Part, Controller_Part, Calculus_Part
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extends Participant {}
one sig S_CT_Part, BGC_Part, HR_Part extends Participant {}
one sig A_CT_Part, A_RAIP_Part, A_LAIP_PArt extends Participant {}
one sig RAIP_Part, SensorRAIP_Part extends Participant {}
one sig LAIP_Part, SensorLAIP_Part extends Participant {}
// EXCEPTIONS
one sig E1, E2, E3, AlarmEXC extends RootException {}
one sig E4, E5, E6, E7 extends RootException {}
fact SystemStructure {
CAACycle.Roles = ParamsCAACycle + ControllerCAACycle + Calculus
CAAChecking.Roles = ParamsCAAChecking + ControllerCAAChecking
CAAExecuting.Roles = ParamsCAAExecuting + ControllerCAAExecuting
CAASensors.Roles = S_CT + BGC + HR
CAACycle.NestedActions = CAAChecking + CAAExecuting
no CAAChecking.NestedActions
no CAAExecuting.NestedActions
no CAASensors.NestedActions
Params_Part.RolesPlayed = ParamsCAAExecuting + ParamsCAAChecking
+ ParamsCAACycle
Controller_Part.RolesPlayed = ControllerCAACycle
+ ControllerCAAChecking + ControllerCAAExecuting
Calculus_Part.RolesPlayed = Calculus
S_CT_Part.RolesPlayed = S_CT
BGC_Part.RolesPlayed = BGC
HR_Part.RolesPlayed = HR
A_CT_Part.RolesPlayed = A_CT
A_RAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = A_RAIP
A_LAIP_PArt.RolesPlayed = A_LAIP
RAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = RAIP
SensorRAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = SensorRAIP
LAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = LAIP
SensorLAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = SensorLAIP
CAAActuators.Roles = A_CT + A_RAIP + A_LAIP
CAARAIP.Roles = RAIP + SensorRAIP
CAALAIP.Roles = LAIP + SensorLAIP
no CAAActuators.NestedActions
no CAARAIP.NestedActions
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no CAALAIP.NestedActions
ControllerCAAChecking.ComponentActions = CAASensors
ControllerCAAExecuting.ComponentActions = CAAActuators
no ControllerCAACycle.ComponentActions
no ParamsCAACycle.ComponentActions
no ParamsCAAExecuting.ComponentActions
no ParamsCAAChecking.ComponentActions
no Calculus.ComponentActions
no S_CT.ComponentActions
no BGC.ComponentActions
no HR.ComponentActions
no A_CT.ComponentActions
A_RAIP.ComponentActions = CAARAIP
A_LAIP.ComponentActions = CAALAIP
no RAIP.ComponentActions
no LAIP.ComponentActions
no SensorLAIP.ComponentActions
no SensorRAIP.ComponentActions
}
fact ExceptionFlow {
no CAACycle.External
CAACycle.Internal = E3 + AlarmEXC
CAACycle.ToResolve = E3->K1 + AlarmEXC->K2 + (AlarmEXC + E3)->K3
CAACycle.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC + K3->AlarmEXC
no CAACycle.AbortException
no CAACycle.FailException
no CAACycle.Excluding
CAAChecking.External = AlarmEXC
CAAChecking.Internal = AlarmEXC
CAAChecking.ToResolve = AlarmEXC->K1
CAAChecking.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC
no CAAChecking.AbortException
no CAAChecking.FailException
no CAAChecking.Excluding
CAAExecuting.External = AlarmEXC
CAAExecuting.Internal = AlarmEXC
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CAAExecuting.ToResolve = AlarmEXC->K1
CAAExecuting.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC
no CAAExecuting.AbortException
no CAAExecuting.FailException
no CAAExecuting.Excluding
CAASensors.External = AlarmEXC
CAASensors.Internal = E1 + E2
CAASensors.ToResolve = E1->K1 + E2->K2 + (E1 + E2)->K3
CAASensors.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC + K3->AlarmEXC
no CAASensors.AbortException
no CAASensors.FailException
no CAASensors.Excluding
CAAActuators.External = AlarmEXC
CAAActuators.Internal = AlarmEXC
CAAActuators.ToResolve = AlarmEXC->K1
CAAActuators.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC
no CAAActuators.AbortException
no CAAActuators.FailException
no CAAActuators.Excluding
CAARAIP.External = AlarmEXC
CAARAIP.Internal = E4 + E5
CAARAIP.ToResolve = E4->K1 + E5->K2
CAARAIP.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC
no CAARAIP.AbortException
no CAARAIP.FailException
no CAARAIP.Excluding
CAALAIP.External = AlarmEXC
CAALAIP.Internal = E6 + E7
CAALAIP.ToResolve = E6->K1 + E7->K2
CAALAIP.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC
no CAALAIP.AbortException
no CAALAIP.FailException
no CAALAIP.Excluding
no Calculus.Signals
Calculus.Raises = E3
Calculus.GeneratesRaising = E3
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no Calculus.GeneratesSignaling
Calculus.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no Calculus.Encounters
Calculus.Handles = AlarmEXC
no Calculus.Propagates
no Calculus.Aborts
no ControllerCAACycle.Signals
no ControllerCAACycle.Raises
no ControllerCAACycle.GeneratesRaising
no ControllerCAACycle.GeneratesSignaling
ControllerCAACycle.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAACycle.Encounters
ControllerCAACycle.Handles = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAACycle.Propagates
no ControllerCAACycle.Aborts
no ParamsCAACycle.Signals
no ParamsCAACycle.Raises
no ParamsCAACycle.GeneratesRaising
no ParamsCAACycle.GeneratesSignaling
ParamsCAACycle.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAACycle.Encounters
ParamsCAACycle.Handles = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAACycle.Propagates
no ParamsCAACycle.Aborts
ControllerCAAChecking.Signals = AlarmEXC
ControllerCAAChecking.Raises = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAAChecking.GeneratesRaising
no ControllerCAAChecking.GeneratesSignaling
ControllerCAAChecking.Resolved = AlarmEXC
ControllerCAAChecking.Encounters = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAAChecking.Handles
no ControllerCAAChecking.Propagates
no ControllerCAAChecking.Aborts
ParamsCAAChecking.Signals = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAAChecking.Raises
no ParamsCAAChecking.GeneratesRaising
no ParamsCAAChecking.GeneratesSignaling
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ParamsCAAChecking.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAAChecking.Encounters
no ParamsCAAChecking.Handles
no ParamsCAAChecking.Propagates
no ParamsCAAChecking.Aborts
ControllerCAAExecuting.Signals = AlarmEXC
ControllerCAAExecuting.Raises = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAAExecuting.GeneratesRaising
no ControllerCAAExecuting.GeneratesSignaling
ControllerCAAExecuting.Resolved = AlarmEXC
ControllerCAAExecuting.Encounters = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAAExecuting.Handles
no ControllerCAAExecuting.Propagates
no ControllerCAAExecuting.Aborts
ParamsCAAExecuting.Signals = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Raises
no ParamsCAAExecuting.GeneratesRaising
no ParamsCAAExecuting.GeneratesSignaling
ParamsCAAExecuting.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Encounters
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Handles
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Propagates
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Aborts
S_CT.Signals = AlarmEXC
no S_CT.Raises
no S_CT.GeneratesRaising
no S_CT.GeneratesSignaling
S_CT.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no S_CT.Encounters
no S_CT.Handles
no S_CT.Propagates
no S_CT.Aborts
BGC.Signals = AlarmEXC
BGC.Raises = E1
BGC.GeneratesRaising = E1
no BGC.GeneratesSignaling
BGC.Resolved = AlarmEXC
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no BGC.Encounters
no BGC.Handles
no BGC.Propagates
no BGC.Aborts
HR.Signals = AlarmEXC
HR.Raises = E2
HR.GeneratesRaising = E2
no HR.GeneratesSignaling
HR.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no HR.Encounters
no HR.Handles
no HR.Propagates
no HR.Aborts
A_CT.Signals = AlarmEXC
no A_CT.Raises
no A_CT.GeneratesRaising
no A_CT.GeneratesSignaling
A_CT.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no A_CT.Encounters
no A_CT.Handles
no A_CT.Propagates
no A_CT.Aborts
A_RAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
A_RAIP.Raises = AlarmEXC
no A_RAIP.GeneratesRaising
no A_RAIP.GeneratesSignaling
A_RAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
A_RAIP.Encounters = AlarmEXC
no A_RAIP.Handles
no A_RAIP.Propagates
no A_RAIP.Aborts
A_LAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
A_LAIP.Raises = AlarmEXC
no A_LAIP.GeneratesRaising
no A_LAIP.GeneratesSignaling
A_LAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
A_LAIP.Encounters = AlarmEXC
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no A_LAIP.Handles
no A_LAIP.Propagates
no A_LAIP.Aborts
RAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
no RAIP.Raises
no RAIP.GeneratesRaising
no RAIP.GeneratesSignaling
RAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no RAIP.Encounters
no RAIP.Handles
no RAIP.Propagates
no RAIP.Aborts
SensorRAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
SensorRAIP.Raises = E4 + E5
SensorRAIP.GeneratesRaising = E4 + E5
no SensorRAIP.GeneratesSignaling
SensorRAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no SensorRAIP.Encounters
no SensorRAIP.Handles
no SensorRAIP.Propagates
no SensorRAIP.Aborts
LAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
no LAIP.Raises
no LAIP.GeneratesRaising
no LAIP.GeneratesSignaling
LAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no LAIP.Encounters
no LAIP.Handles
no LAIP.Propagates
no LAIP.Aborts
SensorLAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
SensorLAIP.Raises = E6 + E7
SensorLAIP.GeneratesRaising = E6 + E7
no SensorLAIP.GeneratesSignaling
SensorLAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no SensorLAIP.Encounters
no SensorLAIP.Handles
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no SensorLAIP.Propagates
no SensorLAIP.Aborts
}
// Application-specific property. For all the actions except for
// the top-level CA action CAACycle, if AlarmEXC is an internall
// exception, it is also one external exception.
pred app_specific_properties() {
all A: (Action - CAACycle) |
AlarmEXC in A.Internal => AlarmEXC in A.External
}
assert AppSpecificProperties {
app_specific_properties()
}
Apeˆndice C
Partial Specifications of Generic CA
Actions Model and Fault-Tolerant
Insulin Pump Therapy in B
MACHINE CoordinatedExceptionHandling
/*
Static B machine for Coordinated Exception Handling.
*/
SETS ACTION = {CAACycle, CAAChecking};
PARTICIPANT = {P1, P2, P3};
ROLE = {Calculus, Controller, Params,
ControllerChecking, ParamsChecking};
ROOT_EXCEPTION = {E3, E4}; OK = {yes, no}
/* Variables of Action */
VARIABLES Internal, External, Roles, NestedActions,
AbortException, FailException, Resolution,
Excluding,
/* Variables of Role */
Signals, Raises, Generates, Resolved, Encounters,
Handles, ComponentActions, Propagates, Aborts,
/* Variables of Participant */
RolesPlayed,
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/* Results of operations */
ActionsConsistent, ParticipantsConsistent,
RolesConsistent
INVARIANT Roles : ACTION <-> ROLE
& Internal : ACTION <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& External : ACTION <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& NestedActions : ACTION <-> ACTION
& AbortException : ACTION +-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& FailException : ACTION +-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Resolution : ACTION <-> (POW(ROOT_EXCEPTION)
+-> ROOT_EXCEPTION)
& Excluding : ACTION <-> POW(ROOT_EXCEPTION)
& card(AbortException) <= 1 & card(FailException) <= 1
& Signals : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Raises : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Generates : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Resolved : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Encounters : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Handles : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Aborts : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& ComponentActions : ROLE <-> ACTION
& Propagates : ROLE <->
(ROOT_EXCEPTION +-> ROOT_EXCEPTION)
& RolesPlayed : PARTICIPANT <-> ROLE
& ActionsConsistent : OK
& ActionsConsistent = yes
& ParticipantsConsistent : OK
& ParticipantsConsistent = yes
& RolesConsistent : OK
& RolesConsistent = yes
INITIALISATION Roles := { CAACycle |-> Calculus,
CAACycle |-> Controller, CAACycle |-> Params,
CAAChecking |-> ControllerChecking,
CAAChecking |-> ParamsChecking}
|| External := {} || Internal := { CAACycle |-> E3}
|| NestedActions := { CAACycle |-> CAAChecking}
|| AbortException := {}
|| FailException := {}
|| Resolution := {CAACycle |-> {{E3} |-> E3}}
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|| Signals := {} || Excluding := {}
|| Raises := {Calculus |-> E3}
|| Generates := {Calculus |-> E3}
|| Resolved := {Calculus |-> E3, Controller |-> E3,
Params |-> E3}
|| Encounters := {} || Handles := {Calculus |-> E3,
Controller |-> E3, Params |-> E3}
|| Aborts := {} || ComponentActions := {}
|| Propagates := {}
|| RolesPlayed := {P1 |-> Controller, P2 |-> Calculus,
P3 |-> Params, P1 |-> ControllerChecking,
P2 |-> ParamsChecking}
|| ActionsConsistent := yes
|| ParticipantsConsistent := yes
|| RolesConsistent := yes
OPERATIONS
actionConsistent =
IF !Act.( (Act : ACTION) =>
(ran({Act} <| Internal) = ran(ran({Act} <| Roles) <| Raises)
\/ ran(ran({Act} <| NestedActions) <| External))
& (ran({Act} <| External) = ran(ran({Act} <| Roles)
<| Signals))
& (ran(union(Resolution[{Act}])) <: Resolved[Roles[{Act}]])
& (card({E | E:ROOT_EXCEPTION & E:ran(union(Resolution[{Act}]))
& (!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}])=> E:Aborts[{R}]))}) > 0 =>
(#AE.(AE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & AE = AbortException(Act)))
)
& (card({E | E:ROOT_EXCEPTION & E:ran(union(Resolution[{Act}]))
& (!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}])=> E:Aborts[{R}]))}) = 0 =>
not(#AE.(AE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & AE = AbortException(Act)))
)
& (#E.(E:ROOT_EXCEPTION & E:ran(union(Resolution[{Act}]))
& !R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}]) => not(E:Handles[{R}]
or E:Aborts[{R}]))
) =>
( (card(Signals[Roles[{Act}]] \/
ran({Act} <| FailException)) > 1 =>
(#FE.(FE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & FE = FailException(Act))))
&
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(card(Signals[Roles[{Act}]]
\/ ran({Act} <| FailException)) <= 1 =>
not(#FE.(FE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & FE = FailException(Act))))
)
)
& ((dom(union(Resolution[{Act}])) /\ Excluding[{Act}]) = {})
& (!ES.((ES:POW(ROOT_EXCEPTION) &
(ES:(dom(union(Resolution[{Act}])) \/ Excluding[{Act}]))) =>
card(ES) <=
( card({R|R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}]
& card(Raises[{R}] /\ ES) > 0})
+ card({NA|NA:ACTION & NA:NestedActions[{Act}]
& card(External[{NA}] /\ ES) > 0})
)
)
)
)
THEN ActionsConsistent := yes
ELSE ActionsConsistent := no
END;
roleConsistent =
IF !Act.((Act:ACTION) =>
!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}]) =>
(Encounters[{R}] = External[ComponentActions[{R}]])
& (Resolved[{R}] = ran(union(Resolution[{Act}])))
& ((Handles[{R}] /\ Aborts[{R}]) = {})
& (Aborts[{R}] <: Resolved[{R}])
& (Signals[{R}] = Resolved[{R}] - Handles[{R}]
- ((Resolved[{R}] - Handles[{R}])
/\ dom(union(Propagates[{R}])))
\/ (union(Propagates[{R}]))[(Resolved[{R}]
- Handles[{R}])]
)
& (Raises[{R}] = Encounters[{R}] \/ Generates[{R}])
& (dom(union(Propagates[{R}])) <: Resolved[{R}]
- Handles[{R}])
& (ran(union(Propagates[{R}])) <: Signals[{R}])
& (Handles[{R}] <: Resolved[{R}])
)
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)
THEN RolesConsistent := yes
ELSE RolesConsistent := no
END;
participantsConsistent =
IF !Act.((Act:ACTION) =>
(!NA.((NA:ACTION & NA:NestedActions[{Act}]) =>
(!P.((P:PARTICIPANT) => card(RolesPlayed[{P}]
/\ Roles[{Act}]) <= 1))
& (Roles[{Act}] <: RolesPlayed[PARTICIPANT])
& (!NAR.((NAR:ROLE & NAR:Roles[{NA}]) =>
#P.(P:PARTICIPANT & NAR:RolesPlayed[{P}]
& card(RolesPlayed[{P}] /\ Roles[{Act}]) > 0)
)
)
))
)
THEN ParticipantsConsistent := yes
ELSE ParticipantsConsistent := no
END
END;
END
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